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Résume 
La construction de réseaux sécurisés est à la fois une étape cruciale et complexe pour toute 
organisation. Traditionnellement, cette tâche couvre les aspects architecturaux en proposant une 
segmentation du réseau où des règles de sécurité différentes sont appliquées à chaque zone ; elle couvre 
également la sécurisation des équipements d’extrémité exploités par des utilisateurs et apporte ainsi des 
garanties sécuritaires pour les informations transférées sur les liaisons de communication. Le plus 
souvent, les aspects sécurité réseau sont pris en compte après la conception du réseau et donc 
tardivement. Ceci se traduit inéluctablement par une augmentation de la complexité et des coûts pour 
prendre en compte les modifications nécessaires qui doivent alors être apportées. 
À cet égard, les exigences de sécurité revêtent une importance primordiale, car elles guident les 
décisions relatives à la mise en œuvre des contrôles de sécurité réseau (ex. Firewalls et proxies sécurité, 
VPN) répondant aux besoins de l’entreprise. En effet, de mauvaises exigences en matière de sécurité 
réseau peuvent conduire à une sécurité inefficace voire à des failles de sécurité dans la conception de la 
sécurité du réseau. Cependant, les méthodologies d’ingénierie des exigences de sécurité actuelles ne 
permettent pas de déduire les exigences de sécurité réseau. 
Ce travail de thèse fait partie du projet de recherche DGA IREDHO2 (Intégration REseau Haut Débit 
Embarqué Optique 2ème phase) qui concerne en particulier les réseaux avioniques du futur. Ce travail est 
le résultat d’une collaboration menée avec la société AIRBUS GROUP. Il a pour objectif de proposer 
une méthodologie d’ingénierie des exigences de sécurité pour capturer, exprimer et analyser les 
exigences de sécurité réseau, afin de pouvoir les dériver et gérer l’application de configurations réseau 
dans une approche « Top Down ». La complexité adressée vient à la fois des différences de point de 
vue : i) en regard de la compréhension de la problématique de la sécurité par les différentes parties 
prenantes, ii) de la nature des systèmes impactés et iii) de la variabilité des niveaux d’abstraction retenus 
dans le cycle de développement réseau. 
Dans ce travail, nous avons défini une méthode qui s’appuie sur les niveaux d’abstraction proposés 
par la méthode SABSA (Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture) afin de décomposer les 
exigences de sécurité métier en exigences de sécurité techniques. En effet, SABSA préconise l’étude de 
vues Métier (décisionnaire), Architecte (objectifs, risques, processus, applications, interactions), 
Concepteur (services de sécurité), Constructeur de réseau (mécanismes de sécurité) et Composants 
(produits, outils, technologies, etc.).  
Les vues Métier et Architecte sont exprimées dans le formalisme STS (Social Technical Systems). 
Nous proposons aussi de représenter les attaques comme un système multi-agent pour l’analyse de 
risques des niveaux Métier et Architecte. Pour l’expression des exigences de la vue Concepteur, nous 
reprenons les approches de définition de zones dont nous renforçons les principes de   
construction/protection en s’appuyant sur les modèles formels d’intégrité.  Nous proposons une 
méthodologie qui automatise la proposition de zones de sécurité ainsi que la dérivation des exigences 
de sécurité réseau à l’aide d’un ensemble fini de règles formalisées. Nous avons développé  un outil qui 
implémente ces règles en ASP (Anwser Set Programming) et facilite le calcul des modèles de zone de 
sécurité à coût optimal. 
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Enfin pour assurer la traçabilité entre les différentes vues Métier, Architecte et Concepteur, nous 
définissons une nouvelle notation de modélisation à partir des concepts proposés dans KAOS (Keep All 
Objectives Satisfied) et STS. Nous illustrons notre méthodologie à l’aide d’un scénario propre au projet 
IRHEDO2.  Finalement, nous évaluons notre méthodologie en considérant deux scénarios 
supplémentaires : 1) une étude de cas de réseau d’entreprise dans le domaine du commerce électronique ; 
2) un deuxième scénario issu du projet IRHEDO2. 
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Abstract 
Building secure networks is crucial as well as challenging for any organization. Network security 
majorly concerns the security architectural needs that describe network segmentation (i.e., security 
zoning); security of network devices connecting the communicating end user systems; and security of 
the information being transferred across the communication links. Most often, a late consideration of 
security aspects (i.e., post-deployment of network design) inevitably results in an increase in costs as 
well as in the complexity to take into account the necessary changes that have be made to the existing 
infrastructures. 
In this regard, network security requirements hold a paramount importance since they drive the 
decisions related to the implementation of security controls about business needs. Indeed, bad network 
security requirements can lead to ineffective and costly security or worth security holes in the network 
security design. Nevertheless, current security requirement engineering methodologies render no 
support to derive network security requirements. 
This thesis work is a part of the research project DGA IREHDO2 (Intégration REseau Haut Débit 
embarqué Optique 2ème phase) that concerns aircrafts future generation networks. Our work is done 
mainly in collaboration with AIRBUS and is related to the security requirements engineering process 
for aircraft networks. Our objective in this project is to propose an SRE methodology for capturing and 
analysing network security requirements, and that facilitates the refinement into network security and 
monitoring configurations (TOP/DOWN approach). The complexity addressed comes at a time from the 
differences in point of view: i) with regard to the understanding of the issue of security by different 
stakeholders, ii) the nature of the systems impacted and the variability of the levels of abstraction in the 
network development cycle. 
In this work, we defined SRE methodology based on the abstraction levels proposed by SABSA 
(Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture) method in order to structure the refinement activity 
of business needs into network security requirements. Indeed, SABSA recommends the expression of 
the needs considering the Business view (decision makers), Architect’s view (objectives, risks, 
processes, applications and interactions), Designer’s view (security services), Builder’s view (security 
mechanisms) and Tradesman’s view (products, tools, technologies). We considered the first three views. 
We express the business and architect’s views using STS (Social-Technical Systems) formalism. We 
also propose to represent attacks as multi-agent systems to facilitate the analysis of security risks at these 
first two views. For expressing the network security requirements captured at Designer’s view, we 
propose a methodology that automates parts of the process of security zoning and network security 
requirements elicitation using a definite set of formalized rules derived from security design principles 
and formal integrity models. We developed a tool that implements these rules in ASP (Answer set 
programming), which facilitates calculating cost-optimal security zone models.  
In the end, to ensure traceability between the three views, we defined a new modelling notation based 
on the concepts proposed in KAOS (Keep All Objectives Satisfied) and STS. We illustrate our 
methodology using a scenario specific to the IRHEDO2 project. Finally, we evaluate our methodology 
using: 1) an e-commerce enterprise case study; 2) a new scenario specific to the IRHEDO2 project. 
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THESIS INTRODUCTION 
Research Background and Motivation  
Over the past years, the growing dependency of the business-critical applications and processes on 
network technologies and services has expanded the threat landscape to a large extent. Today networks 
constitute the main vector for attacks against originations[SANS 2017]. Thus, considering network 
security is extremely crucial for ensuring business continuity against the odds of growing threats.  
Network security majorly concerns security architectural needs that describe network segmentation 
(i.e., security zoning); security of network devices connecting the communicating end user systems; and 
security of the information being transferred across the communication links[ISO/IEC 27033 2009]. The 
ultimate aim boils down to one common objective, which is to prevent illegitimate access to the data 
assets that carry vital information and influence the decisions relating business critical operations [SANS 
2015a]. An appropriate design of the architecture provides many advantages (e.g., isolation of low trust 
systems, limitation of a security breach’s scope, costs savings)[Mariusz Stawowski 2009]. 
Currently, there exists numerous network security controls (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection and 
prevention systems), for implementing network security. Each time a security control (e.g., firewall or 
a proxy) is added or removed to the network, it will have impact on the application running on the 
network, on the quality of service of the network, and also incur costs related to its purchase and 
installation [Sherwood 2005]. For example, DMZ (de-militarized zone) security constraints the network 
architecture. It provides a perimeter defence by isolating the internal network from public network 
through set of firewalls and application proxies. In this regard, considering network security too late in 
the network development cycle (i.e., post deployment of network designs) would render additional costs 
and complexity in terms of incorporating any changes to the existing infrastructures. Studies show that 
the difference in the return of security investments while considered at early and late stages of the system 
development cycle, ranges from 12 to 21 percent [Hoo et al. 2001]. Therefore it is necessary to consider 
network security at earlier stages i.e. right from the planning stages of architecting networks. This 
perspective relates to the “Security by design” principle, which enforces the consideration of security 
right from the requirements analysis phase. 
In this regard, network security requirements play a vital role since they impact the decisions related 
to the implementation of security controls with regards to business needs [ISO/IEC 27033 2009]. Indeed, 
bad network security requirements can lead to ineffective and costly security or worth security holes in 
the network security design. For this, an effective network security requirement engineering is needed 
to help organizations to capture cost-effective security solutions that protect networks against malicious   
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attacks while meeting the business requirements. Requirements Engineering (RE), in general, is a sub-
discipline of system/software engineering, which subsumes the activities of gathering (a.k.a. eliciting), 
evaluating and documenting system/software requirements. Security requirements engineering (SRE) 
methods extend RE to the security context, by enabling the integration of risk analysis concepts. They 
help organizations to capture the security requirements by analysing the business risk impact of potential 
threats. However, majority of existing SRE methods are confined to elicit software/system security 
requirements [Uzunov et al. 2012], which lack support to extend to the network security context 
[Rehman and Gruhn 2018]. For instance, they do not help specifying security zones (e.g., DMZ) relative 
to a business security risk impact, which is a preliminary step for security architects in capturing other 
network security requirements (e.g., related to data flows) [SANS 2015a; Government of Canada, 
Communications Security Establishment 2007]. In this thesis work, we propose an SRE method 
dedicated to network security requirements engineering at early stages, which aims towards “security 
by design” from the network security perspective. 
Thesis Research Project IREHDO2 
This thesis work is a part of the research project DGA IREHDO2 (Intégration REseau Haut Débit 
embarqué Optique 2ème phase) that concerns aircrafts future generation networks. In this project, our 
work is done mainly in collaboration with AIRBUS and is related to the security requirements 
engineering process for aircraft networks (Figure 1). Our objective in this project is to propose an SRE 
methodology for capturing and analysing network security requirements, and that facilitates the 
refinement into network security and monitoring configurations (TOP/DOWN approach). In addition, it 
should be possible to determine which high-level network security requirement is impacted when any 
inconsistency or anomaly is found in network security and monitoring configurations (BOTTOM/UP 
approach). It is to note that this thesis work deals with to network security requirements. The further 
refinement of the network security requirements into low-level network security device configurations 
is out of scope of this thesis work and is a collaborated work done in parallel. 
 
Figure 1: Our goal in IREHDO2 project 
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The SRE process relates to capturing, expressing and analysing network security requirements (i.e., 
high-level) pertaining to the business strategic as well as risk control objectives. This process is complex 
while compared to the capture and analysis of software/system requirements because networks 
principally act as an intermediary that interconnects all the software/systems within an enterprise. First, 
capturing network security requirements needs to consider the security problem context of all the 
stakeholders including the business analysts, and the security analysts of all systems connected to the 
network. Eventually, this will result in many interactions between numerous networked elements at 
varying levels of abstraction. 
Next issue concerns the expression of the captured network security requirements relative to all these 
interactions. In particular, which language to use? Since different stakeholders are involved in the 
process, the language must fit their comprehensibility so that they find it at ease to describe the security 
problem context. Therefore, the language should consolidate different abstraction views suitable to each 
stakeholder. It should also express interdependencies between all the interconnected systems. 
Finally, analysing network security requirements mainly deals with checking for inconsistencies and 
incompleteness. In particular, it is essential to determine which among the network security 
requirements are more important to the business. This relates to traceability issues, which require to link 
the network security requirements to the relative security information back to the business needs. 
As a consequence, the anticipated SRE methodology for network security must facilitate involving all 
the stakeholders with different abstractions; to determine when to start considering network security 
requirements (i.e., from which abstraction level) and how they are refined from high-level business 
objectives.  
Research roadmap and claimed contributions 
The literature does not lack examples of SRE methods aiming at enhancing the quality and 
experience of the security requirements engineering process. The survey works [Fabian et al. 2010; 
Uzunov et al. 2012; Muñante et al. 2014; Souag et al. 2015] present a variety of SRE methods from the 
last decade. Conventionally, these SRE methods are categorized into different classes of SRE 
approaches such as goal-oriented, agent-oriented, problem frames and UML based modelling.  Choosing 
or adapting an SRE approach to the network security context raises our first research question in this 
thesis work: 
 RQ1: How to evaluate SRE methodologies in a network SRE context?  
Each SRE approach varies in the philosophy of how to capture, express and analyse security 
requirements. For instance, an SRE [Van Lamsweerde et al. 2003] referring to goal modelling captures 
the security requirements with reference to the unwanted malicious behaviours of the system, expressed 
as anti-goals. Whereas an agent modelling  inspired SRE [Massacci et al. 2010; Salnitri et al. 2015]  
captures security requirements with reference to the security constraints over the dependency 
interactions between the system agents. A problem frames based SRE [Hatebur et al. 2007a; Lin et al. 
2003] captures security requirements with reference to the security problem environment constraints of 
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the system. Finally, SRE methods [Lodderstedt et al. 2002; Jürjens 2002] based on UML modelling 
capture security requirements with reference to the security design constraints of the system. 
Given this SRE methods diversity, selecting the best suitable method to capture network security 
requirements seemed to be a challenging task. Although, the existing survey works [Fabian et al. 2010; 
Uzunov et al. 2012; Muñante et al. 2014; Souag et al. 2015] provide both an evaluation and an analysis 
of SRE methods to some extent, their evaluation was often based on ad-hoc criteria. Moreover, they 
varied in the evaluation perspectives [Karpati et al. 2011]. 
We propose an SRE evaluation methodology that differentiates its strategy from previous 
comparative studies for two reasons. First, we involve the security experts that are the SRE end-users in 
the whole process. Secondly, identifying SRE evaluation criteria corresponds to identifying the 
characteristics of a good SRE methodology. This is similar to conventional requirements engineering 
problems which deal with identifying the requirements of a system-to-be. In our case, the target system 
is the good SRE methodology, labelled as SRE-methodology-to-be and the evaluation criteria are indeed 
the requirements of the SRE-methodology-to-be.  
Based on this idea, our evaluation methodology is built on the classical idea of requirements 
engineering approach. Our evaluation process subsumes three steps. First, we identify the problem 
context and elicit initial high-level characteristic goals. The latter represent the generic characteristics 
of good security requirements. However, the literature review on the quality characteristics revealed that 
there is no consensus on what a good requirement is. We propose a weaving methodology that provides 
a consolidated list of 20 criteria. Secondly, we refine the high-level characteristic goals into final 
requirements of the SRE methodology-to-be. This step specializes the generic high-level goals to a 
specific problem context by involving the stakeholders, i.e., the security requirement engineers. Finally, 
the last step deals with the evaluation of the existing SRE methodologies using the elicited requirements. 
We implemented this methodology to elicit criteria for evaluating the three distinct SRE approaches 
in the network security context of the IREHDO2 project. We evaluated a method from each group, 
Secure KAOS i.e., goal-oriented, Socio Technical Security (STS) i.e., agent-oriented and Security 
Engineering Process using Patterns i.e., problem frames, which highlighted that they provide no support 
to either capture or express or analyse network security requirements. This problem derives our second 
research question in this thesis work: 
 RQ2: How to define a good SRE methodology that facilitates the network security requirements 
elicitation and refinement i.e., from high-level business objectives into low-level network 
security zoning requirements. 
We propose a layer based SRE methodology to verify the refinement of network security 
requirements from business security objectives. This approach is inspired from the SABSA [Sherwood 
2005], a business risk driven enterprise security architecture development methodology framework, 
which defines a structured model. 
The proposed conceptual model consists in three layered views of abstractions, see Figure 2. Each 
layered view represents the SRE context of the people (a.k.a. stakeholders) working at different 
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abstraction levels during a security engineering process. The business view deals with the elicitation of 
high level security objectives and constraints that are important to do business. The architect’s view 
concerns the elicitation of high-level security objectives in terms of protecting the security entities 
involved in the fulfilment of the business objectives. We express the elicitation and refinement at these 
first two views using STS. In addition, to facilitate the integration of risk analysis concepts, we propose 
a new extension of STS called Anti-STS for modelling attacks as multi-agent systems. The business 
view and architect’s view together correspond to the strategy and planning phases of the system security 
engineering process. The Designer’s view reflects the early phases of the network security design 
process. 
The elicitation activity at the Designer’s view is narrowed down to network security context, where 
high-level network security requirements are captured. For this, we propose a methodology that 
automates parts of the process of security zones and network security requirements elicitation using a 
definite set of formalized rules derived from the Clark-Wilson lite formal security model [Shankar et al. 
2006]. We implemented the rules in Answer set programming (ASP [7]) and provided a tool that 
facilitates calculating cost-optimal security zone models. We integrate the concepts of goal modelling 
(i.e. Secure KAOS) and agent modelling approaches (i.e., STS) to link these three abstraction layers. 
 
Figure 2: Layer based SRE methodology overview 
The implementation of the proposed SRE approach is described using two use case scenarios from 
the IREHDO2 project, plus an e-commerce enterprise network case study. In this process, we show 
clearly how the elicited information at each abstraction layer are captured and linked so that the 
traceability feature is visibly justified.  
Thesis outline 
The thesis dissertation is structured into four chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1 presents a state of the art of the underlying concepts related to security requirements 
engineering and security risk management. Then it provides a review of three distinct and widely known 
SRE methodologies i.e., STS, Secure KAOS and SEPP.  
Chapter 2 describes the evaluation of the three SRE methodologies using our RE based evaluation 
methodology, which concerns the study of RQ1. First we describe the elicitation of evaluation criteria 
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with respect to the network SRE context of IREHDO2. Then we brief the evaluation analysis that 
includes the pros and cons of the three methodologies based on the feedback from security experts. This 
chapter consolidates the publications [Bulusu et al. 2016; Bulusu et al. 2017a; Bulusu et al. 2018b; 
Bulusu et al. 2018a]. 
Chapter 3 presents the integrated concepts and modelling notation of our proposed SRE 
methodology using the two use case scenario related to the IREHDO2 context. The business and the 
architect’s views describes the integration of both STS and our proposed anti-agent modelling notations 
[Bulusu et al. 2017b] . The design view concerns the presentation of our proposed zone modelling 
methodology [Bulusu et al. 2018c]. 
Chapter 4 presents the evaluation and analysis on the performance of our SRE methodology using 
the evaluation criteria defined in chapter 2. For this, we implement an e-commerce enterprise networks 
SRE use case scenario [Cybedu 2017], which includes more network agents and interactions similar to 
a real time scenario.  We could not test all the criteria. The analysis results are drawn from the initial 
feedback from the security experts, which proves supportability to network SRE context. 
In the end, we conclude the thesis work with a discussion on the limitations, subsequent work for 
improving the methodology followed by our future perspectives of research. 
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 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
ENGINEERING  
Security requirements engineering (SRE) is a fundamental process for building secure systems. It 
deals with activities such as gathering, analysing and evaluating security requirements. They act as the 
baseline source for defining security specifications and configurations. This chapter is dedicated to 
present the concepts related to security requirements engineering. 
We first provide an overview of security requirements (section 1.1). Then we present the concepts 
and background of security risk management (section 1.2). Next, we present the steps involved in 
security requirements engineering process followed by the state of the art of security requirements 
engineering (section 1.3). In this aspect, we focus on the underlying concepts and SRE modelling 
notations of three SRE methods Secure KAOS, STS and SEPP, which correspond to three distinct SRE 
approaches: goal-oriented, agent-oriented, problem oriented (section 1.4). We end this chapter with the 
discussion on network security zoning that helps in network security requirements analysis at early 
stages (section 1.5). 
It is to note that this chapter does not include the comparative analysis of these methods. A detailed 
comparison and evaluation of these methods with reference to network security requirements 
engineering will be presented in the following chapter following the presentation of our research method 
for evaluation study. 
1.1 Security requirements, a global view 
A requirement is a familiar term that is omnipresent when building a system. It basically expresses a 
statement that translates or specifies a need and its associated constraints and conditions 
[ISO29148:2011].  In the system development context, Jackson [Jackson 2001] describes a requirement 
as an expected behaviour of a system component in a given problem context. Security requirements 
describe the anticipated functional and non-functional (i.e., quality) behaviour of systems to ensure the 
protection of assets from security threats [OSA 2016]. Wherein, an asset is an entity (e.g., human, 
software/hardware, information, system component, network device) that holds some value to business 
continuity [ISO31010 2009]. Security threats are the unwanted incidents that can inflict harm or a 
damage to business assets with unacceptable consequences [NIST 800–160 2014]. Therefore, a secured 
behaviour of a system is contextualized with the knowledge on what should be protected (i.e., assets) 
from what/whom (i.e., threats) and to what extent it requires protection i.e.,  degree [Fabian et al. 2010]. 
From a broad view, the security behaviour is determined with reference to the business security 
objectives that aim at preserving the CIA triad security properties i.e., confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. These security objectives are realized by security services list , which refers to 
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confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability 
[ISO/IEC27000 2018]. Security control mechanisms (e.g., data encryption, firewall), otherwise called 
security solutions are the countermeasures that helps to prevent, detect, counteract or minimize security 
risks that hold potential threat to business security objectives [NIST 2013]. Wherein, a security control 
mechanism can address one or more security objectives. Conventionally, the security objectives and the  
control measures are traditionally captured through a process called elicitation [Mead and Stehney 
2005]. It includes brainstorming sessions that involves stakeholders (e.g., business users, security 
architects, network security engineers) who claim to have interest on business system assets and 
associated security risks.  
A risk corresponds to an unexpected future event, which hampers the objectives [ISO31010 2009]. 
Security risks always pertain to an asset under threat. ISO 13335 [ISO 13335 2004:2004] defines 
security risk as the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities (i.e., exploitable weakness) 
of an asset or group of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization. Security risk management 
team deals with the tasks of identifying and assessing security risks pertaining to business assets and 
proposing cost-effective security solutions (i.e., mitigations), which takes the form of security 
requirements. Thus, security requirement engineering and risk management practices are 
interdependent. They together drive the transformation of business security objectives into security 
requirements. 
In practice, security requirements evolve iteratively during the development cycle of system that 
concerns with planning, designing and developing secure systems.  In this process, different levels of 
abstraction will often be necessary to address the full range of stakeholders’ objectives and security risks 
[ISO29148:2011] since every system element that is part of a critical business operation is eventually 
subjected to security protection. 
1.2 Security Risk Management 
Security Risk Management (SRM) literature is rather extensive and encompasses risk analysis 
techniques for identifying, assessing and prioritizing security risks (e.g., Attack trees[Schneier 1999], 
Hazop [Kletz 1999], FMEA/FMECA [Stamatis 2003]) and risk management methods for implementing 
risk management process related activities that involves planning, coordinating risk analysis activities 
(e.g., EBIOS [ANSSI 2010], CRAMM [CCTA 2001], CORAS [Lund et al. 2010]). International 
standards such as ISO/IEC 3100:2009, ISO/IEC 2700x and NIST provide guidelines and best practices 
for effective risk analysis and management activities. Figure 3 provides a summary view of the RM 
literature.  
Risk being a future event, it is defined based on the likelihood (i.e., frequency of risk event occurrence) 
and impact of the risk (i.e., risk = likelihood x impact) [ISO31010 2009]. A qualitative risks analysis 
expresses risk impact probabilities using qualitative scales (such as Low, Medium, High), which reflect 
subjective analysis with consensus. Quantitative risk analysis approach articulates risks in numerical 
terms, i.e. expected monetary loss and probability (e.g. annual loss expectancy, ALE). 
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Figure 3: Risk Management global view 
Furthermore, a risk analysis can also vary based on the following two strategies i.e., asset-based and 
threat/vulnerability based approaches [Hogganvik 2007]. Asset-based risk analysis approaches (e.g., 
FMEA/FMECA and Hazop) emphasize on first identifying the critical assets to business, and then 
assessing the potential threats that could harm or damage those assets. Threat-based risk analysis 
approaches (e.g., attack trees) emphasize on focus on addressing risks pertain to assets against most 
deadly and wide spread threats. These approaches rely on informational sources which provide detailed 
information on existing threats and associated list of risk events. These informational sources can be 
referred to threat catalogues/repositories and threat models (e.g., BSI threat catalogue [BSI 2012]; 
Microsoft threat model[Microsoft 2016]; OWASP top web application security risks [OWASP 2017]). 
1.2.1 Risk analysis techniques 
HazOp (hazard and operability) [IEC61882 2016], is an asset-based and qualitative risk analysis 
technique built on structured brainstorming. It helps to identify system hazards or operational risks based 
on set of guidewords. For example, guidewords such as EARLY, LATE, BEFORE, AFTER, could refer 
to deviations related to time dependent operations. The choice of suitable guidewords will strongly 
influence the success of the HAZOP in detecting design faults and operability problems. International 
standard [IEC61882 2016] describe the implementation of this technique. 
FMEA/FMECA [Stamatis 2003], Failure Mode Effect/Criticality Analysis, is an asset-based RA 
approach. FMEA provides support to identify and assess potential failures of systems/sub-
systems/individual components at early stages of development. The identified modes are classified 
according to their criticality, expressed using a qualitative indicator called Risk Priority Number (RPN). 
RPN is computed from the product of three factors Severity(S), Occurrence (O), and Detection (D) (i.e., 
RPN= S * O * D). Severity defines an extent to which a failure mode can affect the system (seriousness 
of adverse effects). Occurrence corresponds to the frequency rate of occurrence of failure modes 
(likelihood). Detection corresponds to the rate at which these failure modes are soon identified. The 
three factors are defined with qualitative subjective values (e.g., 10-point scale, where 1 is the least and 
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10 is the highest, see Figure 4). FMECA, Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis, extends FMEA 
to quantitative criticality analysis, which specifies probability of device failure modes. 
 
Figure 4: FMEA risk calculation example [Stamatis 2003] 
FTA/ETA (Fault/Event Tree Analysis) [Høyland and Rausand 2009], are threat-based risk analysis 
approaches used for reliability analysis. FTA helps to deduce the logical relationship of possible causes 
that result in unwanted events. The top node represents an unwanted incident or failure and the different 
events that can cause the failure, which are represented as intermediate nodes and leaf nodes. [IEC 61025 
2006] provides guidelines on FTA implementation. ETA complements FTA to deduce possible 
consequences (adverse effects) associated with an unwanted incident. It uses binary notation (True/false) 
in order to represent the success and failure of an unwanted incident (event) with respect to the 
corresponding mitigation controls. 
Cause and consequence diagram [Nielsen 1971] is a graph based model which combines the features 
of both Fault and Event trees to provide a complete view of cause and effect analysis, see Figure 5 (taken 
from [Hogganvik 2007]).  On the left is the FTA, where the possible causing temporal events that could 
result in failure of a light were identified. On the right is ETA, where the probability consequences are 
shown with respect to the success and failure of risk event (i.e., light fails). 
 
Figure 5: Cause-Consequence diagram [Hogganvik 2007] 
Attack Trees [Schumacher 2003] are threat-based risk analysis approaches conceptually similar to 
fault trees (FTA), but are used to describe possible attack scenarios in a hierarchical decomposition 
using AND/OR constructs. The root node represents the attacker goal and the decomposed nodes 
represent the different ways to achieve the goal. Figure 6 shows an example of an attack tree to guess 
administrator Password. An attack tree shows a logical breakdown of the various options available to 
an adversary (i.e., attacker). By performing the exploits associated with one or more leaf level events 
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which have been carefully selected to satisfy the tree’s AND/OR logic, the attacker can achieve the root 
level goal. Each minimal combination of leaf level events is known as an attack scenario (highlighted 
in dashed boxes).  
 
Figure 6: Attack Tree: Hack Admin password  
ADTree (attack defence tree) [Kordy et al. 2011] focuses on modelling defensive strategies. Unlike 
cause and effect diagrams, ADTrees intend to project a combined view of possible attack scenarios and 
corresponding applicable mitigation controls and therefore they include attack nodes as well as defence 
nodes. Figure 7 depicts the example of an ADTree for an attack on a bank account. 
 
Figure 7: ADTree example: An attack on a bank account [Kordy et al. 2011] 
Haruspex [Telmon and CIsa 2012] is a simulation driven asset-based risk evaluation technique. It 
evaluates the probability that an intelligent threat agent could successfully implement a multi-step attack 
against a system that results in an impact, e.g., a loss for the owner of the systems. Threat agent 
simulation using Hasruspex is driven by attack graphs [Phillips and Swiler 1998], which helps to 
represent multiple attack paths. The nodes represent events and the edges represent the attack paths, see 
Figure 8. Haruspex methodology makes use of Monte Carlo method [Rubinstein and Kroese 2011] 
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attack graphs in order to define the complexity of multi-step attack as well as to determine the probability 
of exploiting the vulnerabilities to reach the attack goal. 
 
Figure 8: attack graph [Telmon and CIsa 2012] 
Bayesian Network(BN) [Weber et al. 2012], is a graphical and probabilistic model based on the direct 
acyclic graph. Similar to the fault trees, the Bayesian networks provide the possibility of potential causes 
for a system failure, but based on the probability distributions. Nodes represent the variables or factors 
relevant to the problem and the edges represent the statistical dependencies between the nodes. Figure 
9 illustrates an example of BN acyclic graph for system failure based on the conditional probability of 
occurrence of two conditions, i.e. buffer overflow and denial of service. 
 
Figure 9: BN for system failure 
The edges Px defines the probability of buffer overflow causing system failure, Py corresponds to 
the probability of system failure caused by denial of service and Pz is the probability of buffer overflow 
resulting in denial of service. Subsequently, the probable scenarios of system failure can be deduced as: 
(1) System failure occurred either due to Buffer Overflow or Denial of Service; (2) Buffer Overflow can 
result in either DOS or System Failure or both, (3) DOS can cause System Failure. 
Markov Analysis [Høyland and Rausand 2009] is a stochastic mathematical analysis technique 
particularly applied to systems that execute probabilistic movement from one state (or condition) to 
another over time. For example, Markov analysis can be used to determine the probability that a service 
is available one day and becomes unavailable the next day due to some technical error or some 
vulnerability. 
 
Figure 10: Markov Chain [Høyland and Rausand 2009] 
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Markov chains have a finite number of states, after each time step, there is the chance of state 
transition which is calculated as the probability of state transition (represented as P1, P2, Pn in Figure 
10). IEC 61165 [IEC 61165 2006] provides guidelines on application of Markov techniques to model 
and analyse the reliability and maintainability of systems. However, this technique is mostly preferred 
to use to analyse smaller systems with strong dependencies requiring accurate evaluation since the model 
can get complex for large systems [Høyland and Rausand 2009]. 
1.2.2 Risk management methods 
Several RM methods have been proposed in the past with principal aim to support identification and 
assessment of security threats and risks as well as to determine the risk control requirements (see Figure 
3). Some example methods include: 
CORAS [Lund et al. 2010; Solhaug and Stølen 2013] is a European project that defined a customized 
graphical modelling language to enhance effective communication and documentation of threat & risk 
scenarios based on ISO31000 standard;  
EBIOS (Expression des Besoins Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité) [ANSSI 2010] has been 
developed by ANSSI in France and  provides a tool based risk assessment support for governmental and 
commercial organizations that handle confidential or classified information;  
FAIR (Factory Analysis of Information Risk) is a risk management methodology framework 
developed by Open Group that defines a taxonomy of risk attributes (e.g., Loss event frequency, control 
strength), see Appendix A for more details.  
CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method) [CCTA 2001] was developed by British 
Government agency CCTA (Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency) and provides a tool 
support to facilitate qualitative analysis thereby enabling effective brainstorming that involve qualified 
and experienced practitioners.  
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation)[Marek and Paulina 
2006], developed by CERT, is qualitative risk management methodology that enables operational 
security risk evaluation for each group of assets and threats. It is performed through self-organized 
brainstorming meetings that include security experts in organization. 
These RM methods employ one or more risk analysis techniques i.e., either qualitative/quantitative 
or asset-/threat-based approaches, for estimating the risk impact. For instance, CORAS risk assessment 
methodology [Lund et al. 2010; Solhaug and Stølen 2013] is built on HazOp analysis [IEC61882 2016], 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [IEC 61025 2006], (FMECA) [Stamatis 2003], as well as CRAMM [CCTA 
2001]. 
1.3 Security requirements engineering process 
A requirements engineering process subsumes the set of activities that take care of formulating 
requirements by carefully gathering information related to the problem context, expected behaviour and 
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objects in the problem world from three perspectives: WHAT, WHY, WHO [Van Lamsweerde 2009]. 
While, the WHAT perspective helps to study the nature of the required behaviour; the WHY perspective 
helps to study the rationale behind the necessity of the required behaviour; finally, the WHO perspective 
helps to study the nature of the entities on which (whom) the required behaviour is imposed. From a 
security point of view, the required behaviour concerns the protection objectives of business assets, 
imposed on secure systems. Figure 11 depicts an overview of conventional RE-cycle. 
 
Figure 11: RE life-cycle 
The main steps involved in RE life-cycle are as follows [Van Lamsweerde 2009] : 
 Problem context analysis: A problem unstated is a problem unsolved [Ross and Schoman 
1977]. Therefore, this step is dedicated to explore the ‘WHAT’ dimension of security 
problem. Identifying stakeholders and knowledge acquisition is one of the challenging tasks 
in this step [ISO29148:2011]. 
 Requirements Elicitation: This step deals with the process of capturing needs and 
objectives of the stakeholders. There exists various elicitation techniques such questionnaires 
based interviews, structured interviews, passive and active study of environment, which 
enable to explore the  ‘WHAT’ and ‘WHY’ dimensions of their needs [ISO29148:2011]. 
 Requirements Evaluation: This step is the core of whole RE process, which conforms the 
evaluation requirements for their consistency, correctness and completeness. It helps to 
explore the ‘WHAT’ and ‘WHY’ dimensions. These aspects correspond to the quality 
characteristics of good requirements (e.g., complete/correct/ consistent/feasible etc.) 
[ISO29148:2011]. However, there exists no standard set of characteristics (we discuss this 
issue in chapter 2). 
 Requirements Documentation: This step deals with structured and detailed documentation 
of the elicited and evaluated requirements, which describes the ‘HOW’ dimension of 
addressing stakeholder needs. There exists wide range of techniques and models to support 
this process such as natural language templates, diagrammatic notations, formal models [Van 
Lamsweerde 2009]. These requirement models are the essential components to document 
requirements for communication, inspection, negotiation, and their evolution. 
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1.3.1 SRE process models 
SQUARE (System Quality Requirements Engineering) [Mead and Stehney 2005] defines a RE 
process model for eliciting categorizing, and prioritizing security requirements during the early stages 
of the development life cycle of information systems and applications. This methodology assumes the 
participation of experts from SRE as well as SRM teams.  
 
Figure 12: SQUARE methodology 
The whole process of SQUARE methodology is decomposed into 9 steps summarized in Figure 12. 
The first four steps include activities similar to the initial planning activities of risk management, while 
next 5 steps correspond to requirement engineering activities. Each step is defined with input and output 
criteria of necessary information, major participants (i.e., stakeholders) and suggested techniques for 
implementing RE process. 
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SREP (security requirements engineering process) [Mellado et al. 2007] extends SQUARE method 
by integrating it with the security evaluation process given in Common Criteria (CC) [ISO/IEC 15408].  
CC provides guidelines for specifying security requirements and allows developers to specify common 
security attributes known as Target of Evaluation (TOE), for evaluating security functionality of IT 
products. In the SREP process, the evaluation of security requirements is done using CC assurance 
requirements and the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM). Figure 13 
illustrates a brief view of main activities defined as 9 steps in SREP process, similar to SQUARE and 
these steps are iterated at each phase system development. 
 
Figure 13: SREP process 
1.3.2 SABSA (Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture) Framework 
SABSA (Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture) [Sherwood 2005] is a business-driven 
enterprise security architecture framework intended for guiding the security architects. It defines a six-
layered architecture model, with each reflecting the respective stakeholder views in the process of 
specifying, designing, constructing and building the business enterprise architectures. Figure 14, depicts 
an abstract view of SABSA layered model. 
 
Figure 14: SABSA layered model [Sherwood 2005] 
The Business view and Architect’s view together correspond to the strategy and planning phases of 
system engineering process. The Business view deals with the elicitation of high-level security objectives 
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and constraints that are important to do business. It is essential to analyse the context of the business 
before building a secure system. This view facilitates the specification of the business security needs 
(e.g., reputation), operational goals and risk impacts (e.g., monetary loss) that drive the necessity of a 
secure system. The Architect’s view concerns with the integration of protection objectives (e.g., 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information) that are necessary to secure the business 
security needs. It is essential to integrate the defence in depth strategies to minimize security risks. This 
view includes the modelling of the security threats as well as the threat control objectives that drive the 
designing of security architecture for the system. 
The Designer’s view and builder’s view, together, correspond to the designing phases of system 
security engineering process. The Designer’s view deals with the specification of the security services 
(e.g., network entity authentication, data integrity protection etc.,) that are necessary to satisfy the 
control objectives. It is essential to specify the logical elements of the secure system in order to express 
the business security assets. This view facilitates to model the business requirement needs in terms of 
logical system entities that have identity, meaning, function and structure but no physical embodiment. 
The builder’s view deals with the mapping of technical security mechanisms (e.g., firewalls, hashing 
etc.,) to the logical security services.  It is essential to define the functional and technological needs and 
constraints with respect to the physical system elements of the secure system. This view deals with 
assembling of the physical system entities that can be tangible with the technical aspects such as size, 
performance, capacity, and throughput. 
Finally, tradesman’s view (LV5) corresponds to the final implementation phase of system security 
engineering process. It deals with the selection of the tools and components for the construction and 
assembling of physical system elements. It is essential to consider the project specific technology needs, 
demands and feasibility constraints in order to accurately implement the business security system. This 
view facilitates to specify the business requirements needs in terms of a final set of atomic security 
requirements and device configurations. The latest view called operational manager’s view corresponds 
to the maintenance of the system security engineering process after the deployment. 
Although SABSA is not strictly a security requirement engineering approach, it provides a broad 
picture to understand the conventional security requirements engineering process from the perspective 
of business system security architecture. SABSA matrix (see Figure 15) describes a wide variety of 
aspects that a modeller should be able to express with the help of six interrogative questionnaires 
(what/why/how/who/ where/when).  
These six interrogatives correspond to the different perspectives of the stakeholders at a given view. 
In brief, the ‘What’ interrogative helps in capturing the security requirement needs of the stakeholders 
that correspond to the activities involved in respective phase of system engineering process. These needs 
are expressed in form of assets as they must be protected. The ‘Why’ interrogative deals with the 
reasoning behind the motivation for wanting to demand security. These are expressed in terms of 
security risks pertaining to business needs. The interrogatives ‘How’ and ‘Who’ are related to capturing 
the process tasks goals and functions as well the respective roles and responsibilities that are needed to 
fulfil the business security needs. Finally, the interrogatives ‘Where’ and ‘When’ help to capture the 
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dependency constraints such as temporal and geographical location constraints confining to the business 
security needs.  
 
Figure 15: SABSA Matrix 
Altogether, the layers and matrix facilitates in tracing every requirement need to the components that 
provide a solution. It also helps in providing business justification. For instance, when some asks ‘why 
a particular security solution is proposed?’ the rationale will be easier by tracing back to the business 
requirements that drive the specific solution. However, SABSA does not provide any modelling support 
like SQUARE in order to integrate to an SRE process. 
1.4 Security requirements engineering approaches 
Security Requirement engineering (SRE) discipline features a number of SRE methods with 
increasing focus on integrating security risk analysis practices right from earlier stages [Dubois et al. 
2010].  The underlying motivation of these methods to improve the effectiveness of SRE process thereby 
reducing the requirement errors. 
Conventionally, the existing methods in the SRE literature are categorized into different families of 
SRE approaches that vary in philosophies on how to capture i.e., elicit, evaluate and document security 
requirements. In here, SRE approach being a word used to differentiate the underlying common SRE 
modelling concepts employed by the SRE methods [Fabian et al. 2010]. We mainly recognize goal-
oriented, agent-oriented, problem oriented, process oriented and UML based SRE approaches [Souag et 
al. 2015; Fabian et al. 2010]. 
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UML based SRE methods such as secure UML [Lodderstedt et al. 2002], and UML sec [Jürjens 
2002] facilitates to express access control requirements using some standard constructs based on UML 
class diagrams. Similarly, abuse cases [McDermott and Fox 1999] and misuse cases [[Sindre and Opdahl 
2001] extend use case diagrams to analyse malicious behaviour of users. However, these methods focus 
SRE modelling in later stages of SRE process (i.e., at design phases) [Dubois et al. 2010].  
On the other hand, SQUARE [Mead and Stehney 2005] and SREP [Mellado et al. 2007] ( mentioned 
in previous section 1.3) correspond to process oriented approaches that define a systematic procedure to 
implement SRE process. However, they provide no formal modelling support for implementing SRE 
process [Souag et al. 2015; Fabian et al. 2010].  
As consequence, in this thesis, we principally focused on the three SRE approaches i.e., Goal-
oriented [van Lamsweerde 2004; van Lamsweerde 2004], agent-oriented [Massacci et al. 2010; Salnitri 
et al. 2015; Paja et al. 2014] and problem frames based [Hatebur et al. 2007a; Lin et al. 2003]. These 
three SRE approaches propose varying formal modelling concepts to capture security requirements at 
early stages. 
1.4.1 Goal-oriented approaches 
Goals represent high-level objectives of stakeholders that correspond to the development of the future 
system (i.e., system-to-be). These goals play crucial role in system engineering as they capture the 
reasons behind WHAT and WHY aspects of system. These approaches mainly focuses on refining goals 
into sub-goals until each sub-goal is allocated to an agent who believed to be responsible for fulfilling 
those goals [Van Lamsweerde 2009]. A goal assigned to an agent is called a requirement. 
Several goal-oriented SRE methods exist in the literature offering a variety of procedures for 
reasoning about goals. Some examples are NFR [Chung et al. 2012],  KAOS [Van Lamsweerde 2009], 
GRL [Liu, L and Yu, E; Amyot et al. 2009] and GBRAM [Anton 1996]. KAOS SRE method is the first 
in line that introduce formal goal modelling concepts based on temporal logic and therefore it is widely 
recognized in SRE literature [Fabian et al. 2010]. In this thesis work we study Secure KAOS, a security 
extension to KAOS.  
1.4.1.1 KAOS/Secure KAOS 
KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition automated Specification or Keep All Objectives Satisfied), is a 
methodology developed as a joint collaboration of research work between the University of Oregon and 
the University of Louvain (Belgium) in 1990. Respect-IT has built a tool known as Objectiver for KAOS 
[Respect-IT].  
KAOS methodology facilitates to mix the top-down and bottom-up approaches. A goal always 
captures the ‘WHAT’ perspectives of the needs. Since the ‘WHY’ and ‘HOW’ perspectives of the needs 
reflect the rationale behind the refinement process, the principle objective is to link goals in order to 
explicitly reply to the WHY and the HOW questions. This methodology is divided into four modelling 
activities in order to cover the whole process from the specification of goals to the specification of the 
system, see Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Secure KAOS SRE methodology 
 The goal modelling describes the goals of the system-to-be and its environment. A goal model 
is a hierarchy specifying the refinement of strategic goals into requirements; 
 The responsibility modelling defines the assignment of requirements to agents (actors of the 
system-to-be); 
 The object modelling specifies the vocabulary of the domain such as entities, events, 
relationships etc. Object model, which is UML based, represents the correlation between the 
objects, entities and their association in form of a class diagram, corresponding to achieve a 
goal. 
 Finally, the operation modelling defines the possible operations on the system as well as the 
relations with the others models. An operation model captures the behaviour of the agents to 
satisfy the requirements. 
Altogether, this methodology highly focuses on the goal refinement thereby facilitates to verify the 
traceability of the security goals being refined into security requirements. Wherein, the 
goal/responsibility models correspond to the activities of early stage requirement analysis; while the 
object/operation models correspond to requirement analysis at later stages. 
In Figure 16, goals (represented by blue parallelograms) are the desired properties of the system-to-
be and its environment. Goal refinements are realized via the AND/OR constructs and are structured 
similar to acyclic graphs. An edge from goal A to goal B indicates that goal A refines goal B. Then, this 
edge states why goal A exists and how goal B is satisfied. A goal can be refined using an AND edge 
implying that the conjunction of sub-goals is necessary to satisfy the goal. It is also possible to represent 
alternatives using OR refinement. Then one of the sub-goal is sufficient to reach the goal. In addition, 
to facilitate the refinement process, KAOS defines four different types of goals based on the temporal 
logic (achieve/maintain /cease/avoid).  These goal patterns have an impact on the set of possible 
behaviours of the system [Dardenne et al. 1993].  
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Sometimes, goals can be conflicting. These conflicts are defined in KAOS through a link with a flash 
symbol, see Figure 16. It is also possible to identify and to take into account negative events that can 
threaten the system-to-be using obstacles (red parallelograms). An arrow from an obstacle to a goal 
represents an obstruction. An arrow from a goal to an obstacle states that the goal resolves the obstacle. 
The goal resolving intentional obstacle is known as security goal.  
Finally, the properties of the domain are expressed using purple pentagons. They explicitly state the 
invariants of the environment (e.g., physical laws, etc.) or the assumptions. This notion of domain 
property is interesting because domain property items enforce the RE analyst to explicitly specify 
assumptions (e.g., observing the environmental constraints). As consequence, it makes the specification 
of related goals more precise. 
When a goal cannot refined further (i.e., atomic), it is called a requirement of the system-to-be and 
is assigned to an agent (to either environment or system agents). A requirement (represented by a blue 
parallelogram with bold edges) is about the system-to-be. When a requirement concerns an environment 
agent (e.g., human), it is called an expectation (yellow parallelograms in Figure 16). Distinguishing 
requirements and expectation seemed to be a good idea. Since requirements are assigned to system-to-
be agents (actors that we will build) and expectation to environment agents (actors that we cannot control 
completely), it creates an impression that expectations must be dealt carefully.  
 
Figure 17: Anti-goal refinement sample [van Lamsweerde 2004] 
 Furthermore, Secure KAOS method proposes an approach to construct an anti-goal graph similar to 
goal hierarchy, but reflects the attacker’s perspective to break system security goals i.e., intentional 
obstacles. Figure 17 (taken from [van Lamsweerde 2004]) illustrates an example of an anti-goal model 
in the context of an electronic banking service. An anti-goal refinement can be correlated to attack trees 
from risk analysis techniques [Schneier 1999]. Anti-goal refinement is done until leaf nodes are 
identified as software agents corresponding to some software vulnerabilities observable or 
implementable by the attacker. Security requirements are derived to avoid the adverse conditions 
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corresponding to these leaf nodes, similar to attack-defence trees from risk analysis techniques [Kordy 
et al. 2011]. 
1.4.2 Agent-oriented approaches 
Agent-oriented approaches are centred towards Agent-oriented Software Engineering (AOSE), a 
software engineering paradigm corresponding to the development of complex multi-agent system 
[Bresciani et al. 2004]. Whereas, multi-agent system based approaches provide means to model complex 
systems featuring multiple agents and their goals [Rosenschein 1988].  
Eric Yu's i* framework [Yu 2011] is recognized as the first RE approach that integrates goal 
modelling concepts with multi-agent paradigm. The principal idea is to address the WHY dimension of 
SRE process from the perspective of the stakeholders involved. In this respect, it redefines agents as 
actors having some goals within the system or organization of interest. An actor can be either a role or 
an agent. Agents are the concrete known participants of the system (e.g., human/software/hardware 
entities), while roles are abstract representations of the actor concept (e.g., Student role). Roles can be 
played by either human agents or system agents. In addition, it presents dependency models to describe 
the fact that an actor depends on another actor to attain some goal [Yu 2011]. It proposes two conceptual 
models: 1) Strategic dependency model, based on the interactions between actors, and 2) Strategic 
rationale model, based on reasoning the conflictual viewpoints between these actors concerning an 
actor’s dependencies and relationships with other actors.  
Many works have extended the underlying concepts from i* framework in order to fit to different 
RE contexts [Fabian et al. 2010]. Some well-known extension works include: Tropos [Bresciani et al. 
2004], which extends i* modelling concepts to software development context. Secure Tropos 
[Mouratidis and Giorgini 2007] extends the tropos modelling to security context. Suitably, it introduces 
new security concepts such as security constraints specify security related restrictions over the security 
dependencies between actors. Secure i*  method [Massacci et al. 2010] extends the strategic rationale 
dependency models of i* framework, in order to fit to security context it introduces the notion of 
delegation and trust.  
In this thesis we study STS (Social Technical Systems) framework [Paja et al. 2014], which extends 
secure Tropos and secure i* methods featuring advantages to define fine-grained information security 
requirements of the system-to-be with a tool support. 
1.4.2.1 Social technical systems modelling language (STS-ml) 
The main idea of STS (Social Technical Systems) framework is to model not only the technical 
components of the system-to-be, but also its social environment where the system will be deployed. In 
this STS methodology framework [Paja et al. 2014], the security requirement analysis of the system-to-
be (future system), is achieved through three different views: social view, information view and 
authorization view. These three views together constitute the operational view of the system-to-be. 
 The purpose of the social view is to model the social relationships between actors for the 
system-to-be. Actor concept is inherited from i*framework. 
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 The objective of the information view is to introduce primitives and relationships that permit 
to differentiate between the information (content) and the representation of the information 
(document).   
 Finally, the authorization view drives the system designer to determine the fine-grained 
authorization rules over the access permissions on the documents (resources).  
STS modelling language mainly supports early elicitation of security requirements by constraining 
the social dependency interaction relationships between the actors [Paja et al. 2014]. As consequence, 
identifying the actors and analysing their interactions are the core activities. Figure 18 shows the STS 
notation for social modelling. Goals (green rectangles with curved edges) represent actors’ (pink circles) 
interests towards the system. Furthermore, it offers the possibility to create composite goals via the 
AND/OR constructs. This allows refining top-level goals into sub-goals similar to KAOS, but within 
the scope of an actor (Figure 18a).  
 
Figure 18: STS-ml social modelling 
The social relationships between actors are manifested by the relationships such as goal delegation 
and resource provision. This is modelled in the social view. Delegated goal implies the dependency of 
the interaction. That means an actor depends on another actor to achieve a goal (see, Figure 18c). This 
aspect is similar to the responsibility model of the KAOS. In addition, the social relationships between 
actors may also include the exchange of documents (informational resources) that contain necessary 
information for the achievement of a goal. STS captures this exchange via the relationship: document 
transmission (see, Figure 18d). Different constructs have been proposed to represent the possession, the 
production, the modification and the read of documents[Paja et al. 2014], but within the confined scope 
of the agent, see (Figure 18b). 
From security perspective, the security goals are implicitly expressed in the form of the security 
constraints over the interaction dependencies in social view. These security constraints refer to the 
security properties i.e., confidentiality integrity, availability, non-repudiation, accountability, reliability, 
as mentioned in section1.2. Furthermore, security goals can also be observed in form of constrained 
permissions upon the provision of the resources in authorization view. They include 
read/modify/produce/transmit provisions, which will help to ensure the compliance with confidentiality 
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restrictions on documents as expressed in the social view. In addition, STS gives security engineers the 
possibility to represent threats through events that can hamper the actors’ goals. The entity Event and 
the relationship threatens are used to represent the threats in STS (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: STS threat event notation 
Finally, the STS tool can perform an implicit automated analysis hiding the complexity of the 
formalism. It covers three types of analysis: Well formedness analysis, security analysis and threat 
analysis. Well formedness analysis is used to verify the correctness and the validity of the STS models. 
The results are retuned in terms of warnings and errors. The security analysis helps to detect the conflicts 
between security requirements. The threat analysis is used to show the effects over goal trees and 
goal/resource relationships that may have a threatening event. This threat propagation feature highlights 
the impact in over goal trees. 
1.4.3 Problem frames oritented approaches 
Problem frames (PF) are introduced by Jackson [Jackson 2001]. Unlike the STS and KAOS, problem 
frames approach is focused towards characterizing the constrained behaviour of system under 
construction as problems. Problem frames are set of patterns that classify software development 
problems [Fabian et al. 2010].  
 
Figure 20: Problem overview 
Problem frames modelling consists in three main components: problem domains, connecting 
interfaces, required behaviour. Figure 20 depicts a generic view of problem frames modelling related to 
required (or desired) behaviour. 
 Problem Domains help to describe the problem (represented in rectangles). They correspond 
to system entities, people and resources that are referred as casual domains, biddable 
domains and lexical domains respectively. Biddable domains refer to environment agents in 
KAOS. Machine is a special kind of domain that refers to system-to-be (represented in 
rectangles with two stripes). 
 Interfaces help to express the anticipated behaviour of the connecting problem domains. 
Interfaces are of two types: referenced behaviour (represented in solid straight line) and 
constrained behaviour (represented in dashed lines with point arrow head). In addition, 
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interfaces defined with shared phenomena, which represent events, operation calls, 
messages, and the like. The shared phenomena represent shared attributes/information that 
are observed by two or more problem domains during an interaction, but controlled by only 
one of the two connecting domains.  
 Finally, the desired behaviour corresponds to the requirement (represented using dashed 
oval). Altogether, A problem frame contains a requirement that refers to certain domains via 
requirement references in which the requirement constrains at least one domain [Hatebur et 
al. 2008]. 
[Jackson 2001] describes 5 problem frames that represent different class of software development 
problems in software development context. They include required behaviour problem frame, 
commanded behaviour problem frame, information behaviour problem frame, simple work pieces 
problem frame, and transformation problem frame. 
In the literature very few works have extended problem frames approaches. Abuse frames extends 
commanded behaviour problem frame to represent malicious behaviour through anti-requirements[Lin 
et al. 2003; Lin et al. 2004]. In this thesis we study SEPP [Hatebur et al. 2007b], which introduces new 
security problems patterns to represent security requirements. 
1.4.3.1 SEPP (Security Engineering Process patterns) 
SEPP [Hatebur et al. 2007b] extends the concepts and terminology of PF to security problem analysis 
in a particular SRE context. It guides the RE analyst to define security problem patterns, called as  
security problem frames (SPF), separately from the security solution patterns, called as concertized 
security problem frames (CSPF).  
SPF provides the description of security problem context using the three main components of the PF 
approach (i.e., problem domains, secured behaviour, interfaces with shared phenomena). In addition, it 
introduces the notion of pre-conditions and post-conditions for each of the problem frames. Pre-
conditions reflect the conditions that the problem environment much achieve to apply the security 
problem frame. The post-conditions are the formal representations of the security requirement which 
must be fulfilled by the machine to be built. Once the SPF is finalized, then the problem frames are 
instantiated as CSPF. CSPFs are the next abstraction level instantiations of the security problem frames 
which defines some generic security control mechanisms to solve security problems. 
[Hatebur et al. 2007b] presents four SPF mapped to eight CSPF. Wherein, SPF refer to class of 
security problems related to authentication, confidential data transmission, and distribution of secretes 
and integrity preserving data transmission. However, in this thesis, we confine our study to SPF as they 
describe early security requirements. For instance, Figure 21 depicts the SPF diagram for confidential 
data transmission given [Hatebur et al. 2007b]. 
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Figure 21: SPF pattern for confidentiality [Hatebur et al. 2007b] 
This security requirement (SR) in this SPF constrains that transmitted data must not be derived by 
the malicious subject. The transmitted data is expressed as lexical domain (represented as in rectangle 
with ‘X’ in bottom corner) since it holds data being sent and received by the authentic domains (i.e., 
sender machine and the receiver machine). The malicious subject is expressed as biddable domain 
(represented as in rectangle with ‘B’ in bottom corner) since it refers to an attacker. However, the SPF 
notation does not differentiate authentic subjects to fake subjects. 
The events E1 and E2 express the transmission of the data sent and received between the authentic 
subjects.  The interfaces Y1, Y2, Y3 express the contents of the data held by the lexical domains (i.e., 
sent data, transmitted data and received data); while the interface Y4 express the behaviour of the 
malicious subject. Furthermore, the shared phenomena describe the control over the shared information 
defined in the declarations section of SPF. For instance, the sender machine (SM) control the events 
(E1) related to the transmitted contents of sent data. Frame diagram expresses this using an interface 
with shared phenomena denoted as SM! E1. 
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1.5 Network Security requirements 
The study of network security requirements majorly concern with the protection of network 
infrastructure, access control, information flows [Government of Canada, Communications Security 
Establishment 2007]. From an industrial perspective, the current practice for eliciting and analysing 
early network security requirements is driven by security zoning, a well-known defence-in-depth 
strategy for network security design [Sherwood 2005; SAP 2013; ICS-CERT 2016; NIST 2014; SANS 
Institute 2003]. Defence-in-Depth strategy is adapted from military defence security practice, where the 
attacker is forced to circumvent multiple lines of defence, before being able to sneak into the secured 
region [Cleghorn 2013]. Likewise, the Defence-in-Depth strategy in the scope of enterprise security, 
aims at building multiple layered defence lines, for evading any single point of failure, in case of security 
breach [SANS Institute 2003]. 
Security zones constitute the logical grouping of network elements that are identified with similar 
protection requirements (e.g., data confidentiality and integrity, access control, audit, logging, etc.). 
Each security zone is identified with different trust levels, which exhibit the rigor of required protection. 
In this context, determining security zones and respective trust levels is a preliminary step for security 
architects in capturing other network security requirements (e.g., related to data flows), and later in 
selecting the right network security controls/mechanisms (such as VPN, IP Firewall, Web Application 
Firewall, etc.)[NIST 2014; SANS 2015a]. These security measures eventually play vital role in building 
security defence around the business critical assets of the organization [NIST 2014; SANS 2015a].  
In the literature, several research works and best practice approaches propose various zone 
classification schemes and patterns [Secure Arc 2009; Province of British Columbia 2012; Government 
of Canada, Communications Security Establishment 2007]. Different reference works prescribe 
different set of zone categories as well as different guidelines and inter/intra zone communication rules.  
1.5.1 Security zoning reference models 
Majority of the existing works are from industrial/government sectors[Province of British Columbia 
2012; Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment 2007; Secure Arc 2009], which 
mainly focus on providing foundational best practice guidelines, and reference modelling patterns, for 
building secured networks. From a broad view, these reference models propose minimum set of zones 
as well as inter/intra zone interaction rules necessary to be implemented, for achieving basic logical 
network security design. However, there exists no restriction on either the number of zones or their 
category types, as they depend on the size and type of the business. Some of the commonly identified 
network zones include internet zone, demilitarized zone, extranet zone etc. The communication between 
zones are monitored and controlled by some security measures (e.g., a firewall, a gateway, etc.).  
In brief, the Internet zone, by default, is assumed as extremely hostile and least trusted, as it is 
publicly accessible to everyone including the anonymous threat actors. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) 
is the intermediate zone that usually sits between the trusted and less trusted zone in order to reduce 
attacks surfaces. The extranet zone contains trust security entities that belong to an external third-part 
domain (e.g., external internet service provider). Respectively, the interaction rules between the security 
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entities, belonging to a single, or multiple zones, are determined and monitored depending on the 
category of zones. However, different patterns propose different rules for zone interactions.  
The Figure 22 example reference patterns from British Columbia model [Province of British 
Columbia 2012] and Secure Arc Inc., [Secure Arc 2009] that vary in zone interaction rules. For example, 
the British Columbia model [Province of British Columbia 2012] describes seven zones and allows 
communication inside the zones and only between adjacent zones, see Figure 22(a). It defines other 
zones such as client security zone and high security zone that contain the set of security entities (e.g., 
users, desktops, servers, etc.) that are part of the enterprise. Sensitive assets are confined to highly 
restricted zones. In addition, the special zones such as the management zone constitutes of entities that 
are involved in security management activities such as monitoring, and administering the zones and their 
interactions. 
 
Figure 22: Example zone reference models [Secure Arc 2009; Province of British Columbia 2012] 
Secure Arc [Secure Arc 2009] Defines eight zones.  It also adds a parallel cross-zones segmentation 
concept, called silos, see Figure 22(b). Communications are allowed only between adjacent zones and 
within the same silo, or between adjacent silos within the same zone. That means the security entities 
from a silo (e.g., Silo n) are limited to communicate with the security entities that belong only to either 
the adjacent silo (i.e., Silo n+1) in the same zone, (i.e., Internet) or belong to the same silo (i.e., Silo n) 
in the adjacent zone (i.e., application zone). The aim is to limit the interaction between the zones to only 
dedicated traffic even though they are adjacent to each other. However, these documents are only 
guidelines and must be manually adapted. 
On the other hand, the academic community has published only few works concerning network 
security zones. Gontarczyk et al [Gontarczyk et al. 2015] provides a standard blue-print that includes 
three classes of security zone (no physical measures, limited physical measures, and strong physical 
measures), see Figure 23. For instance, no physical security measures can be implemented in internet 
zone since it is publicly accessible to everyone unlike enterprise and restricted zones that are internal to 
enterprise.   
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Figure 23: zone classification model [Gontarczyk et al. 2015] 
In addition, the authors also provide a classifier to guide the deployment of systems/ applications, 
see Figure 24. However, this is a high-level guideline that must be manually adapted by the security 
architects. Furthermore, the classifier is ambiguous (e.g. some systems can be placed in any of the 
zones). They also don’t define network security requirements.  
 
Figure 24: Security zone classifier [Gontarczyk et al. 2015] 
Ramasamy et al [20] proposed a bottom-up approach for discovering the security zone classification 
of devices in an existing enterprise network. It distinguishes between network flows actually allowed 
and those permitted by company policy.   The actually allowed traffic correspond to the network flows 
related to host configurations, and network flow logs handling network statistics data. For instance, there 
are many network administration tools such as Nmap [6], traceroute, netstat, and SNMP-based 
approaches that can collect and analyse information about network configuration of devices in the 
infrastructure. On the other hand, the flows permitted by policy concern business interactions that 
include actual transmission of data. However, this work doesn’t help in eliciting network security 
requirements. 
To consolidate, a zone modelling process consists in classifying zones based on trust levels, and 
employing some best practice guidelines for monitoring inter/intra zone communication. However, this 
process takes place in an ad-hoc manner and do not integrate a rigorous approach to specify security 
zones and rules governing zone interactions. 
CHAPTER 1 Security Requirements Engineering  31 
Network Security Requirements Engineering Methodology S Teja BULUSU 
1.6 Chapter Summary 
Security requirements are essential components that capture business security objectives related to 
the protection of assets from potential threats.  Network security requirements at early stages correspond 
to security zoning, which concerns the logical grouping of assets with regards to the degree of protection 
required. 
Different SRE approaches inspired by the process of requirement engineering security risk analysis 
concepts, have proposed different methods to express and analyse requirements at early stages. The goal 
modelling approaches focus on the risk analysis pertaining to the achievement of system goals in the 
name of obstacles and anti-goals. The agent modelling approaches emphasize on the threat analysis upon 
securing the dependency interactions between the system agents. Finally, the problem frames oriented 
modelling approaches emphasize more on the problem analysis in achieving the required secured 
behaviour of the system. 
SABSA framework provide a reference model for guiding the development of a, enterprise network 
security architecture with definite abstraction levels. With reference to our research objective from the 
project IREHDO2, it is interesting to integrate SABSA reference model to derive network security 
requirements from business. For this, it is important to know which of these SRE approaches suites best 
to facilitate this integration thereby enabling the derivation of network security requirements. In the 
following chapter, we present a research method concerning the evaluation of SRE methods, which 
helps to address this question. 
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 WHICH SRE METHODOLOGY FITS 
BEST TO THE NETWORK SRE CONTEXT? 
As mentioned at the beginning of the document, this thesis work is part of the research project 
IREHDO2, which concerns the aircraft network security. In this project, the security experts of AIRBUS 
want to improve their security process to increase the assurance on the final security solution enforced 
on their aircraft networks. More specifically, they are interested in enhancing their SRE practices. This 
group of security experts is involved at different stages of the security process and comprises of security 
requirement engineers, risk analysts as well as the security testing experts.  
Our task in the project consists in proposing the best SRE methodology, which will help them in 
writing good network security requirements. However, the diversity of SRE methodologies (discussed 
in chapter 1) leads to an open question i.e., which one of them is good to choose? In fact, each security 
expert from our project had a different point of view on what could constitute a good SRE methodology. 
As consequence, it was difficult for us to fix the evaluation criteria to analyse the suitability of the 
existing SRE methodologies studied in chapter 1. This issue gave rise to our first research question RQ1: 
How to evaluate SRE methodologies in a network SRE context? 
Several comparative studies on SRE methodologies are available. Nonetheless, their evaluation is 
often based on a set of ad hoc criteria. These comparison criteria may not fit the SRE needs of every 
company. Thus, a systematic method needs to be defined to capture the company’s requirements of an 
SRE methodology. We address this issue by proposing a requirements engineering-based evaluation 
methodology. It helps in characterizing the goodness of a SRE methodology by considering the SRE 
needs of the stakeholders as well as the quality characteristics of good security requirements (a.k.a. 
quality criteria). Indeed, considering the quality criteria is important to avoid requirement errors. This 
chapter is dedicated to present our evaluation methodology and its implementation. 
We first provide an overview of the existing comparative studies (section 2.1). Next, we present our 
proposed evaluation methodology and its strategy (section 2.2). In this respect, we explored the refined 
research question RQ1a related to the study of the characteristics of good security requirements (section 
2.3). The RQ1a exploration provides a basis for eliciting the characteristics of good SRE methodology 
(section 2.4). Finally, we describe the implementation of our evaluation methodology (section 2.5). In 
this regard, we describe our evaluation process to evaluate the three SRE methodologies (i.e., STS, 
KAOS and SEPP) presented in chapter 1. At the end, we present in brief the pros and cons of each of 
these three SRE methodologies using the elicited characteristics serving as the evaluation criteria. 
This chapter consolidates the following contributions: [Bulusu et al. 2016; Bulusu et al. 2017a; 
Bulusu et al. 2018b; Bulusu et al. 2018a]. 
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2.1 Comparative studies: State-of-the art 
In the literature, there exists numerous works related to comparative studies, which offer varying 
dimensions of SRE evaluation perspectives. In below, we first present an overview of these related 
works and later we enlist the three main issues that we identified in their evaluation perspectives. Note 
that, our literature review does not provide the synthesis or classification of survey studies similar to the 
works [Karpati et al. 2011; Khwaja and Urban 2002]. 
N Mayer [Mayer 2009] provided a comparative study of the SRE methodologies based on a domain 
model consisting of 14 security concepts. These concepts are categorized under three groups as asset-
related (e.g., business asset, system asset), risk-related (e.g., risk, impact, threat, threat agent and attack 
method) and risk treatment related concepts (e.g., security requirements, control). 
Fabian et al. [Fabian et al. 2010] proposed a conceptual framework to support the comparative study 
of the existing SRE methodologies. When compared with the modelling framework in [Mayer 2009], 
this work highlights some similar concepts related to risk analysis but was extended with granular 
security analysis concepts based on the security properties i.e., CIA triad. In addition, it considers the 
concepts related to the multi-lateral security requirement analysis that stresses on the compromise of the 
conflicting stakeholder’s security needs [Rannenberg et al. 1999]. 
Munante et al. [Muñante et al. 2014] extends the comparison frameworks [Fabian et al. 2010; Mayer 
2009] that compose additional evaluation with the concepts related to model-driven engineering (e.g., 
tool support, SRE modelling language, formalism). This work concludes that KAOS [van Lamsweerde 
2004] and secure i* [Elahi and Yu 2007], are the most compatible for formal SRE modelling. 
Souag et al. [Souag et al. 2015] proposed a comparison framework to provide a systematic mapping of 
the reusable concepts and patterns within the existing SRE methodologies. Accordingly, the research 
contributions were classified into 5 categories as security patterns, taxonomies and ontologies, templates 
and profiles, catalogues and generic models and miscellaneous. 
Uznov et al. [Uzunov et al. 2012] proposed a comparative analysis of security engineering 
methodologies using a list of 12 criteria in the name of characteristics of security methodologies. This 
work provides guidelines on the selection of methodologies upon their comprehensiveness, applicability 
and uniqueness from the perspective of their adaptability to an industrial use. 
Mellado et al. [Mellado et al. 2010] provided a systematic review of comparative studies to analyse 
the internal /external verification and documentation support of the SRE methodologies. The evaluation 
is principally based on the quality characteristics of good requirements (e.g., traceability, 
comprehensibility, etc.) referred from the international standard IEEE 830 [IEEE 830 1998]. 
N Mead [Mead 2007] provided a comparative analysis of the requirement elicitation techniques based 
on some criteria such as learnability, client acceptance and durability of the requirement elicitation 
techniques, tools support etc. 
Nhlabatsi et al. [Nhlabatsi et al. 2009] proposed a comparative study of SRE methodologies in order to 
evaluate the extent to which they can support the evolution of secure software during the change 
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management process. Accordingly, the criteria address different perspectives such as the 
modularization, component architectures, change propagation and change impact analysis. 
2.1.1 State-of-the-art analysis 
Many interesting strategies and aspects were discussed in the related works. However they are not 
sufficient to evaluate the goodness of the SRE methodologies. In below we provide our analysis based 
on three issues related to requirements engineering process.  
2.1.1.1 Issue A: evaluation criteria coverage 
This issue concerns the evaluation criteria coverage perspective. The ultimate motive of SRE 
methodology is to help in capturing security requirements with regards to SRE process (i.e., elicitation, 
evaluation and documentation) [Fabian et al. 2010]. 
From our study, we noted that majority of the evaluation studies except [Mellado et al. 2010] lack a 
full emphasis on the whole SRE process. While some works [Fabian et al. 2010; Mayer 2009; Mead 
2007] emphasize on evaluating the extent of support to security requirements elicitation at earlier stages; 
some others [Souag et al. 2015] focus on evaluating the extent of support to documentation in terms of 
reusable patterns or modelling initiatives. In this respect, Mellado et al [Mellado et al. 2010] is 
considered as an exception because, the evaluation based on the quality characteristics of requirements 
explicitly covers all activities of SRE process [ISO29148:2011] (as discussed in Section 1.3). 
2.1.1.2 Issue B: Evaluation criteria affirmation 
Evaluation studies are performed to help researchers with the analysis of the information related to 
the supportable characteristics of SRE methodologies. Therefore, the evaluation criteria must  result 
from a systematic processes or standard methods like [ISO29148:2011], to facilitate their reuse. 
However, in the majority of works, the proposed evaluation criteria were ad hoc and lack affirmation 
on why the criteria were good enough for the evaluation [Mead 2007; Nhlabatsi et al. 2009; Uzunov et 
al. 2012]. In this aspect only [Mellado et al. 2010] can be noted as an exceptional case as the evaluation 
is based on the international standard [IEEE 830 1998]. 
2.1.1.3 Issue C: stakeholders involvement 
This issue concerns the involvement of stakeholder’s views while formulating the evaluation criteria. 
As highlighted in [Kotonya and Sommerville 1996], the requirements process is a human endeavour, 
and so the requirements elicitation method or tool must support the need for stakeholders to 
communicate their ideas and obtain feedback. In here, stakeholders refer to the SRE methodology users 
(e.g., requirement engineers). 
However, from our observation we found that none of these comparative studies involved SRE 
experts while formulating the evaluation criteria for an SRE methodology. Moreover, it is to note that 
almost all of the works acknowledge (either implicitly/explicitly) the significance of involving 
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stakeholders perspectives in the SRE process. For instance, [Fabian et al. 2010] includes a criterion that 
concerns the integration of a stakeholder’s views to support multilateral security requirement analysis.  
Altogether, from our state-of-the-art analysis, we conclude that there exists no generic evaluation 
methodology that can help in identifying the best suitable SRE methodology. Evaluation of an SRE 
methodology is an enduring problem. As long as new SRE methodologies keep arriving, this necessity 
of evaluation persists. Having this in mind, we decided to develop a generic evaluation methodology 
independent from the SRE context of use so that it can be instantiated to varying SRE contexts (e.g., 
network security, software security). 
2.2 RE-based SRE evaluation methodology 
We propose an SRE evaluation methodology that differentiates its strategy from previous 
comparative studies for two reasons. First, we involve the security experts that are the SRE end-users in 
the whole process. Secondly, identifying SRE evaluation criteria corresponds to identifying the 
characteristics of a good SRE methodology. This is similar to conventional requirements engineering 
problems, which deal with identifying the requirements of a system-to-be (section 1.3). In our case, the 
system-to-be is the good SRE methodology, labelled as the SRE-methodology-to-be. The evaluation 
criteria are indeed the requirements of the SRE-methodology-to-be, labelled as RM.  
Based on this idea, we propose an evaluation methodology built on the classic idea of a requirements 
engineering approach. It facilitates the elicitation of the evaluation criteria of SRE-methodology-to-be 
considering the SRE context of the stakeholders. Figure 25 depicts an overview of our approach. Similar 
to the RE process, it subsumes three steps: 1) identifying the problem context and eliciting the initial 
high-level characteristics goal. This is done by coupling the stakeholder’s working SRE context with 
the quality criteria of good security requirements; 2) refining the high-level characteristic goals into the 
final requirements of the SRE methodology-to-be (RM); 3) the final step deals with the evaluation of the 
existing SRE methodologies using the elicited requirements (RM) from step 2. 
 
Figure 25: Our evaluation methodology 
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The first step concerns the actual RE context of the system-to-be in which the requirements engineers 
intend to use the SRE-Methodology-to-be. The SRE methodology users represent the security experts 
who are regarded as stakeholders in our approach. This involvement of security experts is mandatory 
since helps to improve effective communication among them. Besides, works [Firesmith 2007; Kotonya 
and Sommerville 1996; Mead and Stehney 2005; Van Lamsweerde 2009; Walia and Carver 2009] 
consider the lack of people involvement is one of the major requirement problems. 
Since the ultimate goal of the security experts is to derive good security requirements regardless of 
the SRE context [Firesmith 2003; Mellado et al. 2010], the SRE methodology is a way to achieve this 
goal.  Therefore, the second step concerns the elicitation of the initial characteristics goal, which features 
a brainstorming session driven by two further refined research questions, i.e., RQ1a: what are good 
security requirements?, and RQ1b: what is a good security requirement engineering methodology? 
The study of RQ1a helps to setup a common understanding the characteristics of good quality 
security requirements. This study of RQ1a is independent from the SRE context and helps to watch for 
the issue A (described in section 2.1.1.1). This understanding will eventually drive the RQ1b, which 
helps to capture common perspectives of stakeholders’ anticipations over an ideal SRE methodology-
to-be in their SRE context. This study of RQ1a is independent to SRE context and helps to address the 
issue C (described in section 2.1.1.1). Indeed, this correlation between RQ1a and RQ1b has once been 
addressed in similar manner in the work of [Mar 1994], where three software requirements methods 
were compared using quality characteristics of good requirements. However, it has not defined any 
formal process. 
2.2.1 Formal modelling notation 
Our evaluation methodology follows a pure goal-based approach for eliciting requirements (RM) of 
the SRE-Methodology-to-be. We propose to use the goal modelling notation KAOS [Van Lamsweerde 
2009] to represent the goals refinement hierarchy, since it facilitates the traceability of the refined goals 
(see section 1.4.1.1). From a goal-based RE approach, the root goals represent the characteristics of 
good security requirements. They are refined into sub-goals that ultimately represent the anticipated 
characteristics of the SRE-methodology-to-be, which are eventually considered as the evaluation 
criteria. Thus, this goal based refinement process helps in affirming the formulation of evaluation criteria 
formally, which responds to the issue B (given in section 2.1.1.2).  
In the following sections, we instantiate this evaluation methodology in the network SRE context, in 
order to elicit the characteristics of the good SRE methodology. For this, we first need to explore the 
research question RQ1a: “what are good security requirements”. 
2.3 RQ1a: What are good security requirements? 
The common goal of any research contributions in the SRE community is ultimately to facilitate the 
capture of good security requirements [Firesmith 2003; Donald Firesmith 2007; Christian 2010; Van 
Lamsweerde et al. 2003; Mellado et al. 2010]. Because, if the security requirements are error-prone (i.e., 
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ambiguous, incorrect, inconsistent) then the security design will be ineffective regardless of the 
successful implementation of effective security solutions [Anderson 2010]. For instance, let’s take as an 
example the security requirement that states: “The data flow between device1 and device2 must be 
encrypted by a strong encryption algorithm”. This requirement is ambiguous because it is not explicitly 
defined what a strong encryption algorithm means. This ambiguity may lead to false assumptions 
concerning the rigor of security protection, which eventually impacts the decisions related to the security 
solutions.  
 
Figure 26: Quality Criteria - consolidated sources list 
The RE literature features numerous works describing different characteristics of good security 
requirements (a.k.a. quality criteria) such as unambiguous, traceable, consistent, etc. These 
characteristics help to verify and validate the quality aspects (i.e., the goodness) of security 
requirements. Nonetheless, there exists no consensus on how to characterize a good security 
requirement. In addition, there is no one complete and consistent set of characteristics [Mar 1994].  
In this context, we have studied 185 definitions from 17 literature works depicted in Figure 26. 
Different sources have listed different sets of criteria defining different characteristics of good 
requirements. The objective of this survey was to identify and study all the concepts discussed in each 
of the definitions, thereby analysing the possibility to reach a consensus.  
Since the list is huge, we have developed a graph-based analysis tool (see Appendix B) using python 
graph module Networkx [NetworkX developers 2016].  Figure 27 shows the complete view of the 
criteria conceptual graph generated using Gephi tool [Gephi.org]. 
The first result of our analysis has led us to a huge graph with 212 nodes and 278 edges. The graph 
projects a total of 71 criterion nodes and 141 concept nodes. Whereas, the nodes represent the criterion 
names and the concepts concerning the respective definitions, the edges correspond to the reference 
links expressing the semantic relation between a criterion and its associated concepts or between some 
criteria. 
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For labelling the reference links (edges) we used a standard format by associating the abbreviation 
of the criteria with the source ID of the respective authors in Figure 26 that propose the criteria. This 
ensures the single interpretation the reference links in the graph. For instance, the labels PS13, CS14 
and CL15 in Figure 28 refer to the respective definitions from the authors [Hull et al. 2010; Kar and 
Bailey 1996; Karpati et al. 2011] in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 27: Complete view of criteria conceptual graph 
From the graph, it is evident that every node is connected, highlighting the complexity of the semantic 
dependencies between the quality criteria. In addition, the dependencies are found ambiguous in some 
cases. Figure 28 depicts a sample of ambiguous definitions in which the definitions precise (PS), concise 
(CS) and clear (CL) from the authors results in a cyclic referencing, see Figure 28. This opens a new 
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problem that might require a proper research to analyse the semantic meaning of each of the criterion 
definitions. 
 
Figure 28: semantic dependencies - cyclic references 
In our evaluation methodology context, our objective is to define an exhaustive list of the existing 
characteristics that can be integrated to any SRE process. Suitably, we needed something simpler that 
can be used as a standard basis for eliciting the characteristics of the good SRE methodology. Suitably, 
we have identified a total of 20 distinctive criteria definitions. However, we have observed many 
variations in their corresponding definitions (e.g., different authors, for similar criteria, have defined 
different names). This entailed into defining a weaving methodology to express these variations. 
2.3.1 The weaving methodology 
The main goal of our weaving methodology is to showcase the indifferences in the criteria 
propositions of the unified list in a tabular format that featured a weaving strategy. Table in Figure 29 
consolidates our weaving results, which extends the results in [Bulusu et al. 2016]. Firstly, we give a 
unique identifier as a reference to each class of quality characteristics. We denote the term criterion 
(represented as C) that gives us a list of criteria as C1 to C20 (see Table 1). In addition, we have given 
a one-line definition to each criterion. If the characteristic is defined in ISO29148, we used the standard 
definition. Otherwise, we have taken references from respective authors if the characteristic description 
is straight forward (e.g., C8). When the characteristic descriptions seemed ambiguous (e.g., C10), we 
gave our own interpretation. 
Secondly, we used colours (i.e., blue and orange) and typographical emphasis (i.e., bold, underlined 
and italic) to differentiate some special cases as follows: Criterion definitions are highlighted in blue 
colour, when defined by only a single author (e.g., C13).  When different authors employ different names 
to describe similar quality characteristic (e.g., C3), then the respective criterion definition is emphasised 
in italic text. When a single author employs different names to describe similar quality characteristics 
(e.g., C3 by S13), then the respective criterion definition is emphasised in italic text.  Contrarily, when 
the same criterion name is used to describe different quality characteristics (same or different authors), 
then the characteristic name reflecting the uncommon mapping is underlined (e.g., C6 by S5 and C15 
by S15).  
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Figure 29: weaving the characteristics of good security requirements 
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In below we provide the weaving results related to colouring and typographical emphasis in form of 
list, to facilitate the comprehension of the table in Figure 29: 
- Characteristic definition: Single criterion defined by only one author – [C19] 
- Characteristic definition: Different names used for same criterion definition by different authors 
[C3, C5, C6, C7, C10, C11, C12, C14, C16, C17, C18, C20] 
- Characteristic Name: Different names defined by single author maps to single criterion [C3, C5, 
C11, C14, C15 and C17] 
- Characteristic name: Same name used by different authors to describe different criteria [S5:C6, 
S9:C13, S15:C15 and S17:C17] 
Thirdly, we distinguish the applicability of a criterion. If mentioned each, it shows that the respective 
quality characteristic targets a single (or a specific set of) requirement(s) (e.g., C10). If mentioned All, 
it states that the respective quality characteristic targets the whole set of requirements specifications 
document. See Applicability column in the Table in Figure 29. Fourthly and finally, we defined 
credibility scores to show the frequency of citations. We used qualitative scale high, medium and low. 
Credibility given high when cited by at least 15 authors; medium with citation of minimum 8 authors; 
low when cited below 4 authors; very low when cited by less than four authors. 
Altogether, we confine our RQ1a study to the Table in Figure 29, which is self-contained and gives 
a good overview of the non-consensus issue concerning the characteristics definitions. Since the 
interpretation of a definition can vary between different people with varying expertise levels, the table 
contents can raise several questions. This implies that our weaving methodology strategy provides a way 
that can trigger a discussion between experts. This will lead to brainstorming, which serves our purpose 
of initiating the elicitation process of our RE based evaluation methodology. 
2.4 RQ1b: what is a good SRE methodology? 
Since RQ1b is dependent on the SRE context, we describe the instantiation of our evaluation 
methodology to the Network SRE context IREHDO2 project.  The first two steps which concern the 
elicitation of the characteristics of a good SRE methodology from the network SRE context. While the 
final step concerns the evaluation of the SRE methodologies with regards to the elicited characteristics. 
2.4.1 Step1: Problem context and initial requirement analysis 
The initial step of our approach allows to analyse the security problem context of the security experts 
(mentioned in section 2.2). Accordingly, this step deals with interviewing the people involved in the 
security engineering process. We used the brainstorming technique to encourage the people to exchange 
ideas on “the best suitable SRE methodology” that best fits their needs. However, eliciting requirements 
is a hard task [Mead 2007]. The challenge here comes while organizing the brainstormed thoughts and 
ideas in a structured manner. For this, meetings/brainstorming with stakeholders must be controlled in 
order to be effective.  
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Therefore we employed the elicitation technique proposed by SABSA [Sherwood 2005], (see section 
1.3.2). The SABSA framework handles this elicitation issue by proposing a list of generic high-level 
business security concerns, called business attributes. These business attributes might lead to several 
interpretations. Interpretation of business attributes is refined for a specific problem context by a security 
architect who interacts with the business stakeholders. These business attributes guide the interaction 
during the elicitation phase. Respectively, in our case, the list of 20 quality criteria characterizing good 
security requirements given in Table1 is similar to business attributes in SABSA. Based on this list we 
developed an elicitation tool to trigger the discussions, see Figure 30.  
 
Figure 30: Elicitation tool 
The first three columns consolidate the weaving results from Figure 29. They subsume, a unique 
identifier, a quick one-line definition and corresponding synonyms found in the literature, to the weaving 
results in Figure 29. Finally, the last column describes the quality criteria via a set of questions, each 
No
Abstract criterion abstract 
definition
Criterion Names in 
use
QUESTIONAIRES
C3
Accomplishable within the given 
financial, time, legal, technical 
constraints
Feasible, Affordable, 
Legal, Achievable
►  Is it possible to capture the constraints of security 
requirements? such as technical? Legal? Time? Financial? 
[ISO29148 2011]
►  Does SRE methodology require training? is it within the project 
budget? [Firesmith 2003]
►  Is it possible to learn the SRE modelling within project 
timelines? [Mead 2007]
C5
Requirement should be able to 
refer back to its objective. 
Dependency or reference links 
between requirements should be 
explicity defined.
Traceable, 
Cohesiveness
Allocated, Satisfied/
Qualified
►  Is it possible to trace the security requirements back to the 
business needs and the vice-versa? [ISO29148 2011]
►  Is it possible to trace the group of similar requirements e.g., 
related to a particular abstraction level? [Firesmith 2003]
C6
Requirements should state what 
is needed but not how it is met
Abstract
Design independent
External observability
Implementation free
Right level of detail
Minimality
►  Is it possible to express security requirements without 
constraining the design solutions? [ISO29148 2011]
►  Is it possible to respect the abstraction needs of the 
stakeholders? [Mar 1994]
C10
Stakeholders needs are 
sufficienly expressed
Adequacy, 
Validatability
►  Is it possible to capture the individual needs of all the 
stakeholders involved in the SRE process? [Firesmith 2003]
►  Is it possible to express the domain environment assumptions 
and domain constraints for implementing the security 
requirements? [Van Lamsweerde et al. 2003b]
C11
Requirements defined are simple 
using common terminology and 
non-technical jargon.
Clear, Concise,
Comprehensibility,
Customer, User 
Orientation, 
Communicability
►  Is the SRE modelling notation comprehensible to all the 
stakeholders involved in the SRE process? [Firesmith 2003]
►  Is the formulation of security requirements is comprehensible 
to the stakehodlers? [Van Lamsweerde et al. 2003b]
►  Does is facilitate easy communication of the ideas among the 
stakeholders involved at different abstraction levels of the SRE 
process? [Wieringa 1996]
C20
Individual requirements should be 
defined with some attributes or 
annotations that characterizes 
them
Attributes, Metadata, 
Prioritized, Ranked 
for importance / 
degree of stability
►  Is it possible to express implementation costs of the security 
requirements? [ISO29148 2011]
►  Is it possible to express the risk attributes pertinent to the 
security requirements? [ISO29148 2011]
►  Is it possible to express the priority of the security 
requirements based on risk impact? [ISO29148 2011]
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reflecting different perspectives of the respective criterion definitions.  We have provided the references 
to the related works from which we have framed the sample set of questions. Altogether, each of the 
four columns corresponds to a different way to explain each criterion in order to facilitate the 
understanding as well as to ignite the brainstorming. For example,  
Axel van defines the Adequacy quality criterion (C10) as follows: “The requirements must address 
the actual needs of the system-to-be, explicitly expressed by the stakeholders or left implicit. The 
software requirements must be adequate translations of the system requirements. The domain properties 
must correctly describe laws in the problem world. The environment assumptions must be realistic”. 
Firesmith defines the validatability quality criterion that shares similar semantic meaning, which 
says: “Individual requirements must actually fulfil the needs and desires of their primary stakeholders 
and should be validatable: Is it possible to ensure that each requirement is actually what the customer 
representatives really want and need?” 
From these above definitions, we derive the evaluation perspectives as to verify if the SRE 
methodology under validation facilitates to capture the actual needs of the stakeholders involved in the 
SRE process. In addition, the methodology also must facilitate to capture the environment assumptions 
as well as the domain constraints pertain to the security requirements. For example, in network 
environment, the domain constraints can correspond to the security zoning which will enable security 
experts to determine the security requirements pertinent to varying security levels of the zones. 
Respectively, we form the questionnaires (see the last column of C10 criterion Figure 30), which will 
help us to trigger the discussion with the stakeholders.  
 It is to note that, the table in Figure 30 lists the first set of criteria that we considered to elicit the 
characteristics of good SRE methodology. This selection does not mean anything particular. Instead 
they correspond to the initial set of quality criteria that the security experts at AIRBUS showed keen 
interest. We used this list for initiating our discussion in meetings/interviews during the elicitation phase. 
It even provoked the security experts to ask questions on their daily tasks. 
2.4.2 Step2: Refinement (RM) requirement analysis 
The step2 of our evaluation approach deals with understanding the transformation of high-level 
abstract characteristic goals into verifiable evaluation criteria. Respectively, the high-level abstract goals 
realized in step 1 are coarse-grained into refined sub-goals fitting to specific demands of the security 
experts. This refinement process is also performed in collaboration with the security experts. Figure 31 
provides the complete view criteria refinement using KAOS goal modelling notation. This goal 
refinement extends the study [Bulusu et al. 2018b; Bulusu et al. 2018a]. 
The refinement uses the AND-construct and is continued until the final refined goals are realized as 
objectively verifiable. Thus the leaf goal nodes become the evaluation criteria RM. Tracing of the 
refinement characteristics goals conforms the correctness of the final evaluation criteria RM. Since we 
used natural language to describe the criteria and goal modelling notation to express the refinement, the 
affirmation of evaluation criteria is self-contained in the model. The high-level goals are the quality 
criteria from our elicitation tool (goals in orange). The elicited interpretations are the immediate sub-
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goals (in green). It is to note that different colouring of goals is provided solely to facilitate the 
understanding of the readers and this colouring is not compliant with KAOS notation.  
 
Figure 31: SRE-methodology-to-be goals refinement 
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In below we present our arguments relative to the refinement of 6 quality criteria given in Figure 30. 
It is to note that our arguments are based on our discussions and initial feedback with the security experts 
at AIRBUS. The goal refinement is subjected to changes with varying needs of the stakeholders. 
2.4.2.1 Adequacy (C10) and Metadata (C20) 
The Adequacy criterion stresses that the actual needs of all the stakeholders must be captured. In our 
project, we refer the security experts at AIRBUS working in network SRE context. Respectively, we 
refine the high-level quality goal pertaining to the adequacy quality criterion (C10 Figure 31) reads 
“RM1.1: The SRE-Methodology-to-be should facilitate in capturing the actual needs of network security 
experts”.  
Since network security zoning drives the elicitation of network security requirements at early stages, 
we have refined this goal into three sub-goals as: RM1.1.1 and RM1.1.2 to validate if the SRE 
methodology facilitates to specify security zones and derive network security requirements to mitigate 
risks. However, in order to determine the rigor of security/validation measures required at each security 
zones, the security experts must also need to be able to prioritize the elicited security requirements based 
on the risk impact. This requisite of risk analysts is derived into RM1.1.3, to validate if the facilities the 
prioritization of network security requirements.  
However, to ensure the verification of the capture of this information, [ISO29148:2011] describes 
risk related information and environment constraints to be linked as requirement attributes/metadata (see 
C20 in Figure 29). This confirms the refinement of sub-goals RM6.1, RM6.2, RM6.3 from the quality 
criterion C20 (RM6) in compliance with the aforementioned sub-goals (i.e., RM1.1.1, RM1.1.2, and 
RM1.1.3).  
2.4.2.1 Comprehensibility (C11) 
The refinement of quality criterion comprehensibility (C11) reads “RM2.1: The usage of 
methodology should be convenient to the requirement engineers to elicit network security 
requirements”. This concern drives the main motivation for all the model-based RE approaches because 
a security requirement not understood cannot be analysed or implemented properly.  
In this regard, the refined sub-goal RM2.1.1 refers to verify the ease of use of the language of the RE 
methodology itself. That means, which language is understandable to the users? A formal language? 
UML? Or a natural language? This aspect completely depends on the language familiarity of the 
stakeholders who are going to use the methodology. If they are familiar with formal notations then using 
formal languages is better. If they are familiar with UML, then it is better to choose the requirement 
engineering methodology accordingly.  
[Kotonya and Sommerville 1996] argues that verifying the suitability for agreement with the end-
user indicates the extent to which the notation is understandable (as opposed to ‘writeable’) by someone 
without formal training. Besides, different stakeholders, despite their familiarity, can understand the 
same requirements differently, which requires negotiation schemes to calculate an agreement [Ahmad 
2012]. In addition, learning and mastering a new language has a cost in terms of both money and time 
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[Mead 2007; Uzunov et al. 2012]. For example, a five day training course for SABSA framework costs 
around 3000 Euros [David Lynas]. In this thesis work, we do not consider these negotiation aspects. 
Instead, we confine our evaluation study to subjective analysis of degree of support to help understand 
the notation, learnability duration and ease of SRE modelling. This perspective is covered by the sub-
goals RM2.1.2, and RM2.1.3. 
2.4.2.2 Abstract (C6) 
In practice, security requirements evolve gradually building upon the ideas/perspectives of the 
subject experts (e.g., business analysis, security architects, and network security engineers) who work 
at different levels of abstraction in a network development cycle. This requires effective communication 
among the subject experts and the requirement engineers. Therefore, the SRE modelling language 
should support the needs of the people to easily communicate the ideas and feedback relative to the 
security requirements elicitation [Kotonya and Sommerville 1996; Wieringa 1996]. 
On the other hand, with reference to the implementation free criterion definition from 
[ISO29148:2011], the SRE methodology has to ensure that the security requirements stated express only 
the ‘WHAT’ aspects of security needs and must avoid the ‘HOW’ aspects of describing the security 
solutions. This is achieved by accommodating the separation of concerns so that the readers of the 
requirements specification should need to find only those parts of the requirements specification that are 
relevant to their area of expertise and all the other details must be hidden.  
Respectively, the refinement of quality criterion abstract (C6) includes two sub-gaols: RM3.1 to 
validate if the SRE methodology facilitated the easy communication between the stakeholders and 
RM3.2 to if the SRE methodology allows to specify the definite number of abstraction levels for 
expressing the separation of concerns. 
It is to note that, in some cases, it is possible that a sub-goal can be refined from multiple high-level 
goals. E.g. RM3.1 sub-goal, which states “the derived requirements must respect the abstraction level of 
respective stakeholders involved in designing and building aircraft network systems”. This sub-goal was 
initially refined from the root goal node RM3 related to the abstract characteristic criterion (see Figure 
31). However, we discovered it can also be refined from RM2 concerning comprehensibility 
characteristic criterion with a justification stating that the requirements not respecting the abstraction 
requirements of the stakeholders are not comprehensible. This type of refinement patterns explains the 
semantic dependencies between the quality characteristics. It also explicitly reflects the merging of the 
different security experts’ points of views. 
2.4.2.3 Traceability (C3) and Feasibility (C5) 
Finally, the goals RM4.1, RM5.1 and RM6.4 concern the supportability of SRE methodology with 
reference to traceability and feasibility characteristics (i.e., C3 and C5 in Figure 29) in network SRE 
context. Traceability is defined as the ability to establish the link between requirements to the source 
business objectives [ISO29148:2011]. So that it is possible to verify which high-level network security 
requirement is impacted when any inconsistency or anomaly is found in network security and monitoring 
configurations. Feasibility characteristics, on the other hand, concern the ability to verify if the security 
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requirements are realizable within the budget schedule and technology constraints [ISO29148:2011]. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this document, these characteristics hold one of the primary objectives of 
IREHDO2 project since it enables to analyse the implementation costs of network security requirements 
relative to business objectives. 
2.4.3 Elicited set of evaluation criteria (RM) 
As mentioned earlier, the refinement is performed until the final refined goals are realized as 
objectively verifiable. Only then the final sub-goals (leaf nodes) qualify as the evaluation criteria. Table 
1 provides the final list of elicited evaluation criteria in our network SRE context in IREHDO2 project. 
Table 1: Elicited evaluation criteria 
RM2.1.1: The SRE methodology modelling language terminology must be easily understood to the 
user 
RM2.1.2: The cost of the SRE methodology training should be minimal 
RM2.1.3: The time taken to learn the SRE methodology should be minimal 
RM3.1: Should support the need for users to easily communicate ideas and feedback respecting the 
abstraction needs 
RM3.2: Should support the need for users to clearly define the number of abstraction levels of 
refinement 
RM4.1: The methodology should facilitate to trace the network security requirements back to 
business objectives 
RM6.1: Must facilitate to specify and link network security zone information 
RM6.2: Should allow to annotate each requirement with risk attributes 
RM6.3: Should allow to annotate each requirement with priority information 
RM6.4: Must facilitate to specify the implementation costs of network security requirements 
Finally, our approach showed its benefits. We found new evaluation criteria (namely RM3.2, RM6.1 
and RM6.4) that were not proposed by previous comparison/evaluation studies (discussed in section 2.1). 
2.4.3.1 Verification methods 
The verification method expresses suggested ways to evaluate the SRE methodology against the 
evaluation criteria. However, the type of verification and respected performance metrics differs with 
respect to the type of evaluation criteria. We explain this using an example. Let’s consider the evaluation 
criterion RM6.2. Linking risk attributes to security requirements confirms the integration of risk analysis 
process to security requirement analysis. However, to what extent do SRE methods can support this 
integration features the central aspect of this verification method for RM6.2, see Table 2.  The 
performance metrics to measure the evaluation of this criterion.  
The qualitative scale used for performance measure expresses the degree of supportability, i.e., high 
– highly supportable, medium – partially supportable, low – less likely supportable and nil – not 
supportable. Wherein the colouring is used to enhance the understanding. 
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The types of measurements (i.e., nominal/ordinal/interval/ratio[Stevens 1946]) also vary with 
regards to types of criteria. The nominal scaling uses some labels (or names) to differentiate between 
different subjects. The ordinal scaling uses rank ordering to sort the subjects (e.g., less/more or small 
big). Finally, ratio and interval scales use some quantitative numeric values, which allows to estimate 
the degree of difference between the subjects in terms of some meaningful measurement units (e.g., 
length, duration, angles etc.). Ratio scales are very similar to interval scales. However, the interval 
scaling described the exact difference between the units (e.g., number of hours or number of days), 
which ratio scales allows to describe the difference in fractions (e.g., number of hours per day).  
Table 2: Verification method for RM6.2 
R
M
6.2: Verification method Performance 
measure 
The annotation feature is extensible. Requirements can be linked with risk attributes 
i.e., asset criticality, risk event, risk likelihood, control strength) 
high 
At least two risk attributes i.e., risk events and risk likelihood medium 
At least one risk attribute i.e., risk events low 
Requirement cannot be annotated with any kind risk information  nil 
For instance, the measurement scale for RM6.2 reflects the nominal scale, which verifies if each 
security requirement can be linked to risk attributes such as risk likelihood, control strength, threat 
events and risk impact with reference to FAIR taxonomy in Appendix A. Other evaluation criteria may 
require different verification approach. For instance, RM2.1.1 concerns comprehensibility aspects of the 
terminology used by SRE-methodology. The example verification technique employed for this criterion 
can refer to the satisfaction survey of the security experts. Respectively, RM2.1.1 uses an ordinal scale, 
which sorts the understandability factor of SRE methods based on the degree of support required; 
RM2.1.3 uses an interval scale, which allows to estimate the degree of learnability of the terminology 
used by SRE-methodology in terms of the number of weeks. Finally, evaluation criterion RM2.1.2, 
related to the cost of the training, requires the security experts to have knowledge on the internal budget. 
At the end of step 2, the verification methods and the associated metrics for each evaluation criterion is 
agreed (e.g., internal budget, time constraints) in accordance with the specific needs of the stakeholders 
(e.g., security experts) involved in the process.  
Likewise, each evaluation criteria is accorded with the verification method, which will be used during 
the evaluation process. In addition, the number of levels of scaling may also differ with regards to the 
type of verification methods. For instance, the verification of RM6.3 concerns verifying if the SRE 
methodology allows to attribute security requirements with priority information. This verification 
reflects binary information i.e., yes if it allows and no if it doesn’t allow. Respectively, we have only 
two scales i.e., high for yes and nil for no. 
It is to note that these verification methods and measured metrics must be defined in compliance with 
the needs of security experts who intend to use SRE methodology-to-be. This clear separation of 
evaluation criteria list to the verification methods and respective measurement metrics permits the 
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reusability of the evaluation criteria as well as facilitates in justifying the subjectivity of the criterion 
interpretation and relative evaluation perspectives. Appendix C provides the complete set of evaluation 
methods and measurement metrics that we have derived in our work. 
2.5 Step3: Evaluation of SRE Approaches 
This section describes the final step 3 of our SRE evaluation methodology. It concerns the evaluation 
of SRE approaches i.e., goal-oriented, agent-oriented and problem frames oriented with the help of the 
elicited evaluation criteria in step2.  Our evaluation is a qualitative assessment that is performed in 
collaboration with the security experts at AIRBUS. This task has taken us to organize two meeting 
sessions (i.e., precisely 3 hrs brainstorming and discussions for each of the meeting) with a time gap of 
around 2 months. 
We performed the evaluation in two iterations. In the first iteration, we authors acted as stakeholders 
(i.e., SRE analysts) and tested the three SRE approaches i.e., STS, Secure KAOS and SEPP using an 
example scenario. In this regard, first, a description of the system-to-be is presented to three different 
persons (playing the roles of RE analysts) from our research group whose initial knowledge fits the 
aforementioned methodologies the best. Then, each one of them has been asked to elaborate the system-
to-be using the methodology that the person is familiar with. During this process, the persons (acting 
SRE analysts) were not allowed to communicate with each other during the scenario analysis phase. 
Each of them has come up with a different list of security requirements for the system-to-be with respect 
to the. The resulting SRE models have been presented during a meeting that involved the security 
experts. Their feedback is recorded as our initial evaluation results, which enabled us to identify and 
select the SRE approach the found interesting to the experts at first instance. 
In the second iteration, the AIRBUS SRE experts are directly asked to test the SRE approach that 
found interesting to them during the first iteration. The feedback of this second iteration enabled us to 
finalize the evaluation results. In each iteration, a different use case scenario is employed in order to 
ensure the credibility of the capture of evaluation experience. In below we provide the details of the 
evaluation performed in two iterations. 
2.5.1 Evaluation Iteration 1 – Use case Scenario 1 
We first present the use case scenario used in this iteration. The scenario concerns a task related to 
the aircraft maintenance process ensuring the compliance with safety regulations such as Airworthiness 
directives. The objective of this task is to anticipate the health of the on-board aircraft system by 
verifying specific parameters (e.g., fuel indicator) in order to ensure the readiness of the aircraft prior to 
taking the next trip.  The Onboard aircraft system constitutes of two applications i.e., aircraft control 
application and monitoring application (see Figure 32). These two applications are connected to each 
other via an internal avionic bus network (represented as double arrow line in red colour in Figure 32).  
The aircraft control application captures the observed parameters from various sensors and indicators 
of the aircraft system, and transmits them to the monitoring application.  Every time the aircraft has 
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landed, the responsible person (i.e., maintainer) must connect his/her laptop to the monitoring 
application in order to fetch the monitored parameters. However, there is no direct access to the 
monitoring application. The connection is permitted only in the secured network connection within the 
secured premises of the aircraft. The maintainer must carry the laptop to the airport ground in order to 
access the network. In this process, the maintainer is assumed to be trusted, while the laptop is assumed 
as untrusted. 
 
Figure 32: Example scenario 1 
The business risk impact of this scenario is expressed in terms of the integrity and availability of the 
monitored parameters. Although these parameters do not threaten the safety of the aircraft, they may 
impact the critical decision related to deciding whether the aircraft is ready to fly or not. For instance, 
the non-availability of these parameters may delay the inspection process that may incur loss in terms 
of reducing the number of trips per day. While the lack of integrity may cause some problems when the 
faulty aircraft is assumed as correctly functioning and permitted to take the next trip. 
Respectively, the security objectives concern the protection of the integrity and availability of the 
monitored parameters. The aircraft network security design solutions must ensure a trusted transmission 
of parameters from the monitoring application to the monitoring application and then to the laptop of 
maintenance people. It should also ensure that the access to the aircraft control application is restricted 
and the laptop is allowed to connect to the monitoring application only. This implies that network 
security requirements need to be specified in order to closely monitor communication traffic between 
laptop and the monitoring application. In this regard, some example security measures may include: 
VPN connection with some strong encryption algorithm, configuring firewalls, authentication on the 
WIFI access point or router. The security experts at AIRBUS wanted to confirm if these measures are 
sufficient to mitigate the risks. In addition, they wanted to verify the cost of network security solutions 
to compare different choices. E.g., maintenance people can potentially connect to the aircraft using an 
Ethernet cable or a wireless connection.  
The first iteration concerns the implementation of the aforementioned scenario using the three 
methods Secure KAOS, STS and SEPP. The discussion part consolidates our observations on the SRE 
modelling experience of each method. We highlight the relative evaluation criteria in parenthesis to 
facilitate the understanding of which part of the observations are subjected to which evaluation criteria. 
Finally, in section 2.5.1.4, we provide the initial feedback and evaluation results of iteration 1. 
2.5 Step3: Evaluation of SRE Approaches   51 
Network Security Requirements Engineering Methodology S Teja BULUSU 
2.5.1.1 Scenario implementation using Secure KAOS 
For the implementation, we used the KAOS tool known as Objectiver [Respect-IT]. The 
experimentation was conducted using the free trial version which was valid for three months (refers to 
the criterion RM2.1.2). Figure 33 depicts a sample goal model specified in our example scenario context 
(refer section 1.4.1.1 for the details on KAOS modelling notation). It required some effort to get 
acquainted with the tool and its terminology through the help of guidelines and cited references (refers 
to the criterion RM2.1.1 and RM2.1.3). In particular, the security experts expressed some concerns 
regarding the goal patterns based on formal temporal logic.  
KAOS drives RE analyst to define agents later in the RE process. As consequence, it does not help 
in expressing the relation between the agents and their interaction dependencies. For instance, while 
defining network agents (e.g., firewalls) in our scenario analysis, we encountered issues when we had 
to add a new device in the network. In this regard, a conceptual diagram of the network would have been 
more concise and clear. For example, it is not clear on how to express firewall configurations that restrict 
access to aircraft to only maintenance people? As consequence, we had difficulty in specifying network 
security requirements on network agents, particularly relative to security zoning (RM3.1). Furthermore, 
KAOS modelling perspective the abstractions is expressed using the four modelling activities (i.e., goal, 
responsibility, object /operation) (refer section 1.4.1.1). However, this abstraction perspective does not 
facilitate to explicitly differentiate goals/agents of the abstraction levels in network security engineering 
process (RM3.2). Otherwise, KAOS modelling notation provides good support to achieve traceability 
(RM4.1). 
 
Figure 33: Secure KAOS goal specification (sample) 
Coming to the integration of risk analysis concepts, a link between security requirements and risk 
information is explicitly expressed using the concepts of obstacles/anti-goals that are represented as 
relations such as obstruction/resolution. For example, in Figure 33, the security goal “PROTECTION 
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NEED: monitoring data should be available when connected” resolves the anti-goal “maintenance 
unavailable”. The resolution link is expressed using green arrowhead. These anti-goals can be further 
refined like ‘normal’ goals resulting in the specification of attack trees. The obstacles and anti-goals 
include two risk attributes likelihood and criticality (RM6.2) while security goals are attributed with 
ordinal priority scale (RM6.3). However, there is no explicit relationship defined between the priority of 
a security goal/requirement and the risk of an associated obstacle. In addition, it helps in observing the 
environmental constraints upon the goals through specifying domain properties. (e.g., physical laws). 
For instance, the trust assumptions on agents are expressed using the domain properties, see Figure 33. 
Table 3 consolidates the individual evaluation of Secure KAOS relative to the verification methods and 
measurement metrics given in Appendix C. 
Table 3: Individual evaluation of Secure KAOS 
Evaluation criteria (RM) Secure KAOS 
RM2.1.1: The SRE methodology modelling language terminology must be easily 
understood to the user 
medium 
RM2.1.2: The cost of the SRE methodology training should be minimal medium 
RM2.1.3: The time taken to learn the SRE methodology should be minimal medium 
RM3.1: Should support the need for users to easily communicate ideas and 
feedback respecting the abstraction needs 
nil 
RM3.2: Should support the need for users to clearly define the number of 
abstraction levels of refinement 
nil 
RM4.1: The methodology should facilitate to trace the network security 
requirements back to business objectives 
high 
RM6.1: Must facilitate to specify and link network security zone information nil 
RM6.2: Should allow to annotate each requirement with risk attributes medium 
RM6.3: Should allow to annotate each requirement with priority information high 
RM6.4: Must facilitate to specify the implementation costs of network security 
requirements 
nil 
2.5.1.2 Evaluation of STS Methodology 
STS is supported by a tool of the same name. In our evaluation, we explored the social modelling of 
STS notation (see section 1.4.2.1). Figure 34 depicts an example of secure problem frames specification. 
It is not an open source but the tool is freely available to public use (RM2.1.2). The usage of simple 
terminology as well as the user friendly tool took less effort to get used to the overall concepts and 
terminology (RM2.1.1 and RM2.1.3). The security experts provided positive feedback concerning the 
comprehensibility aspects. 
Unlike KAOS, STS does not support full-fledged traceability of the security goals being refined into 
security requirements (RM4.1). Because, from STS point of view, the security needs are implicitly 
expressed either in the form of security constraints attributes (e.g., integrity/availability/non-repudiation 
etc.,) over the interaction dependencies in social view; or in the form of constrained permissions (e.g., 
read/ modify/ produce/transmit) upon the provision of the resources in authorization view.  Figure 34 
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highlights the security constraints over delegated goals in blue dashed rectangle, which cannot be refined 
further into network security requirements (RM3.1).  
 
Figure 34: STS social view specification (sample) 
On the other hand, STS provides good support to express network agents and interaction 
dependencies. However, we had an issue in handling the dependencies between the multiple network 
agents as the social view grow larger. Furthermore, from STS modelling perspective the abstractions is 
expressed using the three modelling views (i.e., social view, authorization view, information view) as 
described in section 1.4.2.1. This abstraction perspective respects the separation of concerns specific to 
authorization security problem context, which does not help to explicitly describe the separation of 
concerns of the agents/actors specific to network security problem context (RM3.2). 
In STS, the threat analysis is used to show the effects over goal trees and goal/resource relationships 
that may have a threating event. Also, it defines attributes (implicit) to link countermeasures to threat 
events (RM6.2). However, the threat analysis is limited to threat event propagation. Thereby it does not 
facilitate the expressing of security needs upon the threats related to environmental risks. Also, it does 
not have a facility to prioritize goals or threats like in KAOS (RM6.3). Table 4 consolidates the individual 
evaluation of STS. Figure 34 shows that the threat event “maintenance unavailable” threatens the goal 
make aircraft maintenance. Likewise, the threat event “bad maintenance” threatens three goals. When 
the threats are propagated, on can witness how the threat impact traces back to the root objective node. 
Respectively, the “maintenance unavailable” threatens the business objective “run business”. 
Table 4: Individual evaluation of STS 
Evaluation criteria (RM) STS 
RM2.1.1: The SRE methodology modelling language terminology must be easily 
understood to the user 
high 
RM2.1.2: The cost of the SRE methodology training should be minimal high 
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RM2.1.3: The time taken to learn the SRE methodology should be minimal high 
RM3.1: Should support the need for users to easily communicate ideas and 
feedback respecting the abstraction needs 
nil 
RM3.2: Should support the need for users to clearly define the number of 
abstraction levels of refinement 
nil 
RM4.1: The methodology should facilitate to trace the network security 
requirements back to business objectives 
medium 
RM6.1: Must facilitate to specify and link network security zone information nil 
RM6.2: Should allow to annotate each requirement with risk attributes low 
RM6.3: Should allow to annotate each requirement with priority information nil 
RM6.4: Must facilitate to specify the implementation costs of network security 
requirements 
nil 
2.5.1.3 Evaluation SEPP Methodology 
SEPP guides the RE analyst to define security problem patterns, called as security problem frames 
(SPF). Figure 35 depicts an example of secure problem frames specification for integrity protection 
scheme.The security requirements is constrained on the communication network domain. The link 
between domains depicts that there is some shared phenomena (i.e., shared attributes) (as described in 
section 1.4.3). The non-availability of a tool for SEPP made our experimentation difficult (RM2.1.2). It 
took some extra effort to get acquainted with the concepts and terminology even with the help of the 
cited references (RM2.1.1 and RM2.1.3). Therefore, we have designed all the SPF and CSPF patterns 
models (for the scenario) manually which consumed more time (RM2.1.3). In addition, there is a 
traceability issue (RM4.1) as well. During our experimentation, we had issues in knowing all the acting 
domains in a network environment, in particular during the early stages. Having a network design will 
facilitate the problem analysis.  
 
Figure 35: SEPP SPF diagram (sample) 
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From SEPP perspective, the security problems (security goals) are identified using the what-if 
analysis technique similar to the Hazard analysis [Kletz 1999]. But it does not provide explicit linking 
between the risk and the associated security goal (RM6.2). This makes the risk definition implicit. The 
constraints on the security requirements are expressed in terms of pre-conditions attributes of SPF. 
These are the formalized conditions that must be satisfied by the problem environment on prior i.e., 
before applying the security problem frame. Similarly, the post-conditions attributes correspond to the 
formal expression of the security requirements. 
Furthermore, SEPP facilitates a two level abstraction through separation of security problems from 
solutions in a generic perspective. However, this abstraction perspective respects the separation of 
concerns  specific to authorization security problem context, which does not help to explicitly describe 
the separation of concerns of the agents/actors specific to network security problem context (RM3.2). 
Lastly, similar to STS, it does not support to attribute security requirements with either priority or 
implementation cost related information (RM6.3 and RM6.4). Table 5 consolidates the individual 
evaluation of STS. 
Table 5: Individual evaluation of SEPP 
Evaluation criteria (RM) SEPP 
RM2.1.1: The SRE methodology modelling language terminology must be easily 
understood to the user 
low 
RM2.1.2: The cost of the SRE methodology training should be minimal low 
RM2.1.3: The time taken to learn the SRE methodology should be minimal low 
RM3.1: Should support the need for users to easily communicate ideas and 
feedback respecting the abstraction needs 
nil 
RM3.2: Should support the need for users to clearly define the number of 
abstraction levels of refinement 
nil 
RM4.1: The methodology should facilitate to trace the network security 
requirements back to business objectives 
low 
RM6.1: Must facilitate to specify and link network security zone information nil 
RM6.2: Should allow to annotate each requirement with risk attributes nil 
RM6.3: Should allow to annotate each requirement with priority information nil 
RM6.4: Must facilitate to specify the implementation costs of network security 
requirements 
nil 
2.5.1.4 Evaluation iteration 1 – consolidated results and discussion 
In Table 6, we resumed the evaluation results of the SRE methodologies to provide a consolidated 
view for comparison (consolidates Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5). Firs column displays the high-level 
root goals of evaluation criteria (refer Figure 31). The second column lists the elicited criteria that 
correspond to the leaf nodes in Figure 31. The remaining three columns display the respective 
measurement scales for each of the three SRE methods. 
Table 6: Sample of the evaluation results 
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Quality criteria 
(Root goal nodes) 
Elicited evaluation criteria list (RM) STS Secure 
KAOS 
SEPP 
Comprehensibility 
(C11) 
RM2.1.1: The SRE methodology modelling 
language terminology must be easily 
understood to the user 
high medium low 
RM2.1.2: The cost of the SRE methodology 
training should be minimal 
high medium low 
RM2.1.3: The time taken to learn the SRE 
methodology should be minimal 
high medium low 
Abstract (C6) 
RM3.1: Should support the need for users to 
easily communicate ideas and feedback 
respecting the abstraction needs 
nil nil nil 
RM3.2: Should support the need for users to 
clearly define the number of abstraction levels 
of refinement 
nil nil nil 
Traceability (C4) 
RM4.1: The methodology should facilitate to 
trace the (network) security requirements back 
to business objectives 
medium high low 
Feasibility (C5) 
Adequacy (C10) 
Metadata (C20) 
RM6.1: Must facilitate to specify and link 
network security zone information 
nil nil nil 
Metadata (C20) 
RM6.2: Should allow to annotate each 
requirement with risk attributes 
low medium nil 
Adequacy (C11) 
Metadata (C20) 
RM6.3: Should allow to annotate each 
requirement with priority information 
nil high nil 
Feasibility (C5) 
Metadata (C20) 
RM6.4: Must facilitate to specify the 
implementation costs of network security 
requirements 
nil nil nil 
Each approach exhibits different features. STS is interesting when it concerns comprehensibility 
factors (i.e., RM2.1.1, RM2.1.2, RM2.1.3), Secure KAOS is interesting in terms of traceability aspects 
(RM4.1) as well as the integration of risk analysis information. Whereas, the modelling terminology and 
notation of SEPP seemed difficult to learn and adapt. Therefore, comparatively, STS and secure KAOS 
seem to be more suitable to our SRE context compared to SEPP. However, some of our requirements 
RM were not supported by any of the three methodologies (i.e., RM3.1, RM3.2, RM6.1, and RM6.4). 
The criteria RM3.1 and RM6.1 are notably related to the network SRE context that concerns the 
integration of network security zoning. Without this support, it would be difficult to elicit network 
security requirements at early stages. Furthermore, the requirement concerning the abstraction 
characteristic goal cannot be respected by the three SRE methods (RM3.2). As a consequence, it is not 
known how to express the security problem context of all the stakeholders including the business 
analysts, and the security analysts of all systems connected to the network. Finally, the quality criterion 
feasibility has been refined into ‘The SRE-methodology-to-be helps in considering the cost of security 
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requirements’. However, none of the three methodologies allows to express the financial attributes 
(RM6.4). 
2.5.2 Evaluation iteration 2 – use case scenario 2 
As mentioned earlier, the first iteration of evaluation the authors acted as stakeholders and tested the 
SRE models, which are then presented to the stakeholders i.e., security experts, to capture their feedback. 
The second iteration encompasses active participation of stakeholders (i.e., security experts from 
AIRBUS) for evaluating the STS modelling notation. The reason for choosing STS is evident as it holds 
high rating in terms of comprehensibility aspects. The purpose of this second evaluation is capture the 
feedback from user’s real-time experience of SRE modelling in STS using a new use case scenario. In 
below we first provide the scenario in a plain textual description as presented to us as an initial step.  
The scenario contains two business needs, see Figure 36. The first business need concerns the safety 
measures related to the aircraft. It implies that the aircraft needs to be updated with correct load 
information through a portable device. The update centre is a sub-component in the aircraft equipment, 
which reads these load parameters and performs an auto-update. The security needs of this activity 
concern that the aircraft network security design must ensure the secure transmission of these parameters 
between the mobile devices to the on-board update centre application. Otherwise, the direct connectivity 
of the mobile devices with the aircraft equipment is forbidden. 
 
Figure 36: AIRBUS new scenario 
The second business need concerns in-flight entertainment services to improve passengers’ inflight 
condition. It describes the necessary functionalities of the aircraft equipment (e.g., passenger 
entertainment panel) to entertain the passengers during their flight journey. For example, one 
functionality is to provide the real-time flight status to the passengers. This functionality requires 
connectivity between the aircraft control panel, centralized on-board entertainment system component 
and the passengers’ equipment panels. The security needs concern the availability of the aircraft’s 
information (e.g., speed, altitude, temperature, distance, etc.) to the passengers accessing the respective 
entertainment system display panels. Respectively, the aircraft inflight network security design must 
ensure the availability of correct information to the passengers.  
2.5.3 Evaluation iteration 2 – STS modelling and feedback discussion 
From our initial analyses, we already know by now that STS provides no support to describe the 
separation of concerns. In this experiment, we investigate if we can apply SABSA layered approach 
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(given in section 1.3.2) to STS modelling (given in section 1.4.2.1) and see how it suites. In SABSA, 
network security requirement analysis (related to security zoning) starts from designers view (i.e., LV3). 
Since STS do not support to derive network security zoning therefore we confine this experiment to the 
first two view alone (i.e., Business view and Architect’s view). This implied that any discussion related 
to network security requirement analysis has been purposefully discarded. This strict confinement to the 
high-level abstraction has helped in improving the elicitation activity by provoking a long discussion. 
Indeed, this strict confinement to the abstraction has helped the team in focusing more on ‘WHAT’ 
perspectives of security needs rather than ‘HOW’ perspective of security needs. During this 
experimentation, we observed that the elicitation part of the scenario seemed clear and the provoked 
discussion. This has eventually developed the scenario details as well, see Figure 37.  
 
Figure 37: Use case scenario 2 STS social view 
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Initially, the description of this scenario was expressed in few lines. However, during the process of 
SRE modelling, the provoked discussion has developed the scenario details which resulted in the 
following social view in Figure 37.  In particular, for the first business need, new agents such as AIRBUS 
or airline are introduced, which were not mentioned during the textual description of the scenario given 
in Figure 36. In addition, we observed that the goals of the maintainer agent are enhanced as well. 
However, the second business need related to passenger entertainment system remained unchanged. The 
respective textual description of the enhanced scenario after SRE modelling in STS is as follows.  
The first business need concerns the safety measures related to the aircraft. It implies that the aircraft 
needs to be updated with correct load information in compliance with the aircraft service bulletin. The 
service bulletin comprises of necessary settings and measured parameters to ensure the safe and correct 
functioning of the aircraft. The aircraft manufacturing company (e.g., AIRBUS) provides the service 
bulletin to the airline as part of the contractual agreement.  The airline translates the service bulletin to 
create an update procedure and assigns the task of updating the aircraft to the responsible person from 
the maintenance team. The person responsible for maintenance task (i.e., maintainer) generates the 
customized load information with reference to the update procedure and transmits them to the aircraft’s 
update centre application through a mobile device.  
To consolidate, the overall feedback of STS notation from the two iterations confirms that STS 
modelling is interesting and easy to adapt. The overall experiment took us 2 hours of time, which proves 
the fact that SRE modelling concepts can be learned in short time (RM2.1.3). However, the STS 
modelling requires the users to know all the agents and their respective before beginning the process. 
Our experiment shows that in real-time it is not the case because the information on agents as well as 
their goals is evolved gradually during the elicitation process. 
Although STS modelling concepts are interesting and easy to adapt, it does not help to describe the 
gradual growth of the social model i.e., where to begin or how agents are introduced in the model. In 
addition, considering the traceability or risk analysis aspects, STS provides less support while compared 
to Secure KAOS (see Table 6). Indeed, the first two layers of SABSA modelling emphasize on risk 
analysis and risk control objectives. Therefore, STS modelling language is an interesting choice to apply 
the layering but require some enhancements in terms of integrating risk analysis concepts and 
traceability attributes. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we described an evaluation methodology that facilitates the evaluation of SRE 
methodologies. This methodology principally explores the research questions what are good security 
requirements and what is a good SRE methodology. Since there exists no complete list of quality 
characteristics, we first provided a unified list of 20 criteria.  
In our evaluation context, we considered 6 quality criteria (i.e., adequacy (C10), comprehensibility 
(C11), traceability (C5), abstract (C6), feasibility (C3) and metadata (C21)), which resulted in 10 
evaluation criteria (i.e., RM2.1.1, RM2.1.2, RM2.1.3, RM3.1, RM3.2, RM4.1, RM6.1, RM6.2, RM6.3 and 
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RM6.4). These criteria correspond to the anticipated characteristics of good SRE methodology for 
network security from the perspective of security experts involved in IREHOD2 project. 
The evaluation study of SRE approaches (i.e., Secure KAOS, STS and SEPP) shows that each 
approach exhibits different features. In particular, STS is very interesting when it concerns 
comprehensibility factors (i.e., RM2.1.1, RM2.1.2, RM2.1.3), Secure KAOS is interesting in terms of 
traceability aspects (RM4.1). Whereas, the modelling terminology and notation of SEPP seemed difficult 
to learn and adapt. 
When considering SABSA layered framework for abstraction, STS modelling is an interesting choice 
for expressing high-level security objectives. But it requires some enhancements from risk analysis part 
as well as traceability aspects. Finally, we needed a methodology to define network security 
requirements and cost attributes relative to business risk impact. 
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 PROPOSED SRE METHODOLOGY – A 
LAYER BASED APPROACH 
From our evaluation experience, we confirm that an SRE approach suitable for network security 
requirements analysis is missing. On the other hand, security zoning is a widely recognized practice for 
analysing early stage network security requirements but lacks a rigorous approach (refer section 1.5.1). 
These issues gave rise to our second research question RQ2: How to define a good SRE methodology 
that facilitates the network security requirements elicitation and refinement i.e., from high-level business 
objectives into low-level network security zoning requirements. 
 Since networks are intermediary that interconnects all the software/systems within an enterprise, we 
need to build a new SRE methodology, which must facilitate involving all the stakeholders with different 
viewpoints. It should also integrate security zoning as it concerns the security problem context of 
security architects, which will help in rightly distributing security controls across network security 
architecture relative to business risk impact.  
We adopted SABSA layered framework for our SRE methodology. We consider the first three 
layered views of SABSA (i.e., Business view, Architect’s view and designers view), which 
corresponding to the early phases of SRE process. We use STS modelling to express high-level security 
requirements at Business view and Architect’s view. For risk analysis part, we propose a new extension 
of STS called Anti-STS for modelling attacks as multi-agent systems in a network. At Designer’s view, 
we propose a methodology that automates parts of the process of eliciting security zones and derived 
network security requirements. Finally, to link the three abstract views, we propose a modelling notation 
that merges STS and secure KAOS modelling concepts. 
This chapter is dedicated to present our three-layered SRE methodology and its illustration using the 
use case scenario 1 (presented in section 2.5.1). We first present the conceptual model of our proposed 
SRE methodology, which describes our layer based SRE modelling (section 3.1). In this respect, we 
describe the modelling notion of proposed SRE methodology and Anti-STS, for business and architect 
views. Next, we introduce the concepts as well as the formal approach of our zone modelling 
methodology for Designer’s view. Finally, we illustrate our SRE methodology in detail using the use 
case scenario, which describes linking of three layers (section 3.2).  
This chapter consolidates the following contributions [Bulusu et al. 2017b; Bulusu et al. 2018c; 
Laborde et al. 2019]. 
3.1 SRE methodology conceptual model 
The conceptual model of our SRE methodology handles three issues: First, to apply SABSA 
abstraction for integrating the concepts of STS and KAOS. Second, to integrate risk analysis modelling 
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in order to enhance the risk analysis concepts of STS and Secure KAOS in order to suite to network 
environment. Third and finally, to define a formal network security zoning. We describe how our model 
addresses these issues in the following. 
3.1.1 Layer based abstraction modelling concepts 
The Figure 38 depicts the underlying conceptual model of our layer based SRE methodology. It is 
built based on the SABSA framework (refer section 1.3.2). Since we focus on early stages of security 
requirements engineering, we considered only the first three layered views. Each layered view (LV) 
represents the requirement-engineering context of the people working at different abstraction levels 
during a security engineering process. We refer to these entities as stakeholders who include business 
users, architects, designers, builders and the tradesmen. Starting with the security needs identified at 
Business view, each successive layer introduces a new level of abstraction and detail towards the design 
and implementation of the network security design. 
Respectively, the Business view deals with the capture of business objectives needs and constraints 
that are important to do business. The Architect’s view concerns with the capture of high-level security 
needs related to the protection of the security entities involved in the fulfilment of the business 
objectives. The elicitation activity at the Designer’s view concerns with the capture of high-level 
network security requirements. Together, these views enable the separation of concerns and security 
needs respecting the abstraction needs of the people. 
 
Figure 38: Initial conceptual model of our layer based SRE methodology 
Because our methodology constitutes different layered views involving different stakeholders, this 
impelled the necessity of choosing rightful SRE methodologies that are suitable with regards the 
comprehensibility level of the stakeholders. So that it becomes easier to establish good communication 
with the stakeholders while eliciting and evaluating the requirements. Therefore, we propose to model 
the requirement needs and risks using different approaches at different layers. Thanks to our evaluation 
feedback in Table 6, which helped in choosing the SRE approaches suiting the abstraction needs.  
We use STS, for expressing the needs of first two views i.e., Business view and Architect’s view, 
since our feedback evaluation from chapter 2 shows that it is easy to adapt (see Figure 38). However, 
when coming to risk analysis, STS seemed less interesting, so we propose a new multi anti-agent threat 
model named Anti-STS that describe the social dependency between attacking agents in a network 
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environment. Finally, at designers view, we propose a new zone modelling methodology based on the 
security design principles.  
Since we are using different SRE methodologies, it is necessary to link all the information and the 
elicited requirements goals provided in every layer. This is to ensure the traceability between the 
business objectives and the high-level network security requirements. For this, we propose to employ 
the KAOS goal modelling notation as it is good for traceability (see Table 6). Our idea is to transform 
the knowledge of each model at the end of each abstract view into KAOS goal modelling notation (see 
Figure 38). So that, in the end, we shall have one final specification language i.e., in KAOS.  
We tested this conceptual model using the use case scenario 1 and presented the same to the security 
experts. From our experience, we observed an additional overhead when we had to transform the results 
of each view into KAOS goal modelling notation. Furthermore, our security experts expressed concerns 
that this conceptual model requires the users to expertise KAOS goal modelling as well. Considering 
this feedback, we decided to propose a new modelling notation that merges the concepts of STS and 
KAOS, which modifies our conceptual model as shown in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39: Finalized conceptual model of our layer based SRE methodology 
3.1.1.1 Our proposed SRE modelling notation 
We were careful to stay simple when coming to introducing new modelling notation as it would 
impact the comprehensibility aspects. Therefore, we have given priority to reuse the SRE modelling 
concepts of STS and Secure KAOS since SRE community is familiar with them. The purpose of merging 
is to accommodate abstraction layers without disturbing the modelling features of STS and Secure 
KAOS. This way, we achieve the traceability features as well as we can able to introduce the 
characteristics of the abstraction level. 
In practice, the business users have an idea and the same idea is taken forward to the people working 
at different levels of the security engineering process. In this process, the information needed to realize 
the idea into proper requirements that are revealed in an incremental manner at each abstraction view. 
Goal refinement on Secure KAOS reflects this perspective, which allows the refinement of business 
objectives into security requirements. While a goal always captures the ‘WHAT’ perspectives of the 
needs, the ‘WHY’ and ‘HOW’ perspectives of the needs reflects the rationale subjected to the refinement 
process (see Figure 40). Also, in order to justify the refinement of the goals from high-level objectives 
we need to clearly specify the rationale behind the goal refinement. 
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Figure 40: generic goal refinement rationale (refer KAOS) 
This goal refinement is similar to the underlying perspective of abstraction layering of our conceptual 
model.  Wherein, in our model, each layer comprises of STS modelling concepts i.e., social actors, goals 
and document resources. As the refinement proceeds to the next levels, the precision over the goal 
refinement enhances and the social actors at high abstraction level are evolved into the system entities. 
To express this type of refinement, we introduce a new notion called composite requirement, which 
takes the form of goal used in KAOS model, see Figure 41. 
 
Figure 41: Composite requirement notation 
The composite requirement is expressed using a parallelogram with blue coloured frame that 
encompasses STS modelling, see Figure 41. Each composite requirement includes social actors 
concerned with the business need. This implies that the composite requirement helps to confine the 
grouping the social actors with respect to an abstraction level. This composite requirements corresponds 
to a goal in KAOS, however, the goal information is expressed using STS social modelling notation. 
Every composite requirement frame must contain at least one actor with a responsibility goal which is 
visually expressed as shown in Figure 41. This is where we successfully integrate the abstraction levels 
by retaining the SRE modelling features of STS and KAOS modelling notations.  
In addition, the composite requirement comes with two mandatory attributes. First, attribute concerns 
numbering to achieve uniqueness of the level. The second attribute concerns the meta-data defining the 
layered view to express the abstraction view the composite requirement belongs to it. It is to note that 
unlike to SABSA, in our notation, an abstraction view may include more than one refinement levels. 
For instance, we may require two refinement levels to express the Business view. This improves the 
flexibility of refinement, which is not possible in SABSA. 
To consolidate, we formally express these integration rules as follows. Let S be the network system-
to-be of our research project context is formally represented as: S = < COMPREQ, AGENT, GOAL, 
SCOPEAG >, Where, 
 GOAL is the set of responsibility goals of an agent 
 AGENT is the set of agents 
 COMPREQ is the set of composite requirements 
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 SCOPEAG  GOAL x AGENT is a relation that states a goal is within the scope of an agent. 
 NUM: COMPREQ → ℕ returns the identification number of the refinement level of the 
composite requirement 
 LV: COMPREQ → {Business view, Architect’s view, Designer’s view} returns the layered 
abstraction view of the composite requirement 
 REFINE_LEVELS  LV x NUM is a relation that states the an abstraction view has a 
refinement level 
Respectively, the newly introduced formal rules related to our composite requirements are as 
follows: 
Composite Requirement – Rule1: The scope of every composite requirement must contain at least 
one agent. Wherein, the scope of every agent must contain at least one goal [Paja et al. 2014]. 
∀ cr ∈ COMPREQ, card ({a | a ∈ AGENT, (a, cr) ∈ SCOPECRA }) ≥ 1 
∀ a ∈ AGENT, card ({g |g ∈ GOAL, (g, a)∈SCOPEAG }) ≥ 1 [Paja et al. 2014] 
Composite Requirement – Rule2: Every composite requirement must be attributed with the level 
of abstraction view i.e., Business view or Architect’s view or Designer’s view. Wherein, an abstraction 
view may contain more than one refinement levels. 
∀ cr ∈ COMPREQ, ∃ LV(cr) | LV (cr) ∈ {business view, architect’s view, designer’s view} 
Composite Requirement – Rule3: An abstraction view can have more than one refinement levels. 
∀ cr ∈ COMPREQ, LV(cr), card ({n | n = NUM (cr), (n, LV(cr)) ∈ REFINE_LEVELS}) ≥ 1 
In addition, our notation retains the delegation features of STS modelling. Furthermore, in KAOS, 
goals assigned to environment agents (i.e., human agents) are described as expectations. We add this 
concepts to STS modelling. If a goal is delegated to an environment agent, then the delegated 
responsibility goal is expressed as an expectation. An actor is considered as an environment agent in 
two cases: either the actor is not managed by the organization or the actor is identified as human agent. 
An expectation allows us to bring the notion of trust over such entrusted actors towards the fulfilment 
expected goals or delegated expectations. Furthermore, the refinement composite requirement as well 
as the responsibility goals can be refined using AND/OR constructs, see Figure 42.  
 
Figure 42: Refinement links of STS and KAOS 
However, the characteristic features of refinements differ with respect to the type of refinement. If 
the refinement of the responsibility goal is within the scope of the layered abstraction view, then goal 
refinement is specified within the same composite requirement frame; otherwise the goal refinement is 
expressed in new composite requirement frame. In other words, a responsibility goal of an agent can be 
refined within the same composite requirement or in a new composite requirements depending on the 
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scope of the refinement relative to layered abstraction view. For instance, in Figure 43, the refinement 
of the responsibility goal of the actor at highest abstraction level is expressed in the lower abstraction 
level. Respectively, the composite refinement links comes with a rationale attribute to allow the 
description of the reasoning behind the refinement. This facilitates the goals’ tracing both forward and 
backward. We formally express this rule as follows: 
 REFINE_LINK  COMPREQ x COMPREQ states the refinement relation between two 
composite requirements 
 Rationale: REFINE_LINK returns the rationale behind the refinement of a composite 
requirements 
Composite Requirement – Rule4: Every refinement link of a composite requirement must be 
explicitly defined with a rationale statement 
∀ cr1, cr2 ∈ COMPREQ, ∀ (cr1, cr2) ∈ REFINE_LINK, ∃ Rationale (REFINE_LINK) 
 
Figure 43: composite requirement refinement 
However, it is to note that, this rationale of refinement is not supported by KAOS or STS modelling. 
This can be observed in Figure 43. On the left side we have KAOS goal refinement plus STS actor 
representation. In our conceptual model the merging of these two notations can be expressed using two 
composite requirements as shown on the right side of the Figure 43. The additional attributes of goals 
and agents relative to abstraction views will be discussed during the scenario illustration in section 3.2. 
3.1.2 Anti-STS Multi-agent risk modelling 
From our evaluation study, we have observed that STS notation does not provide adequate support 
to drive the security risk analysis (refer section 2.5.1.2). Although the threat propagation is an interesting 
functionality for tracing back the threat impact to the business objective, it is not sufficient to assess the 
level of threat. As consequence, it is difficult to detect what the potential threat event can have on 
business objectives, and what rigor of security protection need to be advocated [Matulevicius et al 2012]. 
For example, how severe is the threat? What are the possible threat scenarios? How often does it occur? 
Who could potentially manifest such threats? Answering these questions would drive the risk analysts 
to calculate the probability and frequency of occurrence of the threat event.  To some extent, Secure 
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KAOS enables to express attacker gaols (i.e., anti-goals) hierarchy similar to the attack trees (see Figure 
17), which describe attack scenarios. In addition, it also allows to express the risk attributes such as 
likelihood and criticality of anti-goals (refer section 2.5.1.1). However, in secure KAOS, there is no 
clear link between the likelihood of the risks and the anticipated threat capability or to the rigor of 
protection capability required to mitigate the risks.  
Besides, Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) domain model [Mayer 2009] 
advocates that an SRE methodology must provide support to a  minimum of three risk management 
concepts i.e., assets, risks and risk treatments. Adding to this, [Matulevicius et al 2012] argues that SRE 
methodologies must provide a concrete modelling constructs to represent attack agents and anti-goals 
to complement risk management concepts as prescribed in the (ISSRM) domain model [Mayer 2009]. 
Indeed, [Matulevicius et al 2012] extends secure Tropos to link the threat goals of threat agents with the 
system goals using the relationships: exploits and attacks. However, they imagine the attacking agents 
as a single entity. As consequence, they cannot help to represent complex attacks like APTs (i.e., 
advanced persistent threats) in which multiple agents act collaboratively to infiltrate enterprise networks. 
Apart from the SRE modelling support to risk analysis, there exists enormous risk analysis techniques 
built on the modelling perspectives of attack trees [Schneier 1999] and attack graphs [Phillips and 
Swiler 1998] (refer section 1.2.1). In this regard, Kordy et al [Kordy et al. 2014] presents a detailed 
literature review of risk analysis techniques and compare them with respect to the type of their 
formalisms; their modelling capabilities and usability. From our understanding, we see that these attack 
modelling techniques confined their modelling perspectives to analyse the attack behaviours having 
conventional attacks in mind. As a consequence, they do not provide support to analyse the coordinated 
behavioural aspects of the multiple attacking agents. This situation again advocates the need for a new 
modelling constructs to fulfil this gap. 
To complement this situation, in this thesis, we propose a threat profile based risk modelling 
technique built on the agent-oriented modelling (similar to STS). A threat profile, in general, includes 
the information about critical assets, threat actors, and threat scenarios [SANS 2015b]. We argue that 
attackers are not lonely agents and they too have to rely on some malicious users or malicious programs 
in order to launch an attack. For instance advanced persistence threats (APT) include coordinated 
interactions between multiple attacking agents that execute multi-step attack methods to their ultimate 
motives (e.g., stealing data, stealing money, espionage, etc.) [Chen et al. 2014]. Analyzing the social 
and technical dependencies between the threat actors (i.e., individual or group, system element or 
software program, etc.) will help in anticipating the factors of likelihood and threat capabilities. 
Suitably, we decided to represent the attack models in form of multi-agent systems comprising of 
several attacking agents. We considered the following list of anticipated requirements with reference to 
the characteristic features of composite attacks (e.g., APT). It is to note that the list is not exhaustive and 
describes the minimum requirements needed to model APT: 
o Req1– Must use unambiguous modelling language.  
o Req2– Must facilitate to express all the attacking agents 
o Req3 – Must facilitate to express all the threat goals 
o Req4 – Must facilitate to express all the attack methods 
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o Req5 – Must facilitate to trace the attack path 
o Req6 – Must facilitate to express the social and technical dependencies among the attacking 
agents (i.e., human/system). 
o Req7 – Must facilitate to express the protection goals 
o Req8 – Must facilitate to express the used attack patterns. 
Defining yet another modelling language is not a viable option to us as it can impact 
comprehensibility aspects. Therefore, we propose to integrate the social modelling concepts from STS 
modelling and the Anti-goal modelling concepts from Secure KAOS [Van Lamsweerde et al. 2003] 
(Req1).  We name this model as Anti-STS. Figure 44 depicts the comparison between STS and Anti-
STS.  
 
Figure 44: Comparison between STS and Anti-STS Notations 
We represent the attacking agents with horns [ ] in order to differentiate the malicious actors with 
good ones. Anti-STS, represents an anti-system of attackers who collaboratively work to manifest a 
threat (Req2). The malicious objectives are represented as the anti-goals within the scope of each threat 
actor, see (Figure 44a). Threat scenarios are driven by some malicious motive (e.g., spoil reputation, 
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gain money) and follow a procedural approach. The whole composite attack scenario is divided as 
responsibility goals of the respective threat actors and expressed as their root Anti-goal nodes (Req3). 
Subsequently, the steps involved in the attack methods are expressed as hierarchical threat actor/agent 
anti-goals trees using AND/OR constructs (Req4), (Figure 44b). Unlike Attack trees, a threat actor/agent 
can have more than one anti-goal trees.  That means, the deliberate threat/Attack goals are defined as 
the root nodes. The tree-structured refinements reflects how the threat goals can be fulfilled. 
The social/technical interaction dependencies are expressed similar to STS notation goal delegations 
and data exchange, except that here the intentions are towards manifesting a threat scenario (Figure 44c). 
These social and technical dependency interactions allow to comprehend the strategic plan as well as to 
trace the attack path between the disjointed anti-goal models (Req5 and Req6). This allows to simplify 
the sophistication of composite attacks (like APTs) by breaking the complex strategic attack/threat 
scenario into multiple anti-goal models (Req1). Finally, we use threat propagation functionality in STS 
to represent the propagation of protection events (i.e., protection needs/objectives) such as defensive 
strategy goals to mitigate particular malicious goal (Figure 44d). Accordingly, the protection event 
propagation allows not only to link the protection goals to the anti-goals, but also it facilitates to view 
the protection impact on the whole Anti-goal tree model (Req7). 
We adopt the following steps to gradually develop the expression of an APT in our Anti-STS Model: 
(Step 1) identify threat actors/agents, (Step 2) identify the respective root anti-goals, (Step 3) refine the 
anti-goals based on the threat intelligence information available in reference documents, (Step 4) 
identify the possible interaction dependencies, (Step 5) identify control measures are given and express 
them as protection events. While first two steps are confined to Business view and the other two steps 
are confined to Architect’s view. 
Since we are already using STS modelling notation for SRE at business and Architect’s view, Anti-
STS would be practical to accommodate to the integration of existing attack modelling perspectives 
described in [Kordy et al. 2014]. Since we are already using STS modelling notation for SRE at business 
and architects view, Anti-STS would be practical to accommodate to the integration of existing attack 
modelling perspectives described in [Kordy et al. 2014].  We will present in more details the application 
of our Anti-STS modelling in section 3.2. This will show how this technique has been integrated in our 
methodology. 
3.1.3 Our proposed Zone modelling methodology 
In the first two views of our SRE conceptual model we propose to use STS concepts. In the designers 
view (LV3), we start to consider the network security needs. Our evaluation study shows that, since STS 
is an agent-oriented modelling approach, it gets complicated when starting to analyse the interaction 
dependencies between the network devices. In addition, there is no other SRE approach that facilitates 
the elicitation and analysis of network security requirement needs. Therefore we propose a new 
modelling technique, which is based on the zone segmentation principles in order to introduce the notion 
of network security analysis. 
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3.1.3.1 Analysing the risk of the enterprise network 
The current practice for eliciting and analysing early network security requirements is driven by 
network zoning [8]. Network zoning (a.k.a. network segmentation) is a key defence-in-depth strategy 
for enterprises that segregates and protects key company assets and limits lateral movements of attackers 
across corporate network in case of intrusion. Grouping assets in terms of segmented zones with varying 
trust levels enables organizations to distribute security controls across the network relative to the 
criticality as well the risk exposure of the systems within zones. Therefore, to facilitate the integration 
of security zoning concepts, in our zone modelling methodology we mainly consider three elements: 
domains, zones and agents. 
A security domain represents the organizational authority, which controls and manages the entities 
(i.e., servers, software, data, users, etc.) that belong to it. We call these entities as agents who are 
assigned with different set of responsibility goals to achieve business needs. Furthermore, a security 
domain can be refined into sub-domains highlighting different policies or procedures within the same 
organization. As mentioned earlier, in our SRE methodology, we categorize agents into two groups. 
System agents refer to entities under direct control such as software/hardware systems that are developed 
and/or maintained by the enterprise. Environment agents are not under direct control and refer to 
humans, or to some purchased third party software/hardware. For example, in the given use case scenario 
1, we assume two domains: the airport ground domain and the aircraft domains. The aircraft domain 
consists in the system agents: aircraft control application and aircraft monitoring application. The airport 
ground domain consists in the environment agent i.e., maintenance people. Finally, security zones 
constitute logical grouping of agents with common protection requirements. As consequence, our 
methodology mainly aims at grouping agents within security zones managed in security domains and 
eliciting the related network security requirements. 
We consider that some external risk analysis has assessed security domains and agents to provide 
domain control capability, trust of environment agents and criticality of system agents. Security domains 
control capability describes the maturity of an enterprise to deploy security controls and/or its capability 
to control a given environment. In other words, a well-controlled domain means that the security 
management activity within the domain is mature. For example, in the given use case scenario 1, the 
aircraft domain is mature since it is equipped with well-trained employees (i.e., cabin crew and pilots). 
Thus, we consider that this domain is well controlled by the airline company. On the other hand, the 
aircraft ground domain may consists in people belonging to airport management as well as competitive 
airlines. Therefore, we consider this domain is less controlled by the airline of interest. 
Environment agents are given a trust level, which specifies the degree of the trustworthiness over the 
expected behaviour of environment agents in a given context. Because it will eventually impact the 
responsibility goals entrusted to them. For instance, in our example scenario1, the maintenance people 
are considered as partially trusted because their goal is to collect aircraft parameters by connecting their 
laptop to the monitoring application. If the laptop is vulnerable to viruses, this may comprise the goal 
of the maintenance people. 
Finally, system agents are evaluated based on their criticality levels. Criticality level determines the 
sensitivity to threats and their risk impact on the overall business. For instance, in our example scenario1, 
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aircraft control system controls the dynamics of the aircraft (such as engine speed, flight’s direction, 
inflight temperature and pressure). Its failure is intolerable since it threatens the safety of the passengers 
along with huge monetary loss and reputation. Thus, aircraft control system is considered as highly 
critical. On the other hand, the monitoring application’s role is critical only to the aircraft maintenance 
process. In case of disruption of the responsibility goal “collect monitoring data” it may also incur 
monetary loss, which can be tolerable to some extent but would damage the reputation in long run. 
Therefore, considering the risk tolerance factors, monitoring application is considered partially critical. 
Since Our Anti-STS model facilitates to trace the attack goals to deliberate disruption of business 
needs, it will help in integrating the risk analysis techniques such as FMECA (failure mode criticality 
analysis) in order to analyse the risk impact of the system agents on the business needs in case of failures. 
3.1.3.2 Integration of three core security design principles 
Through security zoning, in the end we expect to achieve secure network design. Therefore, we build 
our security zoning strategy compliant with the three core security design principles i.e., complete 
mediation, least privileges and formal integrity security models for information flows. 
First, the complete mediation principle enforces that every access to every an entity must be checked 
for authority [Saltzer and Schroeder 1975a]. By default, this complete mediation rule is checked for 
client-server models. Applying this principle to the context of security zoning, that means that every 
access to the zones (otherwise data flows between the zones) are controlled with some security 
mechanisms. We also identify and ensure that server and client do not reside in same zone as it will be 
conflict. Second, the principle of least privileges [Saltzer and Schroeder 1975a] requires to limit users 
to access only what is necessary for their legitimate purpose. We translate this principle in the context 
of network security zoning as a user can access a zone only if he is granting access to all the services 
within the zone. Here we map the services level privileges to the network level privileges. This limit the 
propagation of an attack on a service to only the zone. Finally, formal models of integrity fosters to 
avoid critical systems to consume untrusted/fake information. We consider these models to introduce 
the security verification on data flow by validating the integrity of the data flows between zones. 
In practice, there exists several models for integrity such as Biba [Biba 1977], clark-wilson [Clark 
and Wilson 1987], which propose abstract solutions to preserve the integrity of information flows. These 
models are widely used in current operating systems for improving the integrity protection of the 
information flows in inter-process communications (e.g., Microsoft Windows Integrity Mechanism 
[Microsoft]). We adapt the model of Clark-Wilson lite [Shankar et al. 2006] (lighter version of clark-
wilson model), for verifying the integrity property of traffic flows traversing multiple zones. 
In CW-lite model, all information flowing from low integrity subjects to high integrity subjects must 
be filtered. The filter is placed at the receiving subject’s side.  Figure 45 shows the formal notation of 
the CW-lite integrity principle. This predicate should be read as follows: “if a subject s receives an 
information flow from a subject si at interface I, then either there is an integrity validation filter at 
interface I or the integrity level of si is greater or equal to the integrity of subject s”. 
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Figure 45: CW-lite security filtering rule [Shankar et al. 2006] 
Here, the integrity filters correspond to integrity validation procedures that sanitize information or 
block it. For instance, in network security analysis context, an integrity validation filter can be a web 
application firewall that checks SQL statements or URL formats. Integrity models complete the principle 
of complete mediation by checking the content of flows. 
3.1.3.3 Unification of risk analysis information through integrity levels 
The three factors i.e., control capability of domains, criticality and trust levels of agents enables the 
integration of risk analysis process in network requirement analysis context. And to facilitate this 
integration, we unify capability, trust and criticality within the concept of integrity since integrity is a 
pivot concept of risk and trust. For example, scientific articles published in the security conferences are 
more trustful than those published in teenager blogs. Here, the integrity of the published content is 
related to trust when considering the external or unmanaged systems. Likewise, integrity is also related 
to risk. For example a critical system must be consistent, « honest », which means it requires high level 
of integrity. In addition, systems take decisions based on information (e.g. a program executes an 
algorithm based on its inputs). If input information is wrong, then decisions can be wrong too. 
Consequently, we will only permit critical system to consider information with high level of integrity 
(i.e. high level of assurance).   
In our methodology, this unification of risk and trust within integrity allows us also to integrate 
formal integrity security models with security zone modelling design principles for addressing the risks 
pertaining to traffic flows and information assurance. Respectively, the integrity of an agent reflects the 
assurance of an expected behaviour. This fits with the concept of trust related to environment agents. 
Since they are not directly under the control of the enterprise, we assess the confidence that enterprise 
can have on respective entity (in best case) in terms of its expected behaviour. As consequence, the trust 
assessment can be transformed into a maximum integrity value representing an assumption.  
 
Figure 46: integrity values of domain and agents for use case scenario 1 
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Similarly, system agents’criticality can be expressed as a required integrity. Critical goals are 
required to be achieved, hence, it is a required behaviour of the assigned system agent. Criticality 
corresponds to the minimum integrity value required for a system agent, which conveys the minimum 
security protection required in worst case. For instance, since aircraft control application is considered 
highly critical, it requires a high level of integrity. Wherein monitoring application is partial critical it 
requires relatively a lower level of integrity level. Finally, the integrity of a security domain correlates 
with the maximum integrity an enterprise can achieve with its capability control. This implies that a 
security domain cannot guarantee security more than its maturity level.  
We assume the existence of some utility functions (Figure 46a) that map the control capability labels 
of domains, criticality and trust levels of agents into a unified scale of integrity levels. For instance, IEC 
61508 [IEC 61508 2010] defines safety integrity levels (SIL) based on controllability of the system from 
the risk of failures with an SIL scales ranging from A to D. Similarly, Figure 46b shows an example of 
integrity values that will be used for example use case scenario 1, with an integrity scale range from 1 
to 5. These utility functions must be determined based on business risk impact, which is a pre-requisite 
to define zone model [Province of British Columbia 2012]. The example mapping of utility functions 
for integrity range 1 to 5 that we have considered in this thesis work is given in Appendix D.  
3.1.4 Formal approach of zone modelling methodology 
Our zone modelling methodology (see Figure 47) is divided into two main steps: (1) Determining 
the security zones and integrity validation filters and (2) Identifying data flows integrity requirements 
and flows access control filters. In step1 the initial input is the set of security domains, the set of agents, 
the integrity levels of domains and agents, and the data flows between agents. As a result of step1, our 
process computes the security zones and the integrity validation filters.  
 
Figure 47: Our zone modelling Methodology approach overview 
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In step2, the designer needs to provide additional information about the media of communication 
(i.e., the networks). The final result is a set of network security requirements which are a set security 
zones, integrity validation filters, agents integrity requirements, access control filters and integrity data 
flow protection requirements. For the implementation, we formalized step1 and step2 in Answer Set 
Programming. Answer set programming (ASP) [Gebser et al. 2012] is a declarative logic-based 
approach that facilitates the solving of difficult search problems by computing answer sets through stable 
model semantics. We defined rules at each step and the ASP solver determines the set solutions (called 
answers) that are compliant with the rules and the input. This makes our process traceable and verifiable. 
In the following, we discuss in detail the modelling rules at step1 and step2. The implementation and 
the output of our zone modelling solution will be discussed separately in section 3.2, during the 
illustration of use case scenario 1. 
3.1.4.1 Step 1: Specifying zones and filtered flows 
The main goal of this step is to specify zones and identify integrity validation filters. We start with a 
system as a set of domains, zones and agents. We represent it as follows: 
S = <DOMAIN, ZONE, AGENT, FLOW, INSIDEDZ, INSIDEDA, INSIDEZA, Int, Intmax, Intmin, 
Intactual, AgentServer, AgentClient> , Where: 
 DOMAIN is the set of security domains. 
 ZONE is the set of security zones. 
 AGENT is the set of agents, named after entities. AGENT =  ENV_AGENT  SYST_AGENT with 
ENV_AGENT and SYST_AGENT being the set of environment and system agents such that 
ENV_AGENT  SYST_AGENT =  . 
 Agentserver: AGENT → {TRUE, FALSE} states if agent is a server (e.g., WEB server). 
 Agentclient: AGENT → {TRUE, FALSE} states if agent is a client (e.g., browser). 
 FLOW  AGENT  AGENT is the set of allowed flow of information. 
 INSIDEZ
D  ZONE  DOMAIN is a relation that states a zone is in a domain. 
 INSIDEA
D  AGENT  DOMAIN is a relation that states an agent is in a domain. 
 INSIDEZ
D  AGENT  ZONE is a relation that states an agent is in a zone. 
 Int: DOMAIN →  ℕ returns the integrity level of a security domain which is fixed. 
 Intmax: ZONE ∪ AGENT → ℕ returns the maximum integrity of a zone or an agent. For 
environment agents, this value is directly derived from their trust label. 
 Intmin: AGENT → ℕ returns the minimum integrity level of an agent. For system agents, this 
value is directly derived from the criticality label. 
 Intactual: ZONE ∪ AGENT → ℕ returns the actual integrity of a zone or an agent, which are the 
final integrity values chosen at the end of the computation. 
 integrity-validation-filter(a: AGENT, f: FLOW, val1: Int, val2: Int) states integrity validation 
requirements such that integrity-validation-filter(a, f, val1, val2) describes integrity protection 
mechanism at agent a must sanitize dataflow f with an integrity level of val1 to achieve a data 
assurance level of val2. 
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In other words, Int, Intmax and Intmin represent the integrity utility functions in Figure 46. 
Accordingly, we define the rules of step1 as follows: 
RULE1: Every agent is inside a domain. 
∀a ∈  AGENT, ∃ d ∈  DOMAIN | (a, d)  ∈  INSIDEA
D 
RULE2: Every security domain contains at least one security zone. 
∀d ∈  DOMAIN, card({z | z ∈  ZONE, (z, d)  ∈  INSIDEZ
D})  ≥ 1 
RULE3: The maximum integrity level of a security zone is equal to the integrity level of the domain. 
This is because, a domain controls zone and therefore we cannot have more assurance on a zone than 
that of the domain. 
∀d ∈  DOMAIN, ∀z ∈  ZONE, (d, z) ∈  INSIDEZ
D, Intmax(z)  =  Int(d) 
RULE4:  Similar to Rule 3, the actual integrity level of an agent cannot be greater than the integrity 
level of domain. 
∀d ∈  DOMAIN, ∀ a ∈  AGENT, (a, d) ∈  INSIDEA
D , Intactual(a)  ≤  Int(d) 
RULE5: The actual integrity of a zone cannot be greater than its maximum integrity. 
∀z ∈  ZONE, Intactual(z)  ≤  Intmax(z) 
RULE6: The actual integrity of agents must be between the maximum and the minimum integrity 
levels of the agents. 
∀a ∈  AGENT, Intmin(a)  ≤  Intactual(a)  ≤   Intmax(a) 
RULE7: The actual integrity levels of an agent is same as that of its residing zone. 
∀a ∈  AGENT, ∀z ∈  ZONE, (a, z) ∈  INSIDEA
Z , Intactual (a)  =  Intactual (z) 
RULE8 - CW-Lite:  The actual integrity levels of the interacting agents must adhere to the CW-lite 
integrity rule. In this way, an agent doesn’t access a lower integrity information. 
∀a1, a2 ∈  AGENT, (a1, a2) ∈  FLOW Λ ¬ integrity-validation-filter(a2, flow(a1, a2), Intactual(a1), 
Intactual(a2))  Intactual(a1)  ≥  Intactual(a2) 
RULE9 – Principle of complete mediation:  Server agents and client agents cannot reside in same 
zone. Because, as per the zone modelling design principles, intra-zone interactions are usually not 
analysed. With reference the security design principle known as complete mediation rule, every access 
to every object must be checked for authority [Saltzer and Schroeder 1975a]. By default, this complete 
mediation rule is checked for client-server models. Therefore, if server and client reside in same zone 
there will be a conflict. 
∀c, s ∈  AGENT, ∀z1, z2 ∈  ZONE, (a1, z1) ∈  INSIDEA
Z , (s, z2) ∈
 INSIDEA
Z , Agentserver (s), Agentclient  (c)  z1 ≠ z2 
RULE10 - Principle of least privileges:  The least privileges principle aims at minimizing the 
permissions of users to the minimum required for accomplishing their tasks [Saltzer and Schroeder 
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1975b]. From a network perspective, a client agent can send flows in a security zone only if he can send 
flows to all the server agents within that zone.  In this way, we map network level privileges to services 
level privileges. Indeed, agents will be grouped in zones according to users’ privileges. 
∀c, s1, s2  ∈  AGENT, Agentclient (c), Agentserver (s1), Agentserver (s2), ∀z1, z2 ∈  ZONE,  
(s1, z1)  ∈  INSIDEA
Z , (s2, z2) ∈  INSIDEA
Z  , (c, z1) ∉ INSIDEA
Z , (c, z2) ∉ INSIDEA
Z , 
(c, s1) ∈  FLOW, (c, s2) FLOW  z1 ≠ z2 
3.1.4.2 Step2: Specifying integrity requirements for the communication medium between zones 
At the end of step1, we have the set of zones along with the integrity validation filters. In step2, we 
address the security issues of inter-zone interactions, i.e., we consider the protection of the flow through 
the network communication medium (e.g., wired/wireless networks, etc.,) that connect zones. The main 
goal of this step is to protect the integrity of data flows when traversing untrusted media of 
communication. Suitably, we complete our system model as follows: 
S = <DOMAIN, ZONE, AGENT, FLOW, MEDIUM, INSIDEDz, INSIDEDA, INSIDEZA, INSIDEDM, 
CONNECT, Int, Intmax, Intactual>, Where: 
 MEDIUM is the set of media of communication. 
 INSIDEM
D   MEDIUM  DOMAIN is a relation, which states that a medium of communication is 
in a domain. 
 CONNECT  MEDIUM  ZONE is a relation, which states that a zone is connected to a medium 
of communication. 
 Intmax: ZONE ∪ AGENT ∪ MEDIUM → ℕ returns the maximum integrity level of a security 
zone, agent or medium of communication. 
 Intactual: ZONE ∪ AGENT ∪ MEDIUM → ℕ returns the actual integrity level of a security zone, 
agent or medium of communication. 
 PATH   FLOW  (ZONE  MEDIUM)  (ZONE  MEDIUM), is a relation that stores where 
flows are transiting with the constraint that ∀ (f, e1, e2)  ∈  PATH  (e1, e2)  ∈  CONNECT ∨
 (e1, e2)  ∈  CONNECT. For instance, (f,m,z) ∈ PATH means that flow f transits between medium 
m to zone z. 
 access-control-filter(c: CONNECT, f: FLOW) states access control requirements so that access-
control-filter(c,f) means flow f must be permitted at connection point c. 
 dataflow-integrity-protection(f: FLOW, e: ZONE  MEDIUM, value: ℕ) states dataflow 
protection requirements such that dataflow-integrity-protection(f,e,val) means some protection 
mechanism must be applied on dataflow f over zone or medium e to preserve an integrity level of 
val. 
Similar to domains, zones, and agent, the medium of communication m1 has two integrity levels: 
Intmin (m1), and Intactual (m1). Accordingly, we add new rules to include constraints on media of 
communication: 
RULE11: Every zone must be connected to a medium of communication. 
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∀z ∈  ZONE, ∃ m ∈  MEDIUM, (m, z)  ∈  CONNECT 
RULE12 –Access control filter requirements: At each zone, there must be an access control filter 
that permits allowed flow of information. Not explicitly allowed flows are denied by default. 
∀ (f, e1, e2) ∈  PATH, e1 ∈  MEDIUM  access-control-filter((e1, e2), f) 
Respectively: 
∀ (f, e1, e2)  ∈  PATH, e1 ∈  ZONE  access-control-filter((e2, e1), f) 
RULE13: The actual integrity level of a medium of communication is the minimum value of the 
integrity level of its domain, the trust on the medium (i.e., its maximum integrity), and the actual 
integrity levels of the connected zones. 
∀ m ∈  MEDIUM, Intactual(m) = min( {Int(d)|d ∈  DOMAIN, (m, d) ∈ INSIDEM
D } 
  {Intmax(m)}   {Intactual(z) | z ∈  ZONE, (m, z)  ∈  CONNECT}) 
RULE14 – dataflow integrity protection requirements:  A flow that transits over a medium or a 
zone, requires an integrity protection, if the integrity level of the medium or the zone is lower than the 
level of integrity of the flow. 
∀(a1, a2) ∈  FLOW, ∀ e1, e2 ∈  ZONE  MEDIUM | (flow(a1, a2), e1, e2)  ∈  PATH,  
(min (Intactual(a1), Intactual(a2))   >  Intactual(e1)   
data-flow-integrity-protection(flow(a1, a2), e1, min(Intactual(a1), Intactual(a2))). 
Respectively: 
∀(a1, a2) ∈  FLOW, ∀ e1, e2 ∈  ZONE  MEDIUM | (flow(a1, a2), e1, e2)  ∈  PATH, 
(min (Intactual(a1), Intactual(a2))   > Intactual(e2)  
data-flow-integrity-protection(flow(a1, a2), e2, min(Intactual(a1), Intactual(a2))). 
3.2 SRE methodology illustration 
In this section, we illustrate our SRE methodology using the AIRBUS scenario related to aircraft 
maintenance described in section 2.5.1. The information provided in the example scenario does not 
respect the abstraction layers as per out methodology. This illustration focuses in describing the 
separation of concerns at each layered level.  It is to note that, since this work is confine to SRE 
modelling, we consider the information relative to risk analysis as pre-requisites. 
3.2.1 Business view (STS modelling) 
This view concerns the capture of high-level business needs from the perspectives of business users. 
What actually the business is? What are the driving objectives to run the business? What are the business 
needs that are need to be protected from risks? These kind of information is elicited at this view. 
Relatively, the business needs are considered as assets and are prioritized at this view. 
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Figure 48: Business view - separation of concerns 
3.2.1.1 Scenario Analysis at Business view 
Since this view has to capture the perspective of business users, we start by specifying the relation 
between business needs and the driving objectives of the business, also known as business drivers. 
Business drivers describe the business vision towards the continued success and growth of a business. 
An organisation can have several business drivers each accorded with a business value. However, there 
is no standard list available since they differ with type of organization. Some example business drivers 
that include Reputation, business competitive advantage, customer satisfaction, etc., and are taken 
reference form [Sherwood 2005; Simplicable 2002]. 
 
Figure 49: Aircraft maintenance business need liked to business drivers 
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The use case provided by AIRBUS concerns an aircraft maintenance process, which corresponds to 
the high-level business objective. We link this business need to an example business driver i.e., business 
operational continuity because aircraft has to be in good condition to transport the passengers in safely 
or may incur monetary loss in terms of missed flight trips per day.  
The Figure 49 depicts the Business view of the example AIRBUS scenario. The business need “make 
aircraft maintenance” is defined as a responsibility goal within the scope of the role represented by the 
‘AIRBUS’ actor. Here, AIRBUS refers to the airline authority having the business need “make aircraft 
maintenance”. Business drivers are represented within our notation by a blue oval form. This implies 
that business drivers are the root nodes of our entire notation. As described in SABSA, each business 
driver is associated with some business value expressed in monetary terms. A business need can relate 
to one or several business drivers and vice versa. The blue frame represents a requirement known as the 
composite requirement. The composite requirements at this Business view comprises of the social actors 
concerned with the business needs.  
The next composite requirement (CR n°2 in Figure 49) describes the delegation of business need to 
maintenance people. This implies the maintenance people are entrusted to make to decision on whether 
to permit the aircraft to take the next trip or not. Since maintenance people are human agents, we 
consider them as environment agents (represented using violet circles with curve). The delegated goal 
becomes an expectation (represented in yellow colour). 
3.2.1.2 Risk analysis at Business view – (Anti-STS modelling) 
From risk analysis perspective, “bad maintenance” is a threat event that can disrupt the fulfilment of 
the responsibility goal i.e., make maintenance. This is expressed using the threat propagation link named 
‘threatens’ in STS notation. This does not give any information related to how the threat event can be 
perceived. Therefore, we extend this threat information using Anti-STS Risk modelling by first 
specifying the feared threat agents and malicious motivations, see Figure 50.  
 
Figure 50: Anti-STS feared threat agents at Business view 
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For instance, the “maintenance process” can either be threatened by an external threat agent such as 
the “competing airline” with a motive to spoil the reputation; or by an internal threat agent “maintenance 
people” who deliberately wants to make bad maintenance. It can also be imagined that, the competing 
airline and the maintenance people participate together in the execution of a threat scenario. This needs 
an interaction between the two threat actors (competing airline and the maintenance people), which 
explains the social dependency to achieve an anti-goal.  
Since the feared threat agents may sometimes refer to internal agents as well (e.g., employees of the 
enterprise). As consequence, the risk modelling eventually provoke the security experts at Architect’s 
view to analyze and determine the trustworthiness over the expected behavior, which is expressed in 
terms of unified integrity values. This will help us to move to the security requirement analysis at 
upcoming layered views i.e., Architect’s view and Business view. 
3.2.2 Architect’s view (STS modelling) 
This view concerns about eliciting protection control objectives (i.e., protection needs), that secure 
the business needs captured at Business view. This is the abstraction layer where one starts considering 
security and risks of the enterprise networks. What sort of threat scenarios could trigger potential risks 
to the maintenance process need? What kind of system protection strategy would be necessary to control 
such risks? These kind of information is elicited at this view. Besides, SABSA describes this layered 
view acts as a bridge between the business users and the system designers in which the people system 
architects and security architects work in collaboration with business security analysis and risk analysts. 
 
Figure 51: Architect’s view - separation of concerns 
3.2.2.1 Security analysis Architect’s view 
We continue the usage of STS and ANTI-STS for specifying security constraints as well as the 
security risks. Relatively, the capture of protection needs are expressed in terms of security constraints 
over goal delegations using STS agent modelling notation and correspond to non-functional security 
requirements. The capture of risk analysis related information is expressed in terms of unified integrity 
values of security domains and agents in the enterprise network.  
Since this view is a bridge between the business security needs and the system security needs, there 
will be needing an interaction between the system architects as well. In general, architect is the one who 
defines high-level functional goals adhering to the high-level business needs. Relatively, the first 
composite requirement (CR n°3) in Architect’s view express the functional goals requirement preceding 
the capture of security constraints over the agent interactions as shown in Figure 52.  
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Figure 52: refinement of business functional goals and agents - Architect’s view 
The composite requirement CR n°3 is similar to a conventional STS (see Figure 34 in section 
2.5.1.2), which confines the security requirement and risk analysis in terms of security constraints and 
threat events. However, it lacks support to integrate risk analysis information of enterprise network. As 
described in, we propose to security domain concepts and unified integrity levels given in Figure 46 in 
order to fulfil this gap. Suitably, in the next following composite requirement (CR n°4) express the 
capture the security domain information. We have hidden the responsibility goals to facilitate the 
readability. The unified integrity values are expressed in ordinal scale (qualitative) ranging from 1 to 5. 
It is to note that, the security domain information as well as the qualitative scales and range are part of 
elicited information from the security domain experts involved at Architect’s view.  
In the example use case scenario 1, we have considered a total of two domains that are airport ground 
domain (managed by airport authority) and aircraft domain (managed by the airline authority). The 
control capability scales of these domains reflects the perspective of airline authority since it is the 
business user. By applying the utility function described in Figure 46, these control capabilities are 
transformed into maximum integrity values of domain. Since these two domains are independent and 
can have different regulations and governance constraints this will enforce security analysts to take into 
consideration the inter-domain trust relationship between the airline and the airport authorities, which 
helps in anticipating security risks [Sherwood 2005]. For example, the interaction dependency between 
the maintenance people and monitoring application needs attention from security perspective at the 
receiving end (i.e., monitoring application) since maintained people are operating from less controlled 
domain and monitoring application is located in highly restricted domain. 
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Figure 53: Integrating security domain information (use case scenario 1) 
The integrity levels of system agents (depicted in triangular shapes) correspond to the minimum level 
of integrity that should be maintained in terms of security assurance. Here, the criticality assessment of 
assets (i.e., system agents) can be influenced by several factors such as the replacement costs of the 
assets, the degree of involvement in mission critical activities, severity of the consequences of failures 
(i.e., risk impact) on the business missions in case the security agent becomes non-functional [Kim and 
Kang 2011].  
For instance, the European Commission [European Commission 2006] defines a minimum set of 
criteria to assess the severity of the risk impact of critical infrastructure as:  (a) Public effect  i.e., number 
of population affected or loss of life; (b) Economic effect i.e., significance of economic loss and/or 
degradation of products or services; (c) Environmental effect i.e., significant impact on public or 
surrounding environment or public health; (d) Political effects i.e., impact on the overall governance; 
(e) finally, Psychological effects i.e., impact on public or people involved (directly/indirectly ) in 
functioning of critical infrastructure. However, in the end it is up to the risk analysis techniques to 
determine the severity risk impact. 
For example, in our example use case scenario, disruption of aircraft control application goals can 
potentially threaten the safety of human lives; while malfunction of aircraft monitoring application may 
cost some economic loss. Likewise, through the specification of security domain information at 
Architect’s view, our SRE methodology enforces at Architect’s view enforces security experts to 
consider asset-based risk analysis techniques (such as FMEA/FMECA and Hazop), for analysing 
security risks and business impact. 
Finally, the integrity levels of environment agents (depicted in inverted triangular shapes) correspond 
to the maximum level of integrity, which is expected as guaranteed. Since environment agents cannot 
be fully controlled, this compels security analysts to consider the trust assessment in terms of cognitive 
beliefs (e.g., honesty, willingness towards fulfilling the responsibility goals) [Cristiano Castelfranchi 
2002] or technical beliefs (e.g., competence, expertise, experience) or social/technical dependencies 
[Jonker and Treur 1999]. In our example use case scenario, the maintenance people role is assumed as 
entrusted with a maximum integrity level of 2 since there is a dependency on laptop that is uncontrolled. 
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3.2.2.2 Security risk analysis at Architect’s view 
Security domain information (i.e., asset criticality, trustworthiness, control capability) correspond to 
asset-based risk analysis concepts. While, the FAIR risk taxonomy in Appendix A refers to threat risk 
analysis concepts (e.g., threat agents, threat motivation, threat capability, risk impact, control strength). 
We argue that, an SRE methodology must facilitate to link risk analysis concepts that correspond to both 
asset as well as threat-based risk analysis, which will eventually allow us to analyse the likelihood and 
impact of security risks pertaining to critical assets in the enterprise network. 
Thus, similar to the functional goals refinement using STS, we need to refine the anti-goals in 
parallel. For this we continue to refine the malicious objectives of the feared threat agents introduced in 
our ANTI-STS model at Business view (shown in Figure 50), which shows the social/technical 
dependencies between the threat agents for fulfilling their malicious objectives. It is to note that, our 
proposed Anti-STS Risk modelling technique is in preliminary stages. Thus, we limit our illustration to 
present the conceptual modelling perspectives of Anti-STS with an example threat profile. 
We consider a hypothetical threat profile of feared threat agent i.e., competing airline with a motive 
to spoil the reputation of the airline as shown in Figure 50. The respective Anti-STS Model (in Figure 
54) describes that the competing airline wanting to spoil the reputation has delegated the “adverse 
maintenance” anti-goal to a new threat agent called threat manager. The threat manager is believed to 
be having some technical skills and capable to plan threat modelling scenarios e.g., STRIDE [Microsoft 
2016]. In below, we explain the how Anti-STS Model facilitates to integrate the extended risk related 
concepts of ISSRM domain model with reference to FAIR risk taxonomy. 
The Pre-requisites shows that even threat agents have constraints and pre-requisites to launch an 
attack. For example in Figure 54, the threat manager would need to know when and where the 
maintenance activity will be taking place for planning the threat scenarios. This information correspond 
to the constraints of the threat agents in order to initiate an attack or to establish a point of contact with 
the targeting asset in the enterprise network (e.g., time dependent analysis [Arnold et al. 2014]). In 
Figure 54, we assume that threat manager gathers this information through the means of a worker at the 
Airport. 
The refinement of the anti-goals using OR constructs shows various possibilities available to a threat 
agent for satisfying the malicious objectives. For example in Figure 54, adverting aircraft maintenance 
can be threatened in several attack methods such as: (a) bribing maintenance people (e.g., exploiting the 
greediness); (b) physical threatening (e.g., blackmailing); (c) get remote access to the laptop (e.g., 
privilege escalation); (d) intrude the interaction (i.e., man-in-middle attack). Respectively, refinement 
of each of this refers to cyber threat trees [Ongsakorn et al. 2010], which will enable security experts to 
determine the likelihood of threat events of successful attacks (e.g., using Bayesian conditional 
probability distributions [Wu et al. 2012; Buldas and Lenin 2013]). 
The protection needs (referred as protection events in Figure 44d) threaten the anti-goals i.e., the leaf 
goals of the attack trees. Protection strategies are the composite security goals pertaining to defend the 
security design of enterprise network (e.g., multi-layering security, see SABSA [Sherwood 2005]). 
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Expressing protection needs/strategies as protection events allows to explicitly links the anti-goals and 
security goals/protection needs (e.g., similar to attack-defence trees [Kordy et al. 2011]). 
 
Figure 54: Scenario - Risk analysis using ANTI-STS (sample) 
The protection capability measure expresses will allow security experts in expressing the anticipated 
rigor of security control strength needed in order to mitigate the threats based on risk probability. For 
instance, in Figure 54, if we consider the example threat event concerning bribing the maintenance 
people. The protection objective demands the verification of trustworthiness of the maintenance people. 
Which enforces security experts to determine trust level (referred as security domain information at 
Architect’s view). In case the maintenance people are unconditionally trusted then the likelihood of this 
is negligible. Consequently, the security protection need relative to the verification of trustworthiness 
will become obsolete. Likewise, one can prioritize the threat events relative to likelihood of risk (e.g., 
similar to the fuzzy logic-based threat prioritization technique [Singhal and Banati 2013]). Finally, 
similar to STS which promote threat propagation, the propagation of protections event allows the 
security experts to trace to the malicious motives (e.g., spoil reputation) of feared threat agents identified 
at Business view. 
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3.2.3 Designer’s view (zone modelling) 
This view concerns with realising the conceptual protection strategies (application/network 
protection strategies as shown in Figure 54) into logical system design elements. Since our thesis work 
is about network security requirement engineering, we confine this view to integrity the network security 
zoning, which is a known defence-in-depth strategy for network security design. Relatively, in below 
we implementation of our proposed zone modelling methodology (described in section 3.2) in the 
context of example use case scenario 1. At the end of this view, we capture the security zone information 
along with integrity validation filter requirements, access control requirements and data flow integrity 
requirements, see Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55: Designer’s view - separation of concerns 
3.2.3.1 Step1 – Eliciting security zones and integrity validation filter requirements 
As shown in Figure 47, the initial knowledge on the system concerning the agents, domains and their 
integrities needs to be provided as input. We derive this knowledge from the elicited information at 
Architect’s view (see the composite requirement 4 in Figure 52).  In addition, the initial input also needs 
to include the list of permitted data flows between agents with regards to the business objectives. For 
this, we derive the permitted flows from the interactions of the agents. ASP specification of input flow 
are listed in Table 7. In our case we have only three flows defined. For example, role maintenancePeople 
must be able to send data flows to the agent monitoringApplication and vice versa. 
Table 7. Step 1 input – sample of permitted data flows 
Interacting agents List of flows 
Maintenance people,  
monitoring application 
Flow(maintenancePeople,monitoringApplication) 
Flow(monitoringApplication,maintenancePeople) 
Flow(aircraftControlApplication,monitoringApplication
) 
This derivation of flows from interactions is inspired from BPMN (Business process modelling 
notation), which uses a flowcharting technique (similar to activity diagrams [Schmidt et al. 2016]) to 
visually depict the sequence of activities (i.e., task goals) and information flows between system 
components. Respectively, we use the dashed line with open arrowhead pointing the direction of 
message flows (taken from BPMN notation), see the composite requirement 6 in Figure 56. We refer 
these flows as network data flows that are bi-directional. The arrowhead points to the passive agent. The 
other end of the line (with circular end) refer to active agents who initiates the communication. 
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Therefore, in our example scenario, aircraft control application initiates the interaction to end data to 
monitoring application and vice versa is not possible. 
 
Figure 56: Refinement of network data flows 
Given the input information from the composite requirement 5, our ASP-based tool automatically 
identifies the security zones and the integrity validation filters according to the rules listed in section 
3.1.4.1. We express the step1 output in the composite requirement 6 in Figure 57. 
 
Figure 57: Zone modelling STEP1 – output (use case scenario 1) 
Indeed, the Clingo ASP solver can produce many solutions (i.e. zone models), which can equally 
satisfy all the rules. However, their costs of implementation vary. From a broad view, the 
implementation cost is the summation of security management costs (to preserve the actual integrity 
levels of each zones) and the cost of security verification costs to uphold the integrity verification 
filtering requirements. Respectively, our tool computes the optimized solution using the ASP 
optimization statement minimize, to find the minimal cost of solution, see Figure 58.  
 
Figure 58: Cost-based optimization rule 
In our case, the Clingo solver searches for an optimal answer set simply with the least sum of weights 
of all the literals (i.e., actual integrity value L of agent A with respect to the filter at a flow F). However, 
the cost calculus can vary differently for different organisations based on their logistics study similar to 
the varying cost effects of the Design Assurance Levels [PRICE Systems 2005]. Thus, other and more 
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complex cost computation formulas can be specified. Our zone model is abstract and design independent 
therefore does not restrict the design solutions.  The obtained zone solution at step1, subsumes a total of 
three zones (i.e., zone9,) with two zones (i.e., zone3 and zone 10) inside aircraft domain and one zone 
(i.e., zone9) in airport ground domain. However, our tool cannot classify the zone types like DMZ, 
restricted, etc. In addition, we have retained the random zone numbering as such generated by ASP 
solver as it does not allow to customize it.  
Furthermore, the calculated integrity levels attached to the zones also apply to the agents within the 
zones. These integrity levels have to be interpreted as the pre-requisite security requirements. The future 
security design implementing these requirements must maintain these integrity levels at minimum. 
Indeed, in practice, there already exist formally accepted approaches, which specify the profoundness 
of security verification required; for instance, the design assurance levels (DALs) in aircraft systems 
[Bieber et al 2011]. The higher the DAL is, the higher the assurance activities and design verification 
methods are demanded. In our methodology context, the actual integrity levels of zones and system 
agents exhibit similar characteristics of DALs. 
Additionally, our tool identifies the integrity validation filters (IVF) attached to agents, listed. In our 
modelling notation we depict them in yellow squares, see Figure 57. These integrity validation filters 
represent validation processes implemented either by the target agent (e.g., by some specific validation 
code) or some external security mechanisms (e.g., deep inspection mechanisms).In example scenario 1, 
our tool specifies that the data flow between the maintenance people (zone 9) and the monitoring 
application (zone 3) must be validated.  
Table 8: Step1 - IVF rules (use case scenario 1) 
IVF(monitoringApplication,flow(maintenancePeople,monitoringAppl
ication),sanitize(2,3)) 
In Table 8 the specification describes that there is an IVF  defined at monitoring application agent, 
for the flow(maintenanceProple, monitoringApplication), with sanitize (2, 3). Here, sanitize (2, 3) 
specifies that an incoming data flow having an integrity level of 2 (this value is inherited from the 
integrity level of the maintenance people) must be sanitized in order to conform to the integrity level 3 
(of monitoring application). Interpretation of such integrity validation requirement, i.e. what means 
validation to conform integrity level of 3, can be carried out on the basis of dedicated documents such 
as the specification for data assurance levels by EUROCONTROL [EUROCONTROL 2012]. Suitably, 
IVF with sanitize (2, 3) might be implemented by a security mechanism such as a web application 
firewall that checks for SQL injection/viruses/etc. Likewise, at the end of Step1, the security architect 
obtain the list of zones, the integrity values of agents and zones and integrity validation filters. 
3.2.3.2 STEP 2 Implementation Step2 input information 
Before running step2, the security architect needs to complete the output from step1 by providing 
additional information about the media of communication (see Figure 47). The input information 
concerning medium of communication includes the integrity values of the medium, the domain in which 
the medium belongs to, and finally, the zones connected to it (the white clouds and the black lines in 
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Figure 59). In this regard, in our example scenario, we assumed three medium of communication: 
Aircraft access and Aircraft Internal Access.  
 
Figure 59: Zone modelling STEP2 – input (use case scenario 1) 
The integrity value attached to a medium of communication represents the level of trust one can have 
about the packets transmitted by the medium. As consequence, this integrity value depends on the 
assurance level that only known users can connect to it. The integrity value will be calculated as the 
minimum between the integrity value of the domain and the connected zone. We also allow the security 
architect to specify an initial integrity value that represents the risk that unexpected users have access to 
the medium. For instance, it is easier to access a wireless network than a wired network. In this way, 
our methodology can easily integrate a second risk analysis phase dedicated to how easy it is to connect 
to networks. Figure 60 shows an example of the integrity levels of the media for example use case 
scenario 1, calculated based on the restricted levels of the medium.  
 
Figure 60: medium integrity levels example (use case scenario 1) 
The access control filter rules (ACF) are defined (from RULE11) at the interfaces of each zone in 
order to control all the inter-zone communications.  Respectively, the filter rule can either permit or 
deny a flow through a medium.  
 
Figure 61: Step2 output –FINAL 
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These requirements describe the list of permitted flows that are given as input at step1. If not 
explicitly stated in an ACF requirement, data flows are denied. Table 9 shows a sample of the generated 
ACF requirements for the use case scenario 1. For instance, the requirement statement 
ACF(connectedTO( aircraftAccess,9), flow(maintenancePeople,monitoringApplication)) indicates that 
there must be an ACF at the interconnection point between medium of communication aircraftAccess 
and security zone9 that permits data flows from the maintenancePeople to monitoringApplication. 
Depending on the security design choices, these ACF may be implemented by one or more access 
control mechanisms such as firewalls, application gateways, etc.  
Table 9: Step2 – ACF rules (use case scenario 1) 
ACF(connectedTO(aircraftAccess,9), 
    flow(maintenancePeople,monitoringApplication)) 
ACF(connectedTO(aircraftAccess,9), 
    flow(monitoringApplication,maintenancePeople)) 
ACF(connectedTO(aircraftAccess,3), 
    flow(maintenancePeople,monitoringApplication)) 
ACF(connectedTO(aircraftAccess,3), 
    flow(monitoringApplication,maintenancePeople)) 
ACF(connectedTO(aircraftInternalAccess,3), 
   flow(aircraftControlApplication,monitoringApplication)) 
ACF(connectedTO(aircraftInternalAccess,10), 
   flow(aircraftControlApplication,monitoringApplication)) 
Finally, the tool produces data flow integrity requirements (from RULE13) representing security 
protection needs attached to data flows while transiting over a medium or a zone (see Table 10). They 
are depicted by grey squares in Figure 61). For instance, the requirement dataFlowIntegrityRequirement 
(flow(maintenancePeople,monitoringApplication), aircraftAccess,2) states that the data flows from 
maintenancePeople to monitoringApplication must be protected over medium of communication 
airportAccess to ensure the data flows maintain integrity level 2. Different integrity mechanisms such 
as digital signatures can implement these requirements. 
Table 10: Step2 – data flow integrity requirements (use case scenario 1) 
dataFlowIntegrityRequirement( 
    flow(maintenancePeople,monitoringApplication), aircraftAccess,2) 
dataFlowIntegrityRequirement( 
    flow(monitoringApplication,maintenancePeople), aircraftAccess,2) 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we presented our layer based SRE methodology built on SABSA abstraction layers. 
It subsumes three layered views i.e., Business view, Architect’s view and designers view. Each view 
represents the separation of concerns of stakeholders working at different abstraction layers, see Figure 
62. We introduced the notion of composite requirement, which merges modelling feature of STS and 
secure KAOS in order to accommodate the abstract levels at each view. We illustrated the SRE 
methodology with the user case scenario 1 concerning aircraft maintenance process. Appendix D 
provides a complete view of the SRE specification for the AIRBUS use case scenario 1. 
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Figure 62: Layered SRE methodology - complete view 
Business view introduces the business context of enterprise network. It encompass identifying the 
business agents representing the enterprise itself (e.g., AIRBUS) and their respective business needs 
(e.g., make aircraft maintenance). 
Architect’s view introduces the global security context of enterprise network system. It concerns the 
refinement of business functional goals and system actors in STS modelling; capture of protection needs 
with reference to the protection events realized through Anti-STS Risk modelling. In addition, security 
domain information (i.e., criticality/trust levels of agents and control capabilities of security domains) 
are captured in terms of unified integrity values, which permits to express enterprise security risks 
information.  
Designers view introduces the network security design context of enterprise network system. We 
proposed a zone modelling methodology based on three security principles: complete mediation, least 
privileges and Clark-Wilson lite formal model. We defined a set of formal rules as well as the list of 
initial integrity levels values computed based on risk impact, which makes our methodology approach 
traceable and verifiable. The whole process has been implemented in ASP to automate the security zones 
computation. It produces a set of network security requirements: security zones, integrity validation 
filters, access control filters, and data flow integrity requirements. 
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 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED SRE 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, we validate our layer based SRE methodology using the evaluation criteria derived 
in chapter2. We repeat the step3 of our proposed evaluation methodology using two use case scenarios. 
The first scenario concerns the e-commerce enterprise networks taken from ANSSI website. The next 
scenario concerns the AIRBUS use case scenario 2 from IREHDO2 project (described in section 2.5.2). 
It is to note that, since Anti-STS for risk modelling has not been fully developed, we confine our 
evaluation to their layered framework. 
The actual evaluation process as described in section in chapter 2 includes two iterations. In the first 
iteration we authors created the SRE specification and presented the model to the real stakeholders at 
AIRBUS. In the second iteration, we let the real stakeholders create the SRE specification. In this thesis 
work, our evaluation analysis and results are confined to the first iteration alone since we have not yet 
developed the tool. Respectively, the evaluation results that we provide in this chapter correspond to the 
initial feedback obtained from the security experts. However, we could not test all of the criteria (e.g., 
RM2.1.3), the details of which will provided in the discussion part. 
We first brief the e-commerce scenario and the corresponding network SRE context (section 4.1). 
Then we present the SRE specification for the scenario that describes composite requirements specified 
at Business, Architect’s and Designer’s views (section 4.2). In this respect, we describe the security 
domain information that expresses the risk assessment security domains and agents in terms of integrity 
values. Section 4.3 briefs the implementation of airbus scenario 2 (described in section 2.5.2). Finally, 
we report our experience in creating the specifications for the two scenarios using our SRE methodology. 
In this respect, we highlight its pros and cons with reference to the verification methods of the quality 
criteria detailed in Appendix C. At the end, we discuss the threats to validity of our evaluation process 
(section 4.4). 
This chapter consolidates the following contributions [Bulusu et al. 2018c; Laborde et al. 2019]. 
4.1 E-Commerce case study description 
The scenario e-commerce enterprise network from the reference [ANSSI 2017] provides us with an 
initial network architecture. It comprises of server components such as WEB server, DNS server, 
Application server, Database server, and Accountability server.  The employees are distinguished as 
administrators and standard users, who can connect to the network through LAN or WIFI. If the 
employees are outside the enterprise, they can remotely connect to the enterprise network. This will 
differentiate local users and remote users. Finally, when the clients visit the enterprise (noted as visitors), 
they are allowed to connect to the web through a dedicated WIFI network. 
4.1 E-Commerce case study description  92 
 
Network Security Requirements Engineering Methodology S Teja BULUSU 
The accountability server is described as highly critical as it manages the financial information of the 
company (e.g., salaries of employers). The web server hosts the e-commerce web site. Therefore, it is 
also critical because a denial of service attack will highly affect the business of the company. Finally, 
the web server requires interactions with the application and database servers to provide the e-commerce 
service. Consequently, they are also highly important assets for the business especially the database for 
which data integrity is primordial. 
 
Figure 63: e-commerce example case study [ANSSI 2017] 
There can be several ways to improve the security of this enterprise network. The network security 
requirements engineers propose the example security architecture in Figure 63b (and described in 
[ANSSI 2017]). The example solution reflects some best practice guidelines by defining some zones 
such as DMZ zone, user’s zones, etc. For instance, the accountability server is isolated in a separate 
zone as it is highly critical. In addition, total of two firewalls have been defined one to monitor the 
internet traffic flows and the other firewall to monitor the internal traffic of the e-commerce enterprise. 
In this respect, some advocated list of security measures are as follows:  
(a) Provide the access interface to the internal network from the internet, usually via a VPN tunnel; 
(b) Check the authorization of the connection requests from remote users;  
(c) Check the security level of the users before allowing the connection (e.g., using patches and anti-
virus update in particular);  
(d) If everything is OK, then allow streams to the inner zones (and only those that are needed for the 
communication), must always going through the firewalls. 
However, it is not clear on how the architects concluded to this zoning solution as well as derive the 
security measures. This approach requires additional arguments to demonstrate the solution meets the 
elicited risks. For instance, with reference to the example requirement (d), how to verify if the traffic 
4.2 E-commerce scenario implementation  93 
 
Network Security Requirements Engineering Methodology S Teja BULUSU 
flows are needed for communication or not. Similarly, how to ensure that the proposed network zoning 
solution is correct and cost-effective? How to ensure that no network security requirement is missing or 
irrelevant? Here, a formal approach justifying the transition from the problem to the solution is required 
for a traceable and verifiable security zone specification process. 
In below, we describe the first iteration of the evaluation, which concerns the implementation of the 
aforementioned scenario using the layer based SRE model. The following section 4.2, we first 
consolidate our observations and comments on the SRE modelling experience. While presenting our 
specification at each layer, we highlight the relative evaluation criteria (from Appendix C) in parenthesis 
wherever required so that it facilitates link our observations to the verification of the evaluation criteria. 
At the end in section 4.4, we provide the consolidated results of our evaluation in tabular format, where 
we provide the overview of our initial analysis results and observations. 
4.2 E-commerce scenario implementation 
In this section, we implement the e-commerce scenario using our layer based SRE model. It is to 
note that the information provided in the example scenario does not respect the abstraction layers as per 
out methodology. Therefore the scenario is discussed incrementally with increasing level of details, 
respecting the abstraction views. Accordingly we use the information provided in the scenario that is 
relevant to each view. In some cases, where information provided in the scenario seemed not sufficient. 
For instance, since the scenario describe the network architectural components but do not provide details 
on their respective goals and the interactions needs specific to e-commerce business. Therefore, in order 
to facilitate the expression of scenario at different abstraction layers, we had to consider some 
hypothetical information related to functional goals wherever needed. We first describe the specification 
in three layers, then we provide our evaluation analysis. 
Since we did not have any tool, we principally used two tools to create our SRE specification. First, 
STS-tool [Paja et al. 2014] to model STS diagrams, then we used Draw.io [JGraph Ltd] , an online 
diagramming software tool to model our layer based SRE specification, which consumed significant 
amount of time (corresponds to the evaluation criterion RM2.1.2). 
4.2.1 Business view 
In our methodology, we start by specifying the relation between business needs and the driving 
objectives of the business, also known as business drivers. Business drivers are the objectives that are 
vital for the continued success and growth of a business. An organisation can have several business 
drivers each accorded with a business value.  
Figure 64 depicts the e-commerce scenario specification at Business view. The specification is 
targeted to express the business context of business users whose objective is to manage e-commerce 
business. In our specification we considered them as an environment agents since they directly refer to 
the business people of the organization are expressed using the role “e-commerce”, see the composite 
requirement (CR) n°1. The business driver concerns the operational continuity of the e-commerce 
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business. The refinement of link of business driver into identifying the high-level business need we 
refine the “manage e-commerce business” goals into high-level functional goals (see CR n°2).  
 
Figure 64: E-commerce scenario specification - Business view 
Altogether, the Business view confines to the elicitation and refinement of ‘WHAT’ aspects of the 
business needs from the business users. This strictly leaves out the concerns of the ‘HOW’ aspects, 
which concerns the further refinement of functional goals (corresponds to the criterion RM3.1). In 
addition, since we use STS notation to express the business agent and respective goals, we inherit the 
comprehensibility characteristics of STS notation relative to the quality criterion RM2.1.1. 
4.2.2 Architect’s View 
At Architect’s view, where we start identifying the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved 
in the e-commerce business process. The refined business goals at Business view are therefore delegated 
to the respective agents. The composite requirement n°3 in Figure 65 depicts the initial step of election 
process at Architect’s view. This will permit us to introduce the architectural components described in 
the e-commerce scenario that include WEB server, Application server, Database server, Accountability 
server and the  E-commerce employees who include admin user as well.  
In the specification, we express the delegation as well the refinement of functional gaols in 6 sub-
composite requirements (i.e., CR n°3A to CR n°3F). Thanks to the AND-refinement link of composite 
requirement (described in section 3.1.1), enables to use divide and conquer approach [Knuth, 1998]. 
This eventually reduces the complexity of the elicitation process of STS modelling, thereby allowing 
the security experts to independently work with the refinement of each functional goals. 
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Figure 65: E-commerce scenario - refining business goals 
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In addition, this type of refinement also helps in tracing the refinement context (otherwise ‘HOW’ 
aspects) of each of the functional goal elicited at Business view as well as the inclusion of new agents 
identified as architectural components (corresponds to the criterion RM3.2). Whenever the agents 
identified as environment agents (e.g., administrator/employees), the functional goals is transformed 
into an expectation (expressed in yellow colour). However, at some point of time these architectural 
components need to interact with each other for fulfilling some functional goals, which requires the 
transmission/exchange of information between multiple agents. Suitably, the CR n°4 in consolidates the 
individual composite requirements (i.e., CR n°A to CR n°F) in order to facilitate the expression of the 
interaction needs of the architectural components, see Figure 66.  
 
Figure 66: E-commerce scenario - refining agent interaction needs 
In addition, the CR n°4 specification also allows to express the security constraints over the 
interaction needs (characteristics of STS notation). For instance, the commonly identified security 
constraints express the conservation of integrity and availability properties of the transmitted data. 
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Nevertheless, not all agents’ interaction needs may require same level of security protection. Therefore, 
we need to further integrate the risk analyses process to facilitate the assessment of risks related to the 
data resources and objectives assigned to agents. Thanks to the security domain information that allows 
to assess risks related to security domains and agents to provide domain control capability, trust of 
environment agents and criticality of system agents (corresponds to the evaluation criterion RM3.2).  
For security domain information, we assume the existence of some utility functions that maps the 
control capability labels of domains, criticality and trust levels of agents into a unified scale of integrity 
values (see Figure 67).  
 
Figure 67. Integrity values of domains and agents for the example case study 
The integrity values assigned to domains specify the maximum level of integrity that can be reach 
within the domains since they express the maturity of an enterprise to deploy security controls and/or 
its capability to control a given environment. In our e-commerce scenario, we identify two domains: the 
enterprise domain and the rest of the world named internet. The enterprise domain is divided into two 
sub-domains: the internal sub-domain and external sub-domain. The internal sub-domain consists in the 
assets within enterprise premises that are physically secured. We consider also that the enterprise is 
mature with well-trained employees. Thus, this sub domain is well controlled. The outside sub domain 
consists in employees working from their home using laptops provided by the office. Then, it is less 
controlled. The internet domain being outside the control of the enterprise is uncontrolled.  
The integrity levels of environment agents express their trust levels. They are assessed based on the 
the degree of the trustworthiness over their expected behavior in a given context.  These levels 
correspond to the maximum level of integrity, which is expected as guaranteed (depicted in inverted 
triangular shapes). For instance, in our use case, the administrator is highly trusted because this person 
is well-known and qualified. Local employees are only trusted because this role refers to more people. 
Visitors are partially trusted because they are known people and the reception staff verifies the visitor's 
identity card which must be surrendered in exchange for a wearable badge. 
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Finally, the integrity levels of system agents express their criticality levels. They are assed based on 
the sensitivity to threats and their risk impact of system agents’ goals on the overall business. These 
levels (depicted in triangular shapes) correspond to minimum integrity level of integrity that should be 
maintained in terms of security assurance. For instance, ‘providing access to the e-commerce web site’ 
is critical for the business of the enterprise. Thus, the web server, which is assigned to this goal, is critical 
too. The DNS and the application servers have the same criticality as the web server because the risk is 
the same if one of them cannot achieve its associated goal. The database server is highly critical. On one 
side, its goal ‘provide list of products and their price’ is critical only. On the other side, the goal ‘store 
clients’ accounts and purchase’ is highly critical because a threat on this goal will have a strong impact 
on the reputation of the enterprise. Finally, the accountability server is vital because if the enterprise 
can’t manage its accountability leads to bankruptcy. The Figure 68 depicts the CR n°5 that express the 
security domain information captured for e-commerce scenario. 
 
Figure 68: E-commerce scenario - expressing the security domain information 
Altogether, the elicitation at this view takes care of two aspects while eliciting. First one is to identify 
and specify all the concerning actors as well as their respective goals and interaction needs. The second 
one is to specify the security domain information of these actors, which allows specifying the expected 
trust over the security management activities in order to protect the critical assets (e.g., system agents, 
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information resources). At the end of this view, the refined composite must comprise of all the actors 
that play active role in fulfilling the business needs as well as their anticipated security protection needs. 
4.2.3 Designer’s view  
At design view, we start considering the network security context, where we implement our two-step 
security zone modelling methodology (described in section 3.1.4). The zone modelling rules (described 
in section) are implemented in ASP using the Clingo solver [Gebser et al. 2014] and Python2.7.  
The first step takes in as input the security domain information expressed in CR n°5 at Architect’s 
view (corresponds to the evaluation criterion RM6.2). In addition, it also requires set of permitted data 
flows are derived from the resource transmission interactions identified at architect’s view, which must 
be support by the communication. At this point, the security designers has to determine direction of the 
data flow with reference to the type of flows (e.g., TCP/UDP traffic flows). For instance, interaction 
flows between users and webserver are bi-directional since they correspond to TCP traffic flow wherein 
the users are client agents and webserver is the server agent. The set of permitted data flows defined for 
the e-commerce scenario are given in Table 14 in Appendix D.  
The composite requirements specifications CR n°6 and CR n°7 correspond to the step 1 of our zone 
modelling methodology (see Figure 70). The composite requirements (CR n°6) express the initial input 
to the first step zone modelling methodology. In e-commerce scenario we have a total of 10 agents and 
38 data flows specified at the beginning of the design view. 
 
Figure 69: E-commerce scenario - zone modelling step1 (input) 
At the end of step1, the computed zone solution subsumes a total of eight zones (i.e., zone1 to zone7 
and zone9). Wherein, six zones (i.e., zone1, zone2, and zone4 to zone7) are specified within the inside 
enterprise subdomain, and the remaining two zones (i.e., zone9 and zone 1) are specified within the 
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outside enterprise sub-domain and the internet domain respectively. The composite requirement (CR 
n°7) express the zone modelling output of step1 which specifies the zones and their integrity levels along 
with the integrity validation filtering requirements (IVF). 
 
Figure 70: E-commerce scenario - zone modelling step1 (output) 
In addition, it provides us with a total of 12 integrity validation filtering requirements as given in 
Table 11. The refinement link between CR n°6 and CR n°7 permits us to explicitly trace the link to the 
security zone modelling information (corresponds to the evaluation criterion RM6.1). 
Table 11: E-commerce scenario - IVF rules (step1) 
Agents Integrity Validation Filter (IVF) Rules 
DNS Server IVF(dnsServer,flow(clients,dnsServer),sanitize(1,3)) 
IVF(dnsServer,flow(remoteUsers,dnsServer),sanitize(2,3)) 
IVF(dnsServer,flow(visitors,dnsServer),sanitize(2,3)) 
WEB Server IVF(webServer,flow(clients,webServer),sanitize(1,3)). 
IVF(webServer,flow(remoteUsers,webServer),sanitize(2,3)) 
IVF(webServer,flow(visitors,webServer),sanitize(2,3)) 
APP Server IVF(appServer,flow(webServer,appServer),sanitize(2,4)) 
Accountability 
Server 
IVF(accountabilityServer,flow(adminUser,accountabilityServe
r),sanitize(4,5)) 
IVF(accountabilityServer,flow(localUsers,accountabilityServ
er),sanitize(3,5)) 
IVF(accountabilityServer,flow(remoteUsers,accountabilitySer
ver),sanitize(2,5)) 
Administrator IVF(adminUser,flow(dnsServer,adminUser),sanitize(2,4)) 
IVF(adminUser,flow(webServer,adminUser),sanitize(2,4)) 
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At step2, our ASP tool takes in two sets of information that includes: the result of step1, and the 
media of communication and respective integrity values elicited from the security architects. In our 
example scenario, we assumed three medium of communication: Private access, Public Access and 
Internet Access. The private and public access medium are controlled by the enterprise wherein the 
former handles the traffic within the inside enterprise sub-domain and the later handles traffic between 
the two inside/outside sub-domains of the enterprise. Internet access is uncontrolled since it refers to 
public access medium. Figure 71 shows the integrity levels of the medium calculated based on the 
restricted levels of the medium considered in our example scenario. As described in section 3.2.2, these 
integrity values permit security architects to express security risks when unexpected users or attackers 
have access to the medium (corresponds to the evaluation criterion RM6.2).  
 
Figure 71: Example Integrity levels for the medium 
 
Figure 72: E-commerce scenario - zone modelling (step2) (input) 
Respectively, the composite requirements specifications CR n°8 and CR n°9 correspond to the step 
2 of our zone modelling methodology (see Figure 73). Wherein, the composite requirements (CR n°8) 
express the step2 input that aggregates the step1 output with the newly elicited information on the media 
of communication (given in Figure 71). The composite requirement (CR n°9) express step2 output which 
corresponds to the final output of our ASP tool (given in Figure 72). It results us with a total of 85 access 
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control filtering requirements (ACF) 10 data flow integrity validation filtering requirements as given in 
Table 15 and Table 16 in Appendix D.  
 
Figure 73: E-commerce scenario - zone modelling (step2) 
Altogether, at the end of design view, our ASP tool facilitates to derive high-level network security 
requirements which can be traced back to high-level business objectives (corresponds to the evaluation 
criterion RM4.2). 
4.3 AIRBUS scenario 2 implementation 
In this section, we implement the e-commerce scenario2 (described in section 2.5.2) using our layer 
based SRE model. We have employed this scenario for our evaluation iteration 2 in chapter 2. As 
mentioned in section 2.5.2, the experimentation has provoked the discussion and has eventually helped 
in developing the scenario details, (see Figure 37) but still miss the abstraction details. In below, we will 
not explain the SRE specifications in detail like the e-commerce scenario, instead we highlight the 
important observations unique to this scenario2 implementation. For this, we consider the model given 
in Figure 37 as an input and we express is in our layer based SRE model. 
Unlike e-commerce scenario or AIRBUS scenario 1, this scenario consists in 2 business needs (see 
Figure 36 in section 2.5.2). Therefore, our SRE model must be capable to express the network security 
requirements that addresses these two needs.  
The first business need concerns the safety of the aircraft. In order to ensure the safety of the aircraft, 
the aircraft is updated with specific load information. This implies that, update aircraft is a high-level 
objective that is defined with keeping the safety business driver in mind. The second business need 
concerns with the provision of inflight services to the passengers in order to enhance the customer 
satisfaction. Here, we consider the safety and customer satisfaction as the business drivers. The first 
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business need is expressed as the responsibility goal “update aircraft” within the scope of AIRBUS actor. 
Here, by saying AIRBUS actor, we refer to some responsible team within AIRBUS who takes care of 
it. But at this level we do know the details of the responsible team. Similarly, the second need is 
expressed as the responsibility goal “Provide entertainment service”.  
 
Figure 74: AIRBUS scenario 2 - Business view 
Since these two needs are independent to another, we express the two needs in separate layered 
specifications at business and Architect’s views. Figure 74 and Figure 73 express the respective 
composite requirements specifications at business and Architect’s views.  
For business need1, at Business view, we know that the load information has to be generated by 
AIRBUS and transmitted to the aircraft. Only after refining the “update aircraft” gaol in CR n° 2A at 
the Architect’s view, we realize that the load information is not directly transmitted by AIRBUS actor 
to the aircraft. Instead, AIRBUS depends on several other actors and there is a process for generating 
the load. This information is traced using the refinement link between CR n° 1A and CR n° 2A that 
expresses delegation of the goal “generate load”.  
Similarly, the CR n° 2C describes the detailed process for providing the entertainment service. Figure 
89 in Appendix D present the respective security domain information that is expressed in the composure 
requirements CR n° 4A and CR n° 4B. This entails the security experts to ensure that the elicited security 
domain information must not conflict with each other. For instance, the aircraft control application is 
identified as common in both the processes, the receptive integrity level must be same.  This allows to 
verify the consistency of the security domain information. 
However, when it comes to the design view, the network security zoning must consider all the 
components in the scenario. Thanks to the AND refinement link of the composite requirements, that 
allows us to integrate the security domain information of these two needs and compute a consolidated 
security zoning solution, see Figure 76.  
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Figure 75: AIRBUS scenario 2 - Architect’s view 
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Figure 76: AIRBUS scenario 2 - Design view - zone modelling 
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4.4 Discussion and Evaluation – SRE methodology 
This section is dedicated to present our arguments relative our analysis on the performance of our 
layer based network SRE methodology with reference to the 10 evaluation criteria derived from the 6 
quality criteria. Note that, by saying evaluation criteria we are referring to refined anticipated 
characteristics of good network SRE methodology (i.e., leaf nodes in figure) from the perspective of 
security experts involved in IREHOD2 project. They include RM2.1.1, RM2.1.2, RM2.1.3, RM3.1, RM3.2, 
RM4.1, RM6.1, RM6.2, RM6.3 and RM6.4. Wherein, by saying quality criteria we are referring to quality 
characteristics of good requirements (i.e., rood nodes in figure). We considered the following 6 quality 
criteria as our initial analysis. They include: RM1: adequacy (C10), RM2: comprehensibility (C11), RM3: 
abstract (C6), RM4: traceability (C5), RM5: feasibility (C3) and RM6: metadata (C21). 
In section 4.4.1, we present our evaluation results of SRE methodology with reference to the 
evaluation criteria. In the end in section 4.4.2, we present our evaluation comments specific to the zone 
modelling methodology. 
4.4.1 Discussion on the SRE methodology evaluation with reference to the evaluation criteria 
In Table 6, we resumed the evaluation results of the proposed SRE methodology. Firs column 
displays the set of evaluation criteria (refer Figure 31 in section). Second column displays respective 
measurement scales for each of the three SRE methods with respect to the lists the verification methods 
given in Appendix C. Since we integrate the modelling concepts of STS and Secure KAOS in SRE 
model, therefore we inherit some characteristic of their characteristic features analysed in chapter 2, 
section 2.3.  Out of listed 10 evaluation criteria, we could not test the some criteria (i.e., RM2.1.3, and 
RM6.4). In below, we present our arguments related to our evaluation results. 
Table 12: Evaluation results of our proposed SRE methodology 
Evaluation criteria (RM) Layer based network 
SRE methodology 
RM2.1.1: The SRE methodology modelling language terminology must 
be easily understood to the user 
high 
RM2.1.2: The cost of the SRE methodology training should be minimal low 
RM2.1.3: The time taken to learn the SRE methodology should be 
minimal 
-- 
RM3.1: Should support the need for users to easily communicate ideas 
and feedback respecting the abstraction needs 
high 
RM3.2: Should support the need for users to clearly define the number 
of abstraction levels of refinement 
high 
RM4.1: The methodology should facilitate to trace the network security 
requirements back to business objectives 
high 
RM6.1: Must facilitate to specify and link network security zone 
information 
high 
RM6.2: Should allow to annotate each requirement with risk attributes high 
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RM6.3: Should allow to annotate each requirement with priority 
information 
High 
RM6.4: Must facilitate to specify the implementation costs of network 
security requirements 
-- 
Our layered based SRE methodology is largely inspired from SABSA layered framework. It consists 
in three abstraction layers i.e., Business view, Architect’s view, and designers view. At design view, our 
SRE specification express the output of our ASP tool in graphical format. The principle idea to develop 
any new modelling is the comprehensibility factor. Since our methodology constitutes different layered 
views involving different stakeholders, this impelled the necessity in choosing rightful SRE 
methodologies that are suitable in regards with the comprehensibility level of the stakeholders. So that 
it becomes easier to establish a good communication with the stakeholders while eliciting and evaluating 
the requirements (RM3.2). Respectively, we use STS notation at Business view and Architect’s view, 
since our analysis (presented in section 2.5) shows that STS concepts are easy to use (RM2.1.1). At 
design view, we implement ASP tool. 
However, since we do not have tool we had to first create the model in STS specification, then we 
used an online graphical tool (Draw.io) to customize our specification at Architect’s view (RM2.1.2). 
This process consumed some time and also allowed manual errors (e.g., grammatical/typo errors) that I 
had to work several times for some big models (e.g., CR 4 in Figure 66). It is to note that the complexity 
of creating the specification is not evenly distributed and varied for different views. From our 
experience, we observed that the specification at Architect’s view consumed us more time comparatively 
the specifications at remaining two views. However, since we did not run the iteration 2 of our 
evaluation, we could not test the evaluation criteria concerning the learnability from the perspective of 
security experts (RM2.1.3). 
The next issue we faced while creating the specifications is regarding the information gathering (i.e., 
elicitation process). By the end of Architect’s view, we had to identity all the agents and agent 
interactions. For AIRBUS scenarios, this job was easier since we had contact with the security experts. 
However, for e-commerce scenario, all we had was the document from ANSSI website, so we had to 
imagine the information relating to the interaction needs. This information is important because at design 
view we derive the permitted information flows from these interactions. However, it is to note that, we 
do not presume this issue as a shortcoming of our SRE methodology. Instead we consider it as strong 
characteristic that enforces the involvement of security experts while creating the SRE specification, 
which eventually creates a platform to have effective communication (RM3.1). This reflects both the 
forward and backward traceability of the network security needs. This allows the security analysis to 
verify the refinement of these high-level network security requirement. The integrity levels express the 
rigor of security protection required.  
The utility functions that we introduce at the Architect’s view of our SRE methodology, allows to 
express the risk assessment of the agents, domains in terms of integrity values. This permits to link the 
risk analysis information to network security requirements (RM6.2). However, it is to note that logic 
behind the utility functions on how the mapping is made can vary with respect to the risk mangement 
process within an organization.  For example, in order to justify that DNS servers will always have an 
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integrity level of 3, it is first necessary to elicit what characteristics of DNS server should one look to 
attribute a certain integrity level. Likewise, risk analysis techniques like attack graphs can be helpful to 
analyse and measure these characteristics more objectively. 
The ASP tool implementing the formal rules of our zone modelling methodology allows us create 
zone specification based on the security domain information as well as the list of initial integrity levels 
values computed based on risk impact elicited at Architect’s view. In the end, the tool provides us with 
a set of network security requirements: security zones, integrity validation filters, access control filters, 
and data flow integrity requirements. Thanks to our composite requirements with refinement links, that 
facilitates in expressing this network security zoning information in a way that is traceable back to 
business objectives (RM4.1 and RM6.1). In addition, the rationale attribute accorded to the refinement 
links of the composite requirement helps to reason the context of refinement, which we refer to the input 
and output of the zone modelling steps. 
Furthermore, the actual integrity values of the zones help in prioritizing the network security 
requirements with reference to the rigor of security validation required (RM6.3). For instance, the IVF 
requirements state that there must be a data flow integrity validation procedure at an agent if the 
incoming data flows do not satisfy the CW-lite rule (see RULE 8 in section 3.2.3.1). Here, the 
sanitization function helps to increase the confidence on the information flows. 
For example, the IVF filter at Accountability serve is specified for the incoming flows from all the 
employee agents (i.e., local users, remote users and the administrator users). The respective sanitize 
functions describe the rigor of integrity validation needed to check these data flows to guarantee they 
conform to constraints of integrity level 5. Since the integrity level of the zones that these agents resining 
in differ, the rigor of integrity validation checking the incoming data flows to guarantee they conform 
to constraints of integrity level 5, vary accordingly. Respectively, this will help in selecting the security 
measures such as a web application firewall that checks for SQL injection/viruses or a VPN connection 
for remote connections etc. Even though, the elaboration of the sanitization function depends on the 
domain environment as well as the type of information flows we are dealing with. We displayed the 
example prioritization of IVF requirements at accountability server in Table 13.  
Table 13: Prioritizing IVF requirements at accountability server 
IVF requirements at Accountability Server Difference in the 
integrity levels of 
interacting zones 
Rigor of security 
validation 
anticipated 
IVF(accountabilityServer,flow(adminUser,
accountabilityServer),sanitize(4,5)) 
1 Low 
IVF(accountabilityServer,flow(localUsers
,accountabilityServer),sanitize(3,5)) 
2 Medium 
IVF(accountabilityServer,flow(remoteUser
s,accountabilityServer),sanitize(2,5)) 
3 Very high 
However, it is to note that, the qualitative scale for prioritization depends on the scale of integrity 
levels considered by utility functions. In this thesis, we have considered an example scale of integrity 
levels (i.e., 1 to 5). The difference in integrity scales will gives us the three possible values (i.e., 1: low, 
2: medium, 3: high). This scaling permits in prioritizing requirements based on risk impact. That means, 
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the lower the difference in integrity values means the lower the risk impact regardless of 
internal/external threats. 
Finally, the cost of network security requirements is a cumulative function of the cost of security 
zoning plus the cost of network security solutions to implement the high-level network security 
requirements based on the rigor of anticipated security verification. The optimization functions of our 
ASP tool enables the security architects to verify and control the costs of security zoning with the help 
of optimization function. In this work, we presented an example optimization rule presented in Figure 
58, which computes the optimal solution by minimizing the actual integrity levels of agents and zones. 
However, for learning the cost of security measures, we need the further refinement the high-level 
network security requirements, which is not covered in this thesis work. As consequence, we could not 
test the evaluation criteria RM6.4 since we our tool partially addresses the cost requirements. 
4.4.2 Discussion on the evaluation of Zone modelling methodology 
This ASP tool is developed by keeping the requirement engineers in mind. To them, network security 
concepts related to security zoning are novel since they do not have enough background to integrate the 
network security practice to SRE process. On the other hand, the network security practitioners who are 
well familiar with network security zoning and partitioning will not have enough understanding on the 
business communication needs and risk impact. Therefore, our tool facilitates the security architects in 
eliciting high-level network security requirements with reference to the business interaction needs 
identified at Architect’s view.  
We have chosen Answer Set Programming (ASP) because it is a lightweight language for knowledge 
representation and reasoning that has been developed in the field of reasoning and logic programming 
[Grasso et al. 2013]. The optimization function ‘minimize’ of ASP solver allows to compute optimal 
solutions. Note that, in this thesis we do not claim to provide optimal zone solution, for the measurement 
attributes of cost heuristics may differ from organization to organization. Instead, we intend to help 
security architects to be able try different attributes for characterizing the cost heuristics. The cost 
optimazion rule (see figure) is an example considered in our experimentation. Therefore, our tool is not 
subjected to evaluate the novelty or optimality of zone solution obtained. 
One way to test the performance of the tool by checking its compilation time. Because, the 
compilation time is taken to compute the optimized solution using the optimization statement minimize, 
to find the solution with minimal cost. In our experimentation for the e-commerce scenario, we executed 
our tool 30 times on a Mac Book Pro (2.8GHz Core i7, 16GB RAM) and configured the solver to use 4 
threads in parallel. The execution times to calculate the optimal solution based on our cost optimization 
rule varied between 5.8 seconds and 7.6 seconds. However, it is to note that, the execution time varies 
with number of agents, data flows as well as the cost optimization rule (described in 3.2.1.1). In addition, 
the completion time also depends on the number and scaling range of integrity levels considered in the 
utility functions. In our experimentation, we have considered an integrity scale range from 1 to 5. Since 
we confined the utility functions to an assumption, we could not test the accurate performance of the 
tool. 
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4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter principally explores the pros and cons of our SRE methodology with reference to the 
evaluation criteria (i.e., RM2.1.1, RM2.1.2, RM2.1.3, RM3.1, RM3.2, RM4.1, RM6.1, RM6.2, RM6.3 and 
RM6.4) captured in chapter 2. To validate our observations, we implemented two use case scenarios. 
One scenario describes the IREHDO2 context. The other scenario describes the SRE context of an e-
commerce enterprise network. The results of the evaluation study show that the layer based SRE 
approach of our SRE methodology is easier to apply to network SRE context.  
First, the three views (i.e., Business view/Architect’s view/Designer’s view) facilities to integrate the 
security problem context of the stakeholders working in varying layers of abstractions in network 
development cycle. The design view enables to capture network security requirements through network 
security zoning. This confirms our evaluation related to the comprehensibility and abstraction needs 
(i.e., RM2.1.1, RM2.1.3, RM3.1, RM3.2 and RM6.1). Second, the modelling notation of composite 
requirements with the refinement links permits to us to trace the network security requirements back to 
business objectives. This confirms our evaluation related to the traceability aspects (i.e., RM4.1).  
Finally, our security zone modelling methodology at design view computes the actual integrity levels 
of zones using this security domain information, which permits to integrate the risk assessment of the 
domains and agents in the enterprise network. Eventually, the actual integrity levels of the security zones 
facilitates in prioritizing the security requirements based on the risk impact. This confirms our evaluation 
related to the traceability as well as the prioritization aspects (i.e., RM4.1 and RM6.3). However, we could 
not test some criteria related to the learnability of SRE modelling (RM2.1.2) and to the facility to 
integrate the costs of network security requirements (RM6.4). 
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THESIS CONCLUSION 
Thesis Background and Motivation 
Considering the pace of the emerging network security threats, protecting enterprise networks has 
never been more important. Several business-critical activities and operations continue to rely on the 
functionalities of network technologies, disruption of which may incur severe losses to business or even 
damage company reputation. Network security principally aims at ensuring legitimate access to the 
business data assets by preventing intrusion, destruction, modification or misuse. However, to achieve 
network security, several aspects have to be taken into consideration such as network segmentation (i.e., 
security zoning); security of network devices connecting the communicating end-user systems; and 
security of the information being transferred across the communication links[ISO/IEC 27033 2009].  
Even though, security architects contemplate the implementation of security solutions (e.g., IDS/IPS, 
VPN, IP Firewall, and Web Application Firewalls, DMZs) adapting them to the network architectures 
can be challenging. It requires a comprehensive understanding of the business environment and its 
operational context before determining adequate security practices pertinent to the business objectives. 
Otherwise, an inadequate network security design can lead to data loss in spite of the monitored traffic, 
and security incidents handling. Besides, any lateral changes to the network security design (e.g., adding 
firewalls/proxies), post deployment, can turn to be a real overhead in terms of time, effort, and costs. In 
order to evade these aforementioned problems, it is essential to consider network security at earlier 
stages i.e. right from the gathering of security requirements for architecting networks, which otherwise 
refers to the ‘security by design’ principle. 
In this regard, the Security Requirements Engineering (SRE) process has been gaining significant 
attention from both academic research and industrial sectors since it helps to capture and document 
security requirements by analysing the business risk impact of potential threats on business objectives. 
A large variety of SRE approaches (e.g., such as agent-oriented, goal-oriented and problem frames 
oriented) propose varying perspectives of formal modelling in order to enhance the quality and 
experience of the SRE process. However, they render no support to capture security requirements from 
the network security perspective. While one reason is being their emphasis confined to system/software 
security alone, the other reason is being their lack of support to consider security problem context of 
stakeholders (e.g., business users, security architects, network security designers, developers) involved 
at different layers of abstraction in the network security development life cycle. Therefore, a 
methodology for network security is promptly desired. This shortcoming has coerced us to probe for an 
alternative solution (i.e., a SRE methodology) to foster the implementation of the “security by design” 
principle from network security perspective. 
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Thesis Project and Research Questions 
This thesis work is realized as a part of IREHDO2 project that concerns future generation aircraft 
networks. Our work is done in collaboration with the security experts at AIRBUS who are interested in 
enhancing their SRE practices in order to increase the assurance on the final security solution enforced 
on their aircraft networks. Our main objective in this project is to propose an SRE methodology that 
allows us to capture, express and analyse the network security requirements, and that facilitates the 
refinement into network security and monitoring configurations (TOP/DOWN approach). 
 
Figure 77: Our goal in IREHDO2 project 
Security Requirements engineering (SRE) is a complex process. On one hand, the security experts 
(e.g., security requirement engineers, business analysts, security architects) have to discover the business 
assets, associated security needs and constraints (e.g., costs, regulatory constraints). How to be sure if 
security all security needs of all the stakeholders are identified? On the other hand the other group of 
security experts (e.g., security risk analysis, security design engineers) have to ensure that the all security 
threats, are addressed with some counter security measures. How to be sure if some threat is not 
forgotten? How to be sure if the defined security measures are important and rightly address the threats? 
A SRE methodology is considered as a tool that facilitates the security experts in eliciting network 
security requirements while considering the aforementioned aspects in a given SRE context. 
Therefore, this thesis work fosters the review of some important aspects related to the characteristics 
of good SRE methodology that ensure the effectiveness of SRE process in network context. To this end, 
our principle research questions of the thesis are defined as: 
RQ1: How to evaluate SRE methodologies in a network SRE context? 
RQ2: How to define a good SRE methodology that facilitates the network security requirements 
elicitation and refinement i.e., from high-level business objectives into low-level network security 
zoning requirements? 
Considering the RQ1 study, the detailed review of the formal SRE modelling aspects of widely 
acknowledged SRE approaches (i.e., goal-oriented, agent-oriented and problem frames based) has 
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allowed us to explore varying philosophies of eliciting security requirements. In brief, goal-oriented 
approaches (e.g., Secure KAOS) emphasize on capturing security requirements by linking to goals to 
intentional obstacles (a.k.a. anti-goals) hierarchy resembling an attack trees; agent-oriented SRE 
approaches (e.g., STS) emphasize on capturing security requirements over the interaction dependencies 
of the agents; finally, problem frames based approaches (e.g., SEPP) emphasize on capturing security 
requirements by characterizing the constrained behaviour of system-to-be components as security 
problems. Furthermore, we were able to study in detail the varying characteristics of these approaches, 
their pros and cons with reference to the anticipated characteristic features of network SRE methodology 
(such as comprehensibility of modelling concepts, traceability of security requirements, etc.,). 
Considering the RQ2 study, we have investigated the network security zoning principles that help 
security architects in eliciting and analysing early network security requirements. Furthermore, the 
exploring of SABSA, an enterprise architecture driven security requirements framework, has provided 
us insights on the abstraction layers and the abstraction needs of different stakeholders involved within 
the development cycle of enterprise networks. 
Synthesis of contributions and Future perspectives 
While the challenges inherent to our research topic are numerous, we succeeded to consolidate 
several independent areas of research works that together contribute to the successful implementation 
of SRE process.  As a result, the literature study of this dissertation presented in CHAPTER 1 consists 
in the background theory and concepts of security risk management methods and risk analysis (RA) 
techniques; SRE process and the three SRE methods studied in this thesis (i.e., STS, Secure KAOS and 
SEPP); Network security zoning; and SABSA framework. While, CHAPTER 2 consolidates our 
premier contributions relative to RQ1 that facilitate the specification of good characteristics of SRE 
methodology in network SRE context; CHAPTER 3 presents our core contributions of this work related 
to RQ2 that concern our proposed SRE methodology.  
In below, we enlist the claimed contributions and limitations realized during this dissertation. 
 A RE based SRE Evaluation methodology 
Problem concerned: Having observed the varying perspectives of the three renowned SRE approaches 
(i.e., goal-oriented, agent-oriented and problem frames oriented), we had to decide on which one of these 
approaches suites best to the network security context of IREHDO2. Existing comparative studies did 
not help us in this task since their evaluation criteria is ad hoc and does not consider the working context 
of the security requirement engineers.  
Proposed solution: To address this issue, we have proposed a generic evaluation methodology built on 
the classical idea of requirements engineering. Our proposed methodology differentiates its strategy 
from previous comparative studies for two reasons. First, we involve the security experts that are the 
SRE end-users in the whole process. Secondly, identifying SRE evaluation criteria corresponds to 
identifying the characteristics of a good SRE methodology. The refinement of evaluation criteria was 
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done using goal modelling notation (KAOS). The root goal nodes correspond to the quality 
characteristics of good requirements. The leaf nodes express the evaluation criteria, each defined with 
objective verification methods. 
Using this methodology, we have derived 10 evaluation criteria in the network SRE context of 
IREHDO2 project. These evaluation criteria are refined with reference  to the six quality criteria of good 
security requirements (i.e., adequacy (C10), comprehensibility (C11), traceability (C5), abstract (C6), 
feasibility (C3) and metadata (C21)). We have employed the criteria to evaluate three SRE 
methodologies (KAOS, STS and SEPP), the results of which shows that none of them suites to capture 
network security requirements (e.g., security zoning). 
Limitations: The main limitation of this evaluation methodology is that its implementation requires the 
participation of security experts. For instance, iteration 2 requires that the security experts master the 
concepts of SRE methodology under evaluation, which raises concerns in terms of time and training 
costs. In practice, once a SRE methodology is chosen, a lot of time and money is put to train the users 
and it is very unlikely that one would switch to new methodology soon. Therefore, from the industrial 
usage perspective choosing the best suitable SRE methodology at earlier stages reduces overhead and 
saves time. Our evaluation methodology helps in this by enabling its users to think like a requirements 
architect who plans, designs and reviews the derivation of security requirements well before selecting 
an SRE methodology. 
Future perspectives: The 10 evaluation criteria derived with reference to the six quality criteria of good 
security requirements. However, as per our weaving methodology there 15 more quality criteria that 
need to be considered. Therefore, currently we are working on capturing the anticipated characteristics 
of SRE methodology with reference to all the 20 quality criteria. The respective verification methods 
permit us to synthesize and document the meta-information/ measurement metrics that assist in 
addressing the validity threats of evaluation process. 
On the other hand, we would like to apply our evaluation approach to other requirements engineering 
contexts (e.g., cloud computing). The objective to be able to determine which of the evaluation criteria 
are generic and which are specific to security context. In the long term, we intend to build a common 
repository to maintain the evaluations carried out in each scenario context so that they can used as a 
reference for any similar evaluations. Furthermore, the verification methods and the measurement 
metrics can be reused on other contexts or at least can provide a consolidated evaluation prepositive of 
other security experts. This knowledge will constitute a solid foundation to propose future SRE research 
directions towards standardizing the common perspective of good characteristics of an SRE 
methodology. 
 Layer-based SRE methodology for network security 
Problem: The evaluation experiment confirms that currently a SRE methodology for network security 
is missing. From the derived evaluation criteria, we deduce that the anticipated SRE methodology for 
network security must facilitate to express the abstraction needs of different stakeholders involved in 
the network development life cycle. 
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Solution: To address this requirement, we proposed a layer-based SRE methodology inspired from 
SABSA framework. Our methodology consists of three layered views i.e., Business view, architect’s 
view and Designer’s view. The Business view concerns the elicitation of high-level business needs. The 
architect’s view concerns the elicitation of security needs over the interaction needs of the actors; the 
elicitation of security domain information (i.e., criticality/trust levels of agents and control capabilities 
of security domains) through integrity utility functions, which permits to integrate risk analysis process. 
Finally, the Designer’s view concerns the elicitation of high-level network security requirements 
through security zoning. We use express business and architect’s view in STS modelling, while at 
Designer’s view we proposed a security zone modelling methodology. To facilitate the linking of all 
these three abstract views, we proposed a new SRE modelling notation called composite requirements 
that merges STS and KAOS modelling concepts. 
Limitations: The first limitation of our SRE methodology is it lacks a tool support. As consequence, it 
consumes significant time in creating the SRE specification. Second limitation concerns our critical 
assumption relating to the utility functions. We presume that they help to integrate risk assessment 
information through mapping the trust/criticality levels of agents as well as the control capability of 
domains to the unified integrity levels. Indeed, the integrity levels plays vital role the specification of 
security zones. To explain the logic behind this mapping, it would require a rigorous research on how 
to analyse the trust / criticality levels based on risk impact similar to works. 
Future perspectives: For future works, we intend to work towards developing a graphical tool for 
representing the modelling notation of our layer-based SRE methodology. This will facilitate us to 
evaluate our methodology for more complex scenarios of network SRE context. In addition, the tool can 
be used to evaluate the learnability factor of our proposed methodology. In the long term, we would like 
to extend our study on developing the functional logic behind the utility functions. For this, we need to 
look for the Meta information that may help us in characterizing the mapping of integrity scales to the 
trust/criticality and control capability levels. 
 Anti-STS, a multi-agent risk modelling technique 
Problem concerned: We argue that, an SRE methodology must facilitate the risk analysis that 
corresponds to both asset as well as threat-based risk analysis, which will eventually allow us to analyse 
the likelihood and impact of security risks pertaining to critical assets in the enterprise network. Security 
risk analysis consists of two types: asset-based and threat-based risk analysis. The utility functions 
expressing the integrity levels of security domains and agents correspond to asset-based risk analysis 
concepts. Therefore, we needed also to integrate a based risk analysis process.  Our evaluation study 
shows that STS notation does not provide adequate support to integrate threat-based risk analysis 
concepts. Furthermore, existing attack modelling techniques do not help in expressing complex attacks 
like APTs (advanced persistent threats) in which multiple attacking agents act collaboratively to 
infiltrate enterprise networks. 
Solution: To address this issue, we proposed a threat profile oriented risk-modelling technique that 
integrates the social modelling concepts from STS modelling and the Anti-goal modelling concepts from 
Secure KAOS. We name it as Anti-STS. We argue that attackers are not lonely agents and they too have 
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to rely on some malicious users or malicious programs in order to launch an attack. Our Anti-STS Model 
permits to analyse the social and technical dependencies between the threat actors (i.e., individual or 
group, system element or software program, etc.) will help in anticipating the factors of likelihood and 
threat capabilities. 
Limitations: Since our principal objective of this thesis is to propose SRE methodology for network 
security, we had allotted limited time to develop our proposed Anti-STS Model into a full-fledged risk 
modelling technique. We retain this task as our future perspectives. 
Future perspectives:  Although, we introduced Anti-STS modelling to be considered as a threat-based 
risk-modelling technique, we have identified yet another use of Anti-STS, which is to be used as a threat 
intelligence tool to represent existing APT attacks. The threat intelligence reports on APT attacks are 
generally shared as a list of documents that are written in natural language, like APT notes on github1. 
Our perspective is to reuse the modelling concepts of Anti-STS Technique to express explicitly the 
multiple attacking agents and their malicious behaviour in a graphical model. This will help us in 
towards developing a common platform to formally represent the threat intelligence on notable APT 
like attacks. As an initiative, we have already tried our hands on modelling using carbanack attack in 
[Bulusu et al. 2017b]. 
In future, we intend to work in developing a tool to represent the APT attacks. We had prepared a 
proposal to Master students to help us in developing this tool. The tool must facilitate to express the 
composite attack scenario of an APT in terms attacking agents and their interaction dependencies. This 
will enable us to study and analyse the social and technical dependencies between the attackers and the 
technical systems used during the execution of the APT attack. Eventually one can deduce the list of 
events that can enable to detect the malicious behaviour of the APT attack. Some example events can 
include the creation of malicious configuration files in the library or untimely execution of legitimate 
library files etc. In the end, such events can be transformed into formal rules which can be fed directly 
to the security monitoring systems such as intrusion detection systems (IDS) in order to monitor the real 
traffic against such malicious behaviour. The results of this work can also aid in situation based security 
management frameworks such as [Laborde et al. 2018]. 
In long term, we want to use this tool to compare and distinguish varying attack patterns employed 
in APT campaigns. This aspect corresponds to the Req8 given in Section II. For example, the regular 
attack patterns and social engineering styles that are frequently employed or different malicious 
capabilities of malware programs or different skillsets that the attackers exhibited in order to infiltrate 
the target systems. Such information corresponds to learning the threat profile. This will enable us to 
model and compare the threat profiles of multiple APT groups. 
 Logic-based zone modelling methodology 
Problem concerned: Network zoning (a.k.a. network segmentation) is a key defence-in-depth strategy 
that segregates and protects key company assets and limits lateral movements of attackers across 
corporate network in case of intrusion. Therefore, determining security zones and respective trust levels 
                                                     
1 https://github.com/kbandla/APTnotes 
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is a preliminary step for security architects to derive other network security requirements such physical 
access, dataflow control and protection, and end-systems protection [Sedgewick 2014; Secure Arc 
2009]. Nonetheless, in the literature, there has been limited focus in this regard and no rigorous approach 
formally support this process. 
Solution: To address this issue, we proposed a zone modelling methodology based on three security 
principles: complete mediation, least privileges and Clark-Wilson lite formal model. We defined a set 
of formal rules as well as the list of initial integrity levels values computed based on risk impact, which 
makes our methodology approach traceable and verifiable. The whole process has been implemented in 
an ASP tool to automate the security zones computation. It produces a set of network security 
requirements: security zones, integrity validation filters, access control filters, and data flow integrity 
requirements. We illustrated the use of this methodology using an e-commerce use case scenario. The 
tool also facilitates calculating cost-optimal security zone models. 
Limitations: The current methodology does not support in the further refinement of high-level network 
security requirements. For instance, refinement of Integrity validation filtering requirements (IVF) need 
to be further refined in order to be able to identify security measures such as a web application firewall 
that checks for SQL injection/viruses or a VPN connection for remote connections etc. Another 
limitation of this work is it does not automate the prioritization of elicited network security requirements.  
It is to note that, our ASP tool deliberately do not guarantee optimal zone solution since as we 
deliberately focused on enabling security experts to customize the attributes that allow to compute 
optimal zone solution. Therefore, we do not consider it as a limitation.  
Future perspectives: As future works, we want to first investigate the refinement of the high-level 
network security requirements produced by our current work. As an example, IVF attached to agents 
may require to be refined due to design constraints. For instance, it might be impossible to enforce the 
IVF on the accountabilityServer (from the e-commerce case study) for technical constraints. In this case, 
the initial security requirements needs to be refined by introducing new security agents (e.g., network 
security proxies) to achieve the IVF, similar to the final zone model in the e-commerce case study.  
In parallel, we would like to extend our security zone modelling approach to consider the 
confidentiality and availability requirements. Access control filters, defined by our methodology, 
partially address confidentiality requirements only. We intend to explicitly integrate formal 
confidentiality models. In long term, we intend to consider the security zoning aspects of dynamic 
context, in which the agents, their integrity levels, and attack scenarios can change easily from one 
situation to another, increasing the challenge of creating new zones. 
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Appendix A. FAIR Risk Taxonomy 
 
Figure 78: Risk taxonomy hierarchy 
 
NAME Definition 
Loss Event Frequency (LEF) The probable frequency, within a given time-frame, that a threat agent 
will inflict harm upon an asset 
Control Strength (CS) Defined as the strength of a security control or mitigation control as 
compared to a standard measure of force or threat capability of a threat 
agent 
Threat Capability (TC) Defined as the capability (skill set, knowledge) of a threat agent to cause 
harm to an asset. 
Threat Event Frequency (TEF) The probable frequency occurrence of thereat events within a given 
time-frame, when a threat agent act against an asset 
Vulnerability The probability that the control strength of an asset fails to resist the 
malicious actions of a threat agent 
Contact Occurs when a threat agent establishes a physical or virtual (e.g., 
network) connection to an asset 
Action An act taken against an asset by a threat agent. Requires first that contact 
occur between the asset and threat agent. 
Probable loss magnitude (PLM) The probable magnitude of loss occurred as a result of loss events 
Asset Loss Factors Criticality, Cost, Sensitivity (Reputation, Competitive Advantage, 
Legal), etc. 
Threat Loss Factors Action, Misuse, Disclosure, Modify, Deny Access, etc. 
Organizational Factors Timing, Detection, Response, Containment, Repudiation, Recovery, 
etc. 
External Factors Competitors, Legal, Media, Stakeholders, etc. 
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Appendix B. Graphical tool for analyzing the semantic dependencies 
of the quality characteristics 
The key aspect of this graph tool is to identify and categorize the concepts for each of the definitions 
and represent them in a graph format. The method subsumes following stepwise approach Figure 64. 
 
Figure 79: Graph creation approach 
First step, we manually extracted all the 185 criteria definitions into a word file and then for each 
definition, we had further extracted the associated concepts as proposed by respective sources. We then 
categorized the criteria and identified concepts as well as the defined relation between them in an excel 
file as shown in figure 65.   
In the next step, we built a graph, using python parser, where nodes represent criteria and concepts, 
and edges represent the defined relation between as per criterion definitions. We used python graph 
module networkx [NetworkX developers 2016] to create the graph in graphml format, a standard, 
comprehensive and easy-to-use file format available for graphs. This graphml file format is based on 
XML standard and hence ideally supported by many graph visualization tools. The final step of our 
analysis method is to analyse this graph with the help of graph visualization tools. We used two graphml 
viewer tools, Gephi and yEd. 
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Figure 80: Graph creation approach input and output files 
Following Figure 52 reflects all the criterion nodes and their defined reference links. However, it is 
important to note that this graph reflects our first analysis of the semantic dependencies. Different 
interpretation of criterion definitions and the semantic dependencies, can impact the number and nature 
of these edges.  We coloured the nodes to highlight some patterns in dependencies. Therefore, a rigorous 
analysis concerning validity threats requires a proper research. 
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Figure 81: Overview of Criteria graph 
Many variations were found in the propositions of these reference links between the criterion and 
concept nodes resulting in different pattern of definitions. For example, a reference can be observed 
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between a criterion and a concept, or either between two criteria or two concepts. Figure 0-82 depicts 
an example pattern. These criterion graph patterns greatly help in evaluating the efficiency of 
requirements elicitation and evaluation process employed by RE methodology. Depending on the 
context definition and type of reference link, the patterns vary differently. 
 
Figure 0-82: Criteria graph example pattern 
 
Accordingly, we have highlighted some observed patterns by colouring the nodes. 
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Appendix C. Verification methods for the elicited evaluation criteria 
Nominal scaling: uses numerals (a.k.a. labels) towards verifying the determination of equality 
Ordinal scaling: uses rank ordering (e.g., less/more or small/big) towards verifying the determination 
of greater or less 
Interval scaling: uses quantitative numeric values that express the exact difference between the 
values in measurement units (e.g., duration, length, weight). 
Ratio scaling: uses quantitative numeric values that express the exact difference between the values 
in fraction of units (e.g., hours per day) 
RM2.1.1: The SRE methodology modelling language terminology must be easily understood to the 
user 
Ordinal scaling: The degree of support needed to understand the concepts. 
Verification method  Performance 
measure 
Easy to understand 
high 
Easy to understand with some help 
medium 
Need some training to understand the concepts 
low 
   
RM2.1.2: The cost of the SRE methodology training should be minimal 
Ordinal scaling: The degree of openness to tool support 
Verification method  Performance 
measure 
Freely available tool high 
Tool available on free trial version medium 
No tool available, need manual effort low 
 
The verification of criteria RM2.1.3 is relative to RM2.1.1 and RM2.1.2. 
RM2.1.3: The time taken to learn the SRE methodology should be minimal 
Ratio scaling: Learnability time in number of weeks 
Verification method  
Performance 
measure 
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Easy to adapt the concepts in one week high 
Need at least two weeks medium 
Need at least one month low 
 
RM3.1: Should support the need for users to easily communicate ideas and feedback respecting the 
abstraction needs 
Nominal scaling: network security requirements 
Verification method  Performance 
measure (nominal) 
Facilitates to express the network security zoning information high 
No support to define abstraction levels nil 
 
RM3.2: Should support the need for users to clearly define the number of abstraction levels of 
refinement in network security development cycle i.e., from business security problem context till 
network security problem context. 
Interval scaling: definite number of abstraction levels 
Verification method  Performance 
measure (ratio) 
Allows to define the abstraction levels with clear separation of concerns high 
No support to define abstraction levels nil 
 
RM4.1: The methodology should facilitate to trace the network security requirements back to business 
objectives 
Ordinal scaling: The degree of openness to trace security requirements 
Verification method  Performance 
measure (ordinal) 
Tracing of (network) security requirements is explicit (i.e., direct) high 
Tracing of (network) security requirements is implicit (i.e., indirect) medium 
Minimal support for cross-referencing low 
 
The verification of criteria RM6.1 is relative to RM3.1 
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RM6.1: Must facilitate to specify and link network security zone information 
Nominal scaling: link security zoning information 
Verification method Performance 
measure 
Explicit linking of security zoning information to business risk impact high 
No support to link security zoning information  nil 
 
RM6.2: Should allow to annotate each requirement with risk attributes 
Nominal and Ordinal scaling: The degree of support to link risk attributes explicitly 
Verification method Performance 
measure 
The annotation feature is extensible. Requirements can be linked with risk 
attributes i.e., asset criticality, risk event, risk likelihood, control strength) 
high 
At least two risk attributes i.e., risk events and risk likelihood medium 
At least one risk attribute i.e., risk events low 
Requirement cannot be annotated with any kind risk information  nil 
 
RM6.3: Should allow to annotate each requirement with priority information 
Ordinal scaling: link goal/threat with priority 
Verification method Performance 
measure 
Allows to prioritize security goals/requirements high 
Does not facilitate to prioritize security goals/requirements nil 
 
RM6.4: Must facilitate to specify the implementation costs of network security requirements 
Nominal scaling: link implementation costs 
Verification method Performance 
measure 
Allows to annotate requirements with implementation costs high 
Does not allow to give information on implementation costs of requirement nil 
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Appendix D. SRE methodology complete view 
Utility functions example mapping – Integrity scale 1 to 5 
 
Figure 83: utility functions example mapping 
 
 
Figure 84: Example Control capability / integrity level mapping 
 
 
Figure 85: Example Criticality / integrity mapping 
 
 
Figure 86: Example Trust/integrity level mapping 
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AIRBUS scenario – Aircraft maintenance SRE model 
 
Figure 87: Use case Scenario 1 - Business view + Architect’s view 
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Figure 88: Use case Scenario 1 - Designers view 
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AIRBUS Scenario 2 – Security domain information 
 
Figure 89: AIRBUS scenario 2 - Security domain information 
 
E-commerce scenario – Network security requirements 
 
Table 14: E-commerce scenario - permitted data flows (step1) 
Traffic between List of data flows 
Users and the DNS Server flow(adminUser,dnsServer). 
flow(localUsers,dnsServer). 
flow(visitors,dnsServer). 
flow(remoteUsers,dnsServer). 
flow(clients,dnsServer). 
flow(dnsServer,adminUser). 
flow(dnsServer,localUsers). 
flow(dnsServer,visitors). 
flow(dnsServer,remoteUsers). 
flow(dnsServer,clients). 
Users and the WEB  Server flow(adminUser,webServer). 
flow(localUsers,webServer). 
flow(visitors,webServer). 
flow(remoteUsers,webServer). 
flow(clients,webServer). 
flow(webServer,adminUser). 
flow(webServer,localUsers). 
flow(webServer,visitors). 
flow(webServer,remoteUsers). 
flow(webServer,clients). 
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Employees and the Accountabi-lity 
Server 
flow (adminUser,accountabilityServer). 
flow(localUsers,accountabilityServer). 
flow(remoteUsers,accountabilityServer). 
flow(accountabilityServer,adminUser). 
flow(accountabilityServer,localUsers). 
flow(accountabilityServer,remoteUsers). 
Administra-tor and the Database 
Server 
flow (adminUser,databaseServer). 
flow(databaseServer,adminUser). 
APP Server and Database Server flow (appServer,databaseServer). 
flow(databaseServer,appServer). 
The WEB Server and the APP 
Server 
flow (webServer,appServer). 
flow(appServer,webServer). 
Admin user and the APP Server flow (adminUser,appServer). 
flow(appServer, adminUser). 
Table 15: Access control filter requirements (step2) 
ZONES Access medium ACF rules 
Zone1 Private access ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,1), 
 flow(databaseServer,adminUser)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,1), 
 flow(dnsServer,adminUser)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,1), 
 flow(accountabilityServer,adminUser)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,1), 
 flow(webServer,adminUser)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,1), 
 flow(adminUser,databaseServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,1), 
 flow(adminUser,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,1), 
 flow(adminUser,accountabilityServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,1), 
 flow(adminUser,webServer)) 
Zone4 Private access ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,4), 
 flow(dnsServer,localUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,4), 
 flow(accountabilityServer,localUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,4), 
 flow(webServer,localUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,4), 
 flow(localUsers,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,4), 
 flow(localUsers,accountabilityServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,4), 
 flow(localUsers,webServer)) 
Zone5 Private access ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,5), 
 flow(accountabilityServer,adminUser)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,5), 
 flow(accountabilityServer,localUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,5), 
 flow(accountabilityServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,5), 
 flow(adminUser,accountabilityServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,5), 
 flow(localUsers,accountabilityServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,5), 
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 flow(remoteUsers,accountabilityServer)) 
Zone6 Private access ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,6), 
 flow(databaseServer,adminUser)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,6), 
 flow(appServer,webServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,6), 
 flow(webServer,appServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,6), 
 flow(adminUser,databaseServer)) 
Zone7 Private access ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7), 
 flow(appServer,webServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(dnsServer,adminUser)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(dnsServer,localUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(accountabilityServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(webServer,appServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(webServer,adminUser)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(webServer,localUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(adminUser,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(adminUser,webServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(localUsers,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(localUsers,webServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(privateAccess,7),
 flow(remoteUsers,accountabilityServer)) 
Zone7 Public access ACF(connectedTO(publicAccess,7),
 flow(dnsServer,userVISITOR)) 
ACF(connectedTO(publicAccess,7),
 flow(webServer,userVISITOR)) 
ACF(connectedTO(publicAccess,7),
 flow(userVISITOR,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(publicAccess,7),
 flow(userVISITOR,webServer)) 
Zone7 Internet access ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(dnsServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(accountabilityServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(webServer,clients)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(webServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(clients,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(clients,webServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(remoteUsers,dnsServer)) 
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ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(remoteUsers,accountabilityServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(remoteUsers,webServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(dnsServer,clients)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(webServer,clients)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(webServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(clients,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(clients,webServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(remoteUsers,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(remoteUsers,accountabilityServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,7),
 flow(remoteUsers,webServer)) 
Zone2 Public access ACF(connectedTO(publicAccess,2),
 flow(dnsServer,userVISITOR)) 
ACF(connectedTO(publicAccess,2),
 flow(webServer,userVISITOR)) 
ACF(connectedTO(publicAccess,2),
 flow(userVISITOR,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(publicAccess,2),
 flow(userVISITOR,webServer)) 
Zone3 Internet access ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,3),
 flow(dnsServer,clients)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,3),
 flow(webServer,clients)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,3),
 flow(clients,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,3),
 flow(clients,webServer)) 
Zone9 Internet access ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(dnsServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(accountabilityServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(webServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(remoteUsers,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(remoteUsers,accountabilityServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(remoteUsers,webServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(dnsServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(accountabilityServer,remoteUsers)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(webServer,remoteUsers)) 
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ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(remoteUsers,dnsServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(remoteUsers,accountabilityServer)) 
ACF(connectedTO(internetAccess,9),
 flow(remoteUsers,webServer)) 
Table 16: Data Flow integrity requirements (step2) 
Private 
access 
medium 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(accountabilityServer,adminUser),pr
ivateAccess,4). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(adminUser,accountabilityServer),pr
ivateAccess,4). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(adminUser,appServer),privateAccess
,4). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(adminUser,databaseServer),privateA
ccess,4). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(appServer,adminUser),privateAccess
,4). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(databaseServer,adminUser),privateA
ccess,4). 
Internet 
access 
medium 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(accountabilityServer,remoteUsers),
internetAccess,2). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(dnsServer,remoteUsers),internetAcc
ess,2). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(remoteUsers,accountabilityServer),
internetAccess,2). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(remoteUsers,dnsServer),internetAcc
ess,2). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(remoteUsers,webServer),internetAcc
ess,2). 
flowIntegrityRequirement(flow(webServer,remoteUsers),internetAcc
ess,2). 
 
 
